



LIBERALISM AND BORDERS: FINDING MORAL  
 
















A dissertation submitted to the faculty of  
The University of Utah 










Department of Philosophy 
 

































The dissertation of Russell Wayne Askren 
has been approved by the following supervisory committee members: 
 
Bruce Landesman , Chair June 19, 2012 
 
Date Approved 
Margaret Battin , Member June 19, 2012 
 
Date Approved 
Deen Chatterjee , Member June 19, 2012 
 
Date Approved 
Mark Button , Member June 19, 2012 
 
Date Approved 




and by Stephen Downes , Chair of  
the Department of Philosophy 
 









 In recent decades liberal political philosophy has debated a significant question: If 
the basic commitment of liberal political theory is the equal moral standing of all 
individuals, how do we justify the presence of borders and their control such that 
individuals receive different consideration and treatment based solely upon their status as 
members of a particular political community?  One position claims that hard borders are 
unjustifiable; borders must be open as a matter of right and respect for all individuals.  At 
the other end of the spectrum is the position that hard borders are justifiable; borders can 
be closed as a matter of the right of particular communities to the goods that community 
creates and the preservation of that community’s unique identity.  A third category of 
arguments considers the problem from the perspective of the nonideal circumstances in 
the world; opening borders is an appropriate and necessary response to resolving 
problems of hunger, poverty and violence in the world.  I examine several arguments in 
each of these categories, finding that the arguments offered are problematic in ways 
which make them less than fully persuasive, even though they explore in valuable ways 
different aspects of the debate.  A second problem is that this moral debate has failed to 
influence in any meaningful way the ongoing public policy debate related to immigration.  
To overcome this second problem I utilize a model proposed by Jonathan Wolf and 
Avner de-Shalit in which philosophically fragmented concepts, which cannot influence 
policy in their fragmented state, are brought to bear upon policy through the identification 




central moral concern of the debate, can be effectively applied to the appropriate policy 
debate.  The proposed consensus is based upon the central moral concern of the open 
borders debate, the effect of immigration control policies upon the well-being of 
individuals, and argues that states may control their borders constrained by the obligation 
to give consideration to the effects of control policies and to ameliorate the negative 
effects of such policies. 
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Since the first human left the Olduvai Gorge, humans have been on the move.  
Whether pushed from a place by hunger, disease, war or natural disaster, or pulled to a 
place by better weather, better resources, or better opportunities, people have migrated 
from old places to new places, sometimes in hope of a better life and other times without 
any choice.  For most of history, when people have moved they did so without regard for 
the invisible lines we call borders.  Since the initiation of the Peace of Westphalia in the 
mid-seventeenth century, international law has recognized the state rights of political 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Countries had the right to control their borders, but 
none did except in the case of war.  State control of borders, especially as regards 
controlling the movement of people across them, is a recent phenomenon.  Passports 
were created during the First World War and formal state policies are only a few decades 
older.  Migrating peoples have often clashed with the established population, but the 
clash with state authority is a recent problem.   
Immigration policies developed to control borders and those who would move 
across them often lead to difficult decisions with ugly results.  People die in ship holds 
and in deserts trying to reach the Promised Land.  When they make it, they are often not 
allowed to stay.  France deports thousands of Roma, Israel hundreds of Arabs and the 





they have never seen and denying to many any hope of prosperity.  Policies that result in 
such a grave impact upon human lives are rightfully questioned and morally suspect. 
Liberal political philosophy, which as an approach to political philosophy is 
younger than the rights accorded to states in the Westphalian model, has engaged in a 
robust discussion over the last thirty years about the right of states to control borders if 
the foundation of our thought and political systems is that of liberal political philosophy.  
Although there is no single agreed to conception of liberal political philosophy, those 
views that fall within this school of thought may be, according to John Gray, broadly 
characterized as individualist, egalitarian, universalist and meliorist.
1
  It is the individual 
that is primary in our consideration of social systems and within these systems each 
individual is to be treated with equal moral standing.  But this attitude of equality is not 
limited to those with whom we are already associated, but extends to all humanity, even 
to those outside our existing social systems.  Finally, these social systems, because they 
are human social systems, are fallible and always open to improvement.  Lomansky puts 
the problem this way: 
Liberals posit the existence of human rights that proclaim the essential 
moral status of persons qua persons.  Correlative to these rights are duties 
of forbearance falling upon those who transact with rights-holders.  These 
rights and associated duties are universal; they are possessed by everyone 
and owed everyone…the rule among liberal theorists is to take states in 
whatever form and variety they come down to us as the relevant objects 




 From this conception of liberalism the question arises that if all people have fundamental 
equal moral value and should be considered equal by the political systems of the world, 
then on what grounds do we justify treating people differently because of their state 
                                                 
1
 Gray, John.  Liberalism, second ed.  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 6. 
2
 Loren Lomansky, “Toward a Liberal Theory of National Boundaries,” in Boundaries and Justice, edited 





affiliation.  Specifically for the problem of borders, on what grounds do states prevent, by 
means which may include the use of physical force, people from entering and taking up 
residence in a country?  Is it morally permissible for the state to take up arms, build 
fences, and engage in other actions that prevent some person, or group of persons from 
entering the country? 
The answer to these types of questions generally falls into two schools of thought.  
Associated with the membership arguments of Michael Walzer, those who argue for 
closed borders claim that communities of people that share political arrangements have 
the right to shape those communities according to their own desires.  This includes 
deciding who does and who does not benefit from the arrangements the people of that 
community choose to have.  Although this view is often thought to be in support of the 
standard Westphalian approach to the problem of borders, it is more sophisticated and 
subtle than the Westphalian model.  The second school of thought, which has become the 
predominant school in liberal political philosophy, is associated with the work of Joseph 
Carens.  Carens has developed, over the years, a set of arguments in support of the claim 
that states do not, except under very limited and unusual sets of circumstances, have the 
right to close borders and prevent people from moving from one place to another.  Both 
the open and the closed borders proponents also argue from single principles of 
significance to liberals, such as the freedom of movement or the freedom of association 
and claim that when properly understood, a commitment to this principle leads to the 
conclusion that borders should be open or closed. 
These first two classes of arguments aim at theoretical consistency.  In addition to 





circumstances which reach more limited conclusions.  These arguments find open 
migration, under particular conditions or for particular reasons, an important solution to 
these problems.  Frederick Whelan has considered the argument that migration is more 
effective than aid, and more recently Shelley Wilcox has argued that migration is the best 
way to resolve particular dilemmas related to the vast discrepancy in well-being in the 
world and to deal with extreme circumstances.  Taking a more limited economic focus, 
the arguments of Bimal Ghosh and Thomas Straubhaar propose international regimes that 
support the open movement of people as producing the best economic results. 
The standard approach to this “open borders debate” is to develop arguments 
which support the conclusion that countries whose core political commitments are those 
of liberal political philosophy either are, or are not, permitted to close their borders to 
those who live outside them.  Unfortunately this approach has not, over the 
approximately thirty years that the debate has gone on, enabled the resolution of this 
theoretical controversy.  During this same period the political world around us has 
struggled, and continues to struggle, with the very real effects of both legal and illegal 
migration.  The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the standard arguments regarding borders 
and identify problems in the arguments that prevent them from being completely 
persuasive.  I will then argue that one possible way around the stalemate is to identify the 
moral consensus within the debate.  This moral consensus will help to focus the debate 
upon the most important and central concerns of the debate in a manner that will support 
the subsequent development of moral principles reflective of this consensus and 
applicable to contemporary immigration control policy.  I will propose and explore a 










 Standard philosophical practice is to engage in the construction of arguments and 
the analysis of concepts used within those arguments in order to create deductively and 
inductively sound arguments.  This will be my approach as well for the first three 
chapters to follow.  I will analyze the arguments offered and claim that problems exist in 
them that either makes them invalid or unsound.  However, following this analysis I will 
make a positive argument that there is a shared concern in these failed arguments, a kind 
of moral consensus that reflects the heart of the debate.  The idea that a moral consensus 
can often be identified within contentious normative debates is part of the three-step 
process Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit use in their book Disadvantage.  Wolff and 
de-Shalit’s claim is that fields of political theorizing that are fractured by a large number 
of competing views often possess a theoretical consensus that is translatable into policy 
terms.  This consensus can be used to influence policy.  Identifying the consensus is the 
first step of their process and is the focus of this thesis.  I will identify and develop a 




 The present chapter, Chapter 1, “Introduction,” introduces the problem of borders 
for liberal political philosophy, provides a brief overview of methodology, and presents 





Chapter 2, “Liberalism and Open Borders,” considers the argument that the 
central commitments of liberalism lead to a claim that states do not, under almost all 
circumstances, have the right to close their borders to those who are outside them.  The 
positive statement of these arguments is that generally, people should have the right to 
move across national borders unconstrained.  I will consider two arguments of Joseph 
Carens.  The first is his common conclusion argument in which he claims that several 
divergent liberal political philosophies all lead to the conclusion that borders should be 
open.  I will offer my own critique of Carens’ position which concludes that the liberal 
arguments considered by Carens do not support the claim of open borders and, in fact, 
can support the claim for border controls.  I will also consider and reject Peter 
Mailaender’s critique of Carens, which claims that Carens’ argument is incomplete 
because of its reliance upon liberalism without providing a justification for that reliance.  
I will also consider Carens’ second argument, based on the claim that liberalism leads to 
a robust commitment to the freedom of movement which is violated by the control of 
borders.  I will reject this argument, including a variation from the libertarian perspective 
of Chandran Kukathas, by specifying a principle of freedom of movement and 
demonstrating that freedom of movement can be constrained in ways that are not 
objectionable to liberals.  The final portion of this chapter considers two left-libertarian 
arguments of Hillel Steiner.  The first is based upon the claim that freedom of association 
prevents states from controlling borders because it violates the right of individuals to 
associate with those outside the border.  The second argument is based upon the idea of 





borders prevent us from accessing those resources we own, then borders violate 
individual rights and cannot be justified.  I will reject both of these arguments. 
Chapter 3, “Liberalism and Closed Borders,” considers the closed borders 
arguments of Michael Walzer, David Miller and Christopher Wellman.  These arguments, 
communitarian in flavor, fall within political liberalism.  Walzer reflects upon the nature 
of communities and the goods they produce, which includes determining who should 
share in those goods.  In his famous membership argument, Walzer uses neighborhoods, 
clubs, and families to understand why states are justified in controlling borders.  I will 
consider and reject Phillip Cole’s critique of Walzer’s membership argument, but propose 
my own critique of Walzer in which I argue that membership, as conceived by Walzer, 
violates his own theory of justice because membership is a dominant good.  Miller’s 
arguments focus upon the role that national identity plays in communities, the right of 
communities to self-determination and the claim that nations are ethical communities.  
This right to self-determination justifies the right of communities to control the changes 
that occur within those communities.  I will consider and reject Cole’s critique of Miller, 
which is based upon the conflict between ethical particularism and ethical universalism.  
Cole claims the two views are exclusive.  I will argue that not only are they not exclusive, 
but that ethical universalism also can’t solve the problems that Cole believes arise from 
ethical particularism.  I will close by examining the recent work of Christopher Wellman, 
whose freedom of association argument is receiving significant attention.  Wellman’s 
argument is troubling for two reasons.  The first is that he seems to conflate the ideas of 
self-determination and freedom of association, sometimes assuming that freedom of 





fails to properly consider the problem of political disassociation for people at the state 
level. 
Chapter 4, “Nonideal and International Regime Arguments,” considers two 
nonideal arguments in which the claim is made that immigration is a preferred means, 
and in some cases the only means, of resolving the horrendous circumstances and 
inequities in the world.  I begin with Frederick Whelan’s consideration of the claim that 
immigration is superior to the provision of foreign aid.  Whelan will reject this argument.  
This is largely an empirical argument and I will consider some of the issues related to 
determining the benefit of aid as opposed to migration.  In the second nonideal argument 
I will consider Shelley Wilcox’s Global Principle of Harm.  This principle argues that 
states that cause harm are responsible for ending their harmful practices and ameliorating 
the harmful conditions.  Permitting immigration is one method of helping those who have 
been harmed.  I will critique this argument, building on Thomas Pogge’s rejection of 
migration as a solution to poverty, and point out the difficulties in the conditions that 
Wilcox specifies to identify when states have violated her Global Principle of Harm.  
Bimal Ghosh and Thomas Straubhaar, as part of the New International Regime for the 
Orderly Movements of People project, propose international regimes to which countries 
can voluntarily commit themselves.  These regimes, with a strong economic flavor, are 
patterned after existing agreements related to trade in goods and services, to which 
countries would commit themselves to follow.  I will critique Ghosh and Straubhaar as 
being inadequate due to their focus upon economic concerns and the neglect of moral 
concerns, leading to significant questions about who benefits and what the benefits would 





 Chapter 5, “Moral Consensus in the Open Borders Debate,” will explore the 
methodological approach of developing moral consensus for fragmented theoretical 
concepts as a means of enabling these concepts to influence public policy.  This chapter 
will propose that the central concern of the open borders debate is the negative effects of 
immigration control policies upon individuals, both inside and outside the controlled 
borders.  I will propose and explore a statement of moral consensus that reflects this 
concern. 
Chapter 6, “Conclusion,” will summarize the thesis and point towards the next 






LIBERALISM AND OPEN BORDERS 
 
 
 The claim that state borders should be open to the unconstrained movement of 
people is deeply rooted in various commitments of liberal political philosophy.  There are 
two main variants of this argument.  The first and oldest variant is rooted in claims that 
open borders are a moral ideal because many prominent and divergent political theories, 
when pushed to examine the problem of borders, result in a conclusion that borders 
should be open.  When many different theories point to the same conclusion, that 
conclusion gains strength.  I call this the common conclusion argument.  The second 
variant, and perhaps the most common one expressed today, appeals to some principle of 
liberalism and then develops an argument for open borders based upon that principle.  I 
call this category single principle arguments.  This approach comes in several forms.  The 
first form is rooted in egalitarian claims.  Individuals are moral equals with rights to a 
freedom of movement that requires a robust expression in order for their standing as 
moral equals to be meaningful.  People choose a kind of life to live and constraining 
movement in pursuit of that kind of life denies their moral equality.  Life and opportunity 
require the possibility of movement.  Hence, constraints upon that movement are 
unjustified and immoral.  A variant of this form is rooted in the liberal commitment to 
liberty.  People have rights to liberty that the state should not constrain.  Principal among 





therefore, unjustified and immoral.  The distinction between these first two variants is 
that the second emphasizes freedom of movement as a right in itself whereas the first 
emphasizes moral equality with freedom of movement as instrumental in achieving other 
purposes.  The third form is an appeal to the right of freedom of association.  Rights to 
association are denied when borders prevent the voluntary association of free individuals.  
The fourth form of the argument for open borders has not gained much traction in the 
open borders debate.  This approach relies upon a left-libertarian view regarding shared 
ownership of the world with a corresponding entitlement to resources.  The denial of 
movement to resources to which one has ownership rights without compensation is a 
violation of an individual’s rights.  Therefore, there must be open borders or 
compensation. 
 In this chapter I will discuss each of these arguments, laying out the specific 
structures of each argument as exemplified in its most well-known proponent.  I will 
argue that each of these arguments is problematic and therefore do not justify the claim 
that borders should be open.  In some cases I will claim that the argument can be used to 
justify the opposite claim, that borders should be closed, or at least controlled.  I will 
begin with the common conclusion argument since it is the oldest of the arguments, 
turning afterward to the single principle arguments. 
 
The Common Conclusion Argument 
 
 The liberal argument for open borders is widely regarded as having its initial, and 
most influential statement, in the 1987 article of Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Borders: The 
Case for Open Borders.”  In this article Carens argues that when we examine the issue of 





of the theories supports the claim that borders should be open.  These three theories, the 
minimalist state and entitlement arguments of Robert Nozick, the “justice as fairness” 
arguments of John Rawls and standard utilitarian approaches to political theory, all reach 
the conclusion that borders should be open, albeit for different reasons.  When such 
divergent theories all reach the same conclusion, we are justified in claiming that the 
conclusion has great warrant and the burden of proof shifts to those claiming otherwise.  
Carens writes, “The fact that all three theories converge upon the same basic result with 
regard to immigration despite their significant differences in other areas strengthens the 
case for open borders.”1 
 It is possible to understand the structure of Carens’ argument in standard 
inductive format.  Each of the three theories forms a premise leading to the conclusion 
that border should be open.  In propositional format the argument is this: 
1.  Theories divergent in their basic claims should lead to different conclusions 
on significant issues.  
2. When divergent theories support the same claim, that claim is stronger than if 
only one theory supported that claim. 
3. Nozick’s theory of the minimalist state and entitlement theory supports the 
claim that borders should be open. 
4. Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness supports the claim that borders should be 
open. 
5. Utilitarian political theory, in which the greatest good for the greatest number 
is pursued, supports the claims that borders should be open. 
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6. Each of these theories is divergent in its basic claims, expecting one to lead to 
different conclusions.  (1, 2) 
7. However, each of these theories leads to the same claim regarding open 
borders.  (3, 4, 5) 
8. Each of these theories is a form of liberal political theory. 
9. Therefore, liberal political theory strongly supports the claim of open borders.  
(6, 7, 8) 
As an inductive argument Carens’ claim is vulnerable in a number of ways.  One may 
weaken the conclusion by showing cases of liberal political theory that don’t support the 
claim of open borders.  I shall take this approach in the next chapter when I discuss the 
closed borders claims of liberal thought with a communitarian emphasis.  Another way to 
undermine this argument is to demonstrate that one or more of the premises, which are 
themselves arguments, is incorrect.  The balance of this section shall take this tactic in 
regard to premises 3, 4 and 5, thereby, undermining the conclusion.  The argument, as it 
stands and as it is widely used, will no longer be sound.  An additional tactic for 
undermining this argument, which will not be explored here, is to claim that the political 
theories of Nozick, Rawls and utilitarianism, all forms of liberalism that assume the equal 
moral worth of individuals, are not sufficiently divergent in their basic claims to meet the 
claim of the first premise.  If that is the case, it is not surprising that they all reach a 
shared conclusion regarding open borders.   
 
Nozick, Property and Borders 
 
 Carens claims there is a popular property rights argument in support of closed 





keep out whomever we want.”2  Carens interprets this statement to mean “the right to 
exclude aliens is based on property rights, perhaps collective and or national property 
rights.”3 This general argument is as follows: 
1. People have rights to private property, which includes the acquisition, use and 
disposition of property. 
2. The territory within state boundaries is owned by the citizens of the state. 
3. Government, as representative of the citizens of the state, has the right to control 
all of the property within the state.  
4. Therefore, the closing of state borders by the state is permissible as an exercise of 
the property rights citizens hold regarding private property.  (1, 2, 3) 
Carens claims that the argument of Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia is 
representative of this class of property rights arguments.  I will argue against this claim 
on two fronts.  The first is that understanding Nozick as an example of this property 
rights argument is not the only way, or the best way, to understand Nozick.  I will argue 
that there are other ways to interpret Nozick which permit the control and possible 
closing of borders.  If my argument holds, then Carens must justify the claim that his 
approach to Nozick is the correct approach, which he does not do. The second approach 
will argue against Carens’ interpretation of the initial colloquial claim. 
 Nozick is well known for the libertarian arguments he makes in Anarchy, State 
and Utopia.  Carens’ interpretation of Nozick begins with the recognition that people 
have property rights, extending from the concept of self-ownership, in the state of nature.  
Self-ownership is the idea that each person has a moral right to their body and to the use 









of that body.  G.A. Cohen writes, “each person is the morally rightful owner of 
himself…if I am the moral owner of myself, and therefore of this right arm…no one is 
entitled, without my consent, to press it into their own or anybody’s else’s service, even 
when my failure to lend it voluntarily to others would be morally wrong.”4  But it isn’t 
just the self that is owned.  The ownership of self enables one to become the owner of 
property through the use of one’s labor.  Cohen again:  “persons can become, with 
equally strong moral right, sovereign owners of unequal shares of natural resources, as a 
result of proper exercises of their own…personal powers.”5  These natural rights to the 
ownership of self and of property are held equally by each person.  Various 
inconveniences of the state of nature lead to the establishment of the minimalist state, 
whose sole role is to protect people from the violation of their rights.  This means that the 
state cannot enforce rights that are not held by individuals in the state of nature.  The state 
as an institution holds no special significance; it is merely instrumental in achieving the 
end of protecting rights that people cannot protect for themselves.  The minimalist state 
protects both citizen and noncitizen within its territory.  Therefore, citizenship gives rise 
to no distinct claims – both citizen and noncitizen are treated alike.  Based upon 
entitlement theory, individuals may enter into voluntary exchanges regarding their 
property with whomever they choose.  The state has no basis for interfering with these 
exchanges, so long as they are voluntary, because the right to participate in these 
exchanges is held by the individual qua individual, not by the individual qua citizen.
6
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 G.A. Cohen, “Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality,” in Justice and Equality Here and Now, 
edited by Frank S. Lucash (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 109. 
5
 Ibid., 110. 
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 The implications of Carens’ interpretation of Nozick for migration related issues 
are significant.  The state has no grounds for preventing voluntary exchanges.
7
  If this 
exchange involves someone entering the state, for example, in the case of an American 
farmer who wishes to hire a Mexican laborer for harvest, the state cannot prevent this.  
To do so is to prevent the farmer from entering into a voluntary exchange.  The 
disadvantage to American workers that results from this exchange is not a state concern 
and American workers should not be protected by the state from being disadvantaged by 
private, voluntary exchanges.  Since all individuals are treated alike, foreigners may enter 
the country provided they are nonviolent and rights respecting.  If the state prevents entry 
it violates the individual rights of both parties.  The exclusion of a person from some 
piece of property can only be performed by the owner of that property; for another, be it 
individual or state, to exclude is to violate individual property rights.  Carens’ conclusion 
is that closed borders are, therefore, a violation of individual property rights on Nozick’s 
account.   
Carens allows that Nozick provides a caveat to this scenario.  Individuals may 
undertake collective action to restrict entry.  But this right is limited to small 
communities, nothing on the scale of either the minimalist state or the modern nation 
state.  These communities can restrict entry but only if they permit exit so that individuals 
may exercise their individual rights elsewhere if they so choose.  This caveat of Nozick’s 
is of little significance here as it applies only in the context of utopian societies, a 
circumstance in which the current debate does not take place. 
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Carens argues that this view of Nozick is problematic for the claim that states may 
close borders.  Entitlement theory recognizes that individuals have the right to determine 
the disposition of justly held holdings.  Each individual chooses whether, and to whom, a 
holding should be transferred.  The state has no role to play unless this process is violated 
in some way.  Suppose that I hold some object that I wish to sell.  If the state interferes 
with this process by closing borders so that I cannot deal with particular individuals, in 
this case foreign individuals, the state has interfered with my right to dispose of my 
property as I see fit.  The state has violated my rights.  Similarly, if the state refuses to 
permit entry, it has violated the rights of the entering individual.  Only by permitting a 
completely open border can the state fully honor my property rights as well as the 
property rights of those outside the border.  Carens’ claim is that Nozick contains a 
property rights argument for completely open borders.  He concludes, “Prohibiting 
people from entering a territory because they did not happen to be born there or otherwise 
gain the credentials of citizenship is no part of any state’s mandate.  The state has no right 
to restrict immigration.”8  This is a strong and definitive conclusion to draw from 
Nozick’s arguments.  But is it justified? 
Nozick’s libertarian arguments in Anarchy, State and Utopia accomplish two 
purposes, of which Carens considers only one.  Nozick offers both a theory of the state 
and a theory of goods.  From the opening line of the “Preface” in which Nozick claims, 
“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without 
violating their rights),”9 to the statement of Entitlement Theory in Chapter 4, rights held 
by people in the state of nature, which include the right to hold property as an extension 
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of self-ownership, hold a central position in Nozick’s argument.  Entitlement theory is 
built around three principles which are intended to demonstrate how individuals come to 
hold things justly and how these individual holdings, when just, also lead to a claim about 
the justice of holdings across society.  History, that is the actual process by which 
individuals come to hold particular things, determines whether any particular holding is 
just.  The sole role of the minimalist state regarding the distribution of material goods is 
the protection of property rights by enforcement of the rules of entitlement theory.  
However, this role is not to ensure that holdings are distributed in some particular way in 
accordance with some principle of distribution (what Nozick calls a patterned 
distribution), but rather to ensure that the process is correctly followed.  When the 
process is violated then the state uses its power to restore the proper distribution, which is 
the state of holdings prior to the violation.  For example, if I steal someone’s crops, the 
state may require me to either return the crops or pay for the crops, because I came to 
hold them in violation of the process.  Carens’ claim of Nozick as an example of a 
property rights theorist might be justified if this was the central component of Nozick’s 
argument.  There are other ways to cast the central concerns of Nozick. 
Nozick is a natural rights theorist with a robust perspective on who possesses 
those rights and how they might be infringed upon.  However, Nozick’s central concern 
is the nature of the state: What kind of state can be justified before it violates the rights of 
individuals?  Nozick’s most basic question is, “If the state did not exist would it be 
necessary to invent it?  Would it be needed and would it have to be invented?”10  His 
answers to these questions are that it is needed and it would be invented.  But it would be 
only a limited state: “Our main conclusions about the state are that a minimal state, 
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limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of 
contracts, and so on, is justified.”11  Drawing on Locke’s conception of the state of nature 
and the laws of nature, individuals are entitled to many things, including the rights to 
“life, health, liberty or possessions”12  The inconveniences of individuals protecting these 
things themselves will, on Nozick’s account, lead first to mutual-protection associations 
and eventually to dominant protective agencies and finally to the state, which wields a 
complete monopoly on enforcement power over some geographic region.  Thus, 
individual rights are protected.  The central concern of a Nozickian state is protection of 
the complete set of natural rights, not just the distributive property rights of individuals.  
What can the state do to protect the complete set of rights?  I will argue that the state may 
do a lot, at least as concerns borders. 
Nozick’s justification for the state is complex and doesn’t rely solely upon the 
inconvenience of individuals protecting their own rights.  In the step from the 
ultraminimal state to the minimal state Nozick considers the problems that result from 
having members and nonmembers of the protective association residing within the 
geographic area for which the protective association is responsible.  What happens when 
this group of nonmembers chooses to exercise its natural rights of enforcement upon 
members?  If the means of enforcement are appropriate and reliable there is no problem.  
However, in the case in which those means are not reliable, or are not known to be 
reliable, a rights violation for the protective association’s member might occur, one 
which the protective association is obligated to protect against.  Nozick uses this problem 
to engage in a general discussion regarding border crossings. 
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 A border crossing occurs when a person’s natural rights are violated without 
prior permission.  The sense of border used here is not that of a boundary between 
countries, but involves the moral space that surrounds individuals in which others are not 
permitted to act.
13
  An action that under some circumstances would be considered a 
border crossing is not a border crossing if prior permission is obtained.  Some border 
crossings in which permission has not been obtained prior to the crossing can be set right 
by providing the victim with compensation such that the victim is no worse off than he 
otherwise would have been.  Although this simple set of conditions is straightforward, 
meeting them is often not.  Permission to violate may not always be obtainable because 
either the victim is unavailable or the victim is unknown or cannot be individually 
identified.  Compensation poses problems because it may not be possible to adequately 
determine the amount of compensation required or the perpetrator of the border crossing 
may not have adequate resources to compensate the victim.  In many cases it will not be 
possible to identify the perpetrator after the fact.  Nozick’s concern is whether protective 
association can prevent actions in such circumstances.  The conclusion is that the 
protective association can prevent such actions, because of the risk and fear that the 
possibility of such border crossings creates.
14
  People living under the threat of border 
crossings, as a part of natural human psychology, experience fear because of what might 
happen.  Even in a system which requires compensation for these kinds of border 
crossings, people still experience fear because of the risk that the perpetrator won’t be 
identified or be able to compensate or the harm might be greater than expected.  This 
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“argument from fear” focuses upon the fear of being harmed as well as the result of a 
system that permits such harm, individually and across the community.  Nozick writes, 
“The argument from general fear justifies prohibiting those boundary-crossing acts that 
produce fear even when it is known that they will be compensated for.”15   
There are also circumstances in which actions might not create a border crossing 
but bear the risk of a border crossing.  Such cases might apply to single actions or to 
cases in which any single action contains low risk, but the risk of a border crossing and 
the associated fear, grows as a result of repeated actions.  In either case, Nozick 
concludes that the protective association can prohibit actions that possess these kinds of 
risk.  The caveat is that the person who is prevented from acting must be compensated for 
the disadvantage that results from being prohibited from acting:  “those who are 
disadvantaged by being forbidden to do actions that only might harm others must be 
compensated for these disadvantages foisted upon them in order to provide security for 
the others.”16 
  With this understanding of the permissible actions of Nozick’s state, it will be 
useful to consider some examples of border crossings of the kind involved in the open 
borders debate.  Consider an example of this form.  A wants to enter country Z in order to 
buy or sell X from, or to B, a member of country Z.  This is a fairly nonproblematic case.  
Carens claims that the Nozickian state would be prevented from acting in this case 
because preventing A’s entry would violate the rights of both A and B to enter into 
voluntary exchange, rights they hold as individuals, not as citizens.  Any action the state 
takes to interfere with the voluntary exchange must be based upon a rights violation.  So, 
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as long as A doesn’t steal, trespass, defraud or commit any other action that violates a 
right of any member of country Z, A is permitted to enter the country.  If some other 
member of Z, say C, is disadvantaged by A entering the country because A takes B’s 
business away from C the state cannot take action so long as the exchange between A and 
B is voluntary.  No one has the right to be protected from competitive disadvantage 
whether citizen or not.
17
  I want to argue, however, that there are other cases in which the 
state is justified in acting, and if it is justified in acting in these cases it is also justified in 
acting in the first case as part of its justifiable actions in these other cases.  Consider any 
of the following cases: 
 A wants to enter country Z to kill B. 
 A wants to enter country Z to steal from B. 
 A wants to enter country Z to destabilize Z. 
Each of these cases warrants preventing the entry of A into Z on either mine or Carens’ 
account of the Nozickian state because they violate the rights of individuals the state 
should protect.  The problem in each case is determining the intentions of A prior to 
entering Z.  This cannot be known without stopping A for questioning.  Such a method is 
not foolproof, but the failure to do so, especially in certain conditions may increase the 
amount of risk and fear felt by members of the state.  This risk and fear justifies the 
border controls, not only in these circumstances, but also in the circumstances of the case 
presented by Carens.  For it cannot be known which of the cases is present without 
applying controls to each case.  Hence, rather than an argument for open borders, it 
appears that an argument based upon Nozick’s ideas18 supports an argument for the 
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implementation of border controls  thereby, closing borders to the kind of free movement 
Carens envisions.  That the current international scheme provides no compensation for 
those disadvantaged by it doesn’t undermine my argument that Nozick’s state can control 
international migration; it only means that the current system doesn’t comply with 
Nozick’s conditions for such control. 
The problem with Carens’ argument regarding Nozick is that it focuses upon one 
narrow section of Nozick’s theory to demonstrate that Nozick supports open borders.  I 
have argued that this approach does not work because it is the wrong interpretation of 
Nozick.  The Nozickian state may exercise power to prevent harm and protect the 
individuals within the state.  This power may include preventing border crossings that 
cause harm or create fear through the risk of causing harm.  Preventing border crossings 
that cause harm may require controlling the borders of the state and may include a variety 
of common immigration policies such as performing background checks in advance of 




Let me now turn briefly to the base argument for which Carens uses Nozick as 
representative.  Recall that the argument is, “It’s our country.  We can let in or keep out 
whomever we want.”  Rather than understanding this argument as being about the 
exercise of property rights, it should be understood as an argument about sovereignty and 
control over a recognized geographic entity.  This argument is most reasonably 
understood as nothing but an assertion of Westphalian rights.  In Nozickian terms this 
appears to be equivalent to the claim of monopoly of force that turns the dominant 
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protection agency into a state.
20
  It is not a claim based upon what a group of people can 
do with their property, but rather a claim about what a political institution can do in 
exercising its rights within an established international order.  Admittedly, in the context 
of a discussion about the justifiability of border controls and exclusion, it is question 
begging.
21
  It assumes that states have the right to control borders in arguing that states 
can control their borders to keep others out.  But without any mention of property or 
individual property rights in the argument, Carens has overreached to interpret this 
popular argument in terms of Nozick.  It is more plausibly an argument about control, 
rather than holdings. 
If my arguments in this section stand, then I have weakened the support for the 
conclusion regarding open borders in Carens’ common conclusion argument.  Let me 
turn now to the premise of the argument regarding Rawls. 
 
Rawls, Justice as Fairness and Borders 
 
 The broad structure of Rawls’ justice as fairness is well known.  Individuals in the 
original position, behind the veil of ignorance, choose the principles of justice to be used 
to shape their society.  Two principles would be chosen.  The first principle is a system of 
equal liberties for all.  The second principle establishes that offices and opportunities 
shall be open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and that differences in 
economic distributions shall be permitted only if to the benefit of the least advantaged.  
Rawls’ doubly hypothetical statement of the social contract has received widespread 
acceptance and holds wide appeal within liberal political philosophy.  For Rawls, the 
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scope of social justice is bound by the borders of domestic society.  Social justice is to be 
achieved within the state, not between states.  This constraint has long been questioned
22
 
and Carens will set it aside in order to utilize the Rawlsian approach to domestic justice 
on an international scale.   
Carens’ application of justice as fairness to the problems of borders and 
immigration focuses upon four aspects of Rawls’ theory.  The first relates to the scope of 
justice, the already mentioned domestic vice global constraint.  The second relates to the 
principles and rights which people would choose behind the veil.  The third problem 
relates to freedom of movement, which Carens argues would be chosen behind the veil.  
The fourth concerns Rawls’ public order constraint, which might be used to constrain 
freedom of movement.
23
  I will examine each of these in turn. 
The scope of justice in Rawls’ thought has long been debated.  Rawls limited the 
scope of justice to domestic society, principally because it is the effective reach of social 
institutions.  Because institutions are based within the state, their reach is bounded by 
state borders.  By agreement nations may extend their commitments to justice beyond 
their own borders, but it is by agreement only.  There is no manner of effectively 
implementing social institutions across all societies.  Carens, however, claims that the 
ideas that make justice as fairness appealing at the domestic level also make it appealing 
at the global level.  The Rawlsian principles of justice should be extended outside the 
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boundaries of the state.
24
  There are two aspects to this appeal.  The first relates to 
conditions of interaction between societies.  When people interact with one another 
across borders, justice as fairness should raise questions about the fairness of the context 
in which such interactions take place.  Other practices that include the reach across 
borders, such as the violence of war, require justification.  This justification of state 
practices should be required of all cross border interactions.  The principles that apply 
domestically seem equally relevant at the international level if all people are free and 
moral equals.   
The second aspect appeals to the conditions of the social contract.  The purpose of 
the veil is to eliminate the arbitrary effects of “social contingencies and natural 
endowments.”  Citizenship is a social contingency with significant effects on people’s 
lives, effects profound enough that Carens likens them to the problems associated with 
feudalism: “Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of 
feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one’s life chances.”25  In 
feudalism an individual has few options for rising above the status of their birth: born a 
peasant, always a peasant.  Just as political theory has come to realize the immoral nature 
of that kind of birth constraint, so also should we come to realize the immoral nature of 
the birth constraint known as citizenship.  The effects of citizenship should be 
eliminated.
26
  If we are to take seriously a moral commitment to the free and equal status 
of persons, we should commit to a global original position, wherein all persons are 
behind the veil of ignorance. 
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What would people choose behind the veil?  Presumably they would start by 
choosing the same two principles of justice that were chosen under the domestic 
constraint.  Appropriate institutions would be designed to implement the principles in a 
global context.  The crucial question raised by Carens is whether a system of states would 
be part of this system of institutions.  There is no reason why a system of states would be 
chosen, or, that if it were chosen, that states would possess the same powers they do 
currently.  Carens is willing to grant that people might choose to create states as a result 
of linguistic, historical and cultural differences, but not for any other reason.  Whatever 
powers the states possess will be constrained by the two principles of justice.  States will 
not have the same kind of power they have today.  But this is not all.  Carens questions 
whether people in the original position would claim freedom of movement between states 
as a right which can be demanded of states.  Freedom of movement is instrumentally 
valuable and guaranteed within the state.  Whatever reasons justify unconstrained 
movement within the state would also justify unconstrained movement between states.  
These reasons are not limited to economic prosperity, but also include opportunities for 
marriage, recreation and other social activities.  If this is the case, then people in the 
original position will choose as a basic right a principle of freedom of movement that 
permits them to move between these cultural states.  Freedom of movement is on par with 
the right of religious freedom.  This commitment to movement is the most effective 
means of eliminating the arbitrary effects of citizenship.
27
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A final problem arises.  Rawls permits that some liberties might be constrained in 
order to provide a similar scope of liberty for others, or when the need arises to maintain 
public order.  This latter constraint has been labeled the “public order restriction.”28  The 
realization of justice through the application of the principles of justice by each member 
of society requires stable social conditions.  When these conditions become unstable, the 
state may restrict the exercise of rights in order to restore or maintain public social order.  
Carens’ worry is that this restriction might justify closing borders if misapplied.  Rawls’ 
conditions for these kinds of restrictions, however, are very tight.  The threat must be 
actual (“reasonable expectation”) rather than hypothetical and any restrictions 
implemented are limited to those required to preserve or restore public order.  In the case 
of immigration, this means that society must be truly overwhelmed by immigrants in such 
a manner that society is breaking down.  Further, the breakdown cannot be due to a 
negative reaction against the immigrants.  It must be that the ability of social institutions 
to function is undermined.  In an ideal world where a global difference principle is 
operative and has eliminated much of the discrepancy in social well-being, Carens 
believes that the possibility of such a threat is negligible. 
Carens’ global justice as fairness, which includes cultural states, will permit 
constraint of movement only in the condition that the intent of a person is to overthrow 
functional and just institutions.  All others will be permitted to move, with priority of 
movement granted, in accordance with a global difference principle, to those who have 
been denied basic liberties (of the first principle).  Carens conclusion is that “ideal theory 
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holds up the principle of free migration as an essential part of the just social order toward 
which we should strive.”29 
Each of the four points Carens emphasizes is intended to demonstrate that Rawls’ 
theory of justice supports a claim for open borders.  However, I do not believe this is the 
case, and for each of the four points there are reasons not to interpret Rawls in the way in 
which Carens does.  I will address each one in turn. 
The problem of the scope of justice is not a new problem and is one which has 
long been debated.  Rawls’ own argument against expanding the scope of justice in The 
Law of Peoples, including the desire of peoples to create different kinds of society, is 
useful here, although it should be noted that these arguments were not available at the 
time of Carens’ early work.  Holding all societies to the same standard denies the 
opportunity of people to develop different lives, although Rawls would not grant that just 
any type of society is acceptable.
30
  As each society develops institutions appropriate to 
its own vision of the good life it will be difficult to justify their active reach into other 
communities.  There is a second reason to reject this first claim of Carens which is simply 
that once the scope of justice is expanded to encompass the globe and all peoples, the 
problem of borders has been dissolved because there are no borders.  Even with Carens’ 
cultural states, the problem is nonexistent because these states do not have the kind of 
power that creates the problem.  A state whose purpose is to foster and protect language 
and other cultural elements is an emaciated state, without the important purposes and 
powers traditionally associated with the state.  A state that doesn’t provide security, 
manage economies or provide for social well-being won’t encounter any of the 
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challenges or concerns that immigration presents in these areas.  By changing the scope 
of justice, Carens doesn’t demonstrate why borders should be open between autonomous 
political entities; rather, he simply does away with the problem by changing the context 
of the discussion.   
The elimination of the difference between domestic and international justice 
through the elimination of a system of states appears to make the second and third 
concerns of Carens to be without force.  On the one hand, it seems unreasonable to think 
that an original position that encompasses the entire world would be any different than 
what Rawls specifies in A Theory of Justice since it is based upon a shared human nature, 
unless for some reason the characteristics of people are different.  But Carens offers no 
reason to believe that this is the case.  Rawls does not specify a principle of freedom of 
movement as part of the basic liberties in either A Theory of Justice
31
 or Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement.
32
  Rawls’ commitment to freedom of movement is made 
explicit only in Political Liberalism
33
 where it is mentioned as part of the basic liberty 
regarding personal integrity.
34
  It is mentioned again as part of the second principle 
regarding distributive justice related to equality of opportunity.
35
  In those contexts 
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movement is regarded not as basic in itself, but as supportive of the integrity of the 
person and equality of opportunity.  Such movement is context dependent in ways which 
Carens ignores.
36
  A person doesn’t have an absolute freedom to move, but will find that 




Finally, Carens misinterprets the public order restriction in Rawls.  In §34 of A 
Theory of Justice Rawls’ concern is with problems caused by the liberty of conscience 
and the problem of tolerating the intolerant.  Liberal societies must tolerate the intolerant 
so long as their existence does not threaten the order of society.  This is, as Rawls notes, 
because there is a “common interest in public order and security.”38  This common 
interest of the representative equal citizen relates to individual interests and life plans.  
Citizens have an interest in the government maintaining an environment in which 
individuals can pursue their interests.  If the liberty of conscience undermines this order 
then liberty might be constrained.  Carens misinterprets the public order restriction here 
in the scope of its application.  Despite this misinterpretation of Rawls by Carens, it isn’t 
unreasonable to apply this concept to other aspects of the public order than the intolerant.  
Various other problems as well, such as civil disobedience, might affect the public order 
in ways that upset the environment and affect all citizens.  Granting that this restriction 
might reasonably apply to the problems of immigration brings us to the problem of what 
is reasonably certain or imminent.  Carens holds that no amount of movement will ever 
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unsettle the public order.  Yet it is plain from cases of refugee movement, that large 
numbers of new immigrants for which plans have not been made, can threaten the public 
order, if in no other manner than by overwhelming the resources available to support 
them.
39
  Other migrant movements might also threaten the public order.  In fact, this is 
precisely the claim made in the current American debate.  The claim is that there are such 
a large number of immigrants that social support networks are stretched thin and forced 
to supply services to a free-riding population.  Whether this is actually the case is an 
empirical matter and the data is mixed.  What is relevant for my argument is that the 
claim is being made that the public order is threatened and threatened in ways that are 
different than tolerating the intolerant.  The effects of immigration under consideration 
are substantively different than those involving toleration of the intolerant because they 
potentially prevent the state from functioning as it should, thereby, meeting the Rawlsian 
condition for restricting liberty.  If the public order is threatened then Carens’ claim that 
these conditions cannot arise is wrong.  They have in fact arisen.  If this is the case, then 
border controls limiting people’s liberty might be justifiable.  One could argue further 
that the long term maintenance of these border controls is justifiable to ensure that the 
circumstances don’t occur again. 
If my arguments in this section stand, then I have weakened, again, the support 
for the conclusion regarding open borders in Carens’ common conclusion argument.  Let 
me turn now to the premise regarding utilitarianism. 
                                                 
39
 Consider the influx of Tunisian and Libyan refugees into Italy during the 2011 revolutions.  The refugees 
overwhelmed Italy’s ability to provide food and shelter, leading Italy to grant them residency to the state 
and thereby permitting the refugees to move throughout the European Union, against the wishes of other 
European Union members.  Rachel Donadio, “Italy Lashes Out at European Union Over Immigrants,” New 
York Times, April 11, 2011 and Rachel Donadio, “Fears about Immigrants Deepen Divisions in Europe,” 





Utilitarianism and Open Borders 
 
 Utilitarianism, in its simplest formulation, seeks the greatest good for the greatest 
number through the production of pleasures and the reduction of pains across the affected 
group of people.  Once those affected by any action have been identified, the increase in 
pleasure and the reduction in pain that results from an action can be summed and the 
morality of the action determined.  It is this simplistic expression of utilitarianism that 
Carens uses.  Applied to the problem of immigration, Carens focuses upon the economic 
gains for impoverished people against the economic losses of those in prosperous 
countries and concludes that it is likely that a utilitarian calculation of an open border 
policy will result in an increase in the total amount of good across those affected. 
Admittedly, some citizens will be harmed as others gain, but this will be greatly 
outweighed by the benefit to noncitizens at being able to move from poor to prosperous 
countries.  This will be the case even if we factor in the effects upon cultures.  Cultural 
gains from the mixing of cultures are likely to outweigh the loss of cultural characteristics 
due this mixing.  It is also not clear which aspects of lives, besides the economic features, 
should be utilized.  Regardless of how wide we make the scope of the utilitarian calculus, 
the gains will be positive and therefore, count for open borders. 
 This general calculation may be strengthened with a second calculation of a rule-
based format.  Most migrants are economic migrants, that is, they move for economic 
benefit.  Classical economic theory indicates that economies perform better when there is 
free movement of capital, resources and labor.  By permitting the market-based exchange 
of these components, markets generate a greater total output than they would if they are 





must have open borders if we are to maximize economic output.  We now have both act 
and rule utilitarian calculations in support of open borders. 
 There are problems in Carens use of this simplistic view of the utilitarian 
calculation.  The first problem is the focus solely upon economic goods without regard 
for any of the other kinds of goods that count.  These goods, especially the “higher 
pleasures”40 associated with the cultivation of humanistic and artistic capabilities will be 
affected by migration in ways that Carens simply does not consider.  Throughout the 
world today there are concerns about the protection of languages and cultures against the 
forces of globalization, especially when these are held by small groups.  It may be that 
the pleasures associated with these goods would not outweigh the benefits to noncitizens, 
but without considering them the calculation is insufficient.  A further problem is that 
utilitarianism calculates from individual pleasures and pains across a group affected by an 
action rather than from group measures.  Carens’ approach relies upon a group measure 
(gross domestic product (GDP)) as indicative of individual pleasure.  It is not the case 
that GDP reflects in a meaningful way the pleasures and pains experienced at the 
individual level and is not reliable in all cases.  In the economic recovery from the 2008-
2009 recession national GDPs, corporate profits and economic productivity were 
climbing at the same time that individual welfare was still in decline.  Given this 
situation, a utilitarian could question the usefulness of GDP as a measure of individual 
utility.  An additional problem is the role that pragmatic judgment has in utilitarian 
assessments.  Given a particular set of facts regarding benefits, different weights will be 
placed upon the value of these benefits, resulting in a different assessment of the 
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circumstance.  Utilitarian calculations to be shared across large groups of people require 
some agreement about the rankings of the goods generated to reach any conclusion that 
would be widely shared. 
Additional evidence for the complexity of this kind of utilitarian calculation that 
Carens ignores is manifest in what has become known as the “brain drain hypothesis.”  In 
this kind of circumstance, the emigrants who leave a country create holes in the social 
network they leave behind because they take their important skills with them.  Examples 
of this include estimates that the Philippines has a nursing shortage even though it trains 
an adequate number of nurses, because 85% of them work overseas for better pay and the 
emigration of physicians from sub-Saharan Africa to the prosperous countries of 
Europe.
41
  The negative impact of these movements must be involved in the calculation.  
The other end of the brain drain hypothesis is the ”crowding out effect” in which locals 
lose work to immigrants because there are more people looking for work than the number 
of positions available.  Carens assumes that this effect will be positive, but this is not 
always the case.  Balancing these labor forces in practice, rather than theory is likely to 
be a very difficult pathway, and it is not obvious this will always lead to a positive 
calculation of utility.  If this is the case, utilitarian arguments may actually lead to an 
argument for closed borders in some cases.  Certainly, the security provided by controlled 
or closed borders also would count for something in utilitarian calculations and 
dependent upon the facts of particular circumstances, such as immediately post 9/11, may 
count for quite a bit in the calculation, creating an even stronger utilitarian argument for 
controlled borders. 
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 Finally, Carens appears to miss the irony of appealing to a utilitarian morality 
which will compromise the liberal principles that originally led him to the open border 
conclusion.  Rawls thoroughly rejects the relevance of utilitarian thought for liberal 
political communities because of the likelihood of violation of the first principle of 
justice.
42
  The account of economic utilitarianism has also recently been forcefully 
critiqued by Nussbaum.
43
  If these critiques are sound, then the utilitarian calculation 
must be rejected.  The claim that the calculation is far more complicated than Carens 
envisions and is more likely than he expects to lead to a closed borders argument is not a 
claim that aliens don’t count or don’t count equally.  In fact, the approach I have outlined 
takes into account a more robust picture of the world and gives full recognition to all 
aspects of their lives, not just their economic lives. 
 At this point I have undermined each of the key premises in Carens’ common 
conclusion argument sufficiently to claim that the common conclusion argument is 
inadequate to justify the claim that liberal political philosophies must support open 
borders.  This is not, however, the only criticism that might be applied to Carens. 
 
Other Critiques of Carens 
 
 The open borders arguments of Carens have become representative of 
contemporary liberal political philosophy with little critical assessment.  They are 
routinely cited as canonical.  Joseph Meilaender has written, to my knowledge, the sole 
critical assessment of Carens’ work.  Meilaender’s critique is substantively different than 
the critique I have offered to this point, and therefore, requires review. 
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 In two related works Meilaender offers a critique of Carens.  The first, and most 
substantive, is in “Liberalism and Open Borders: The Argument of Joseph Carens.”44  
The second, more recent but less substantive, occurs in his book Toward a Theory of 
Immigration.
45
  Meilaender acknowledges that Carens’ argument is built upon a solidly 
liberal foundation.  However, this foundation is undefended.  This creates a kind of 
confusion about his work.  Is Carens arguing for a view to which only liberals are 
committed or does the view have wider reach such that all countries, regardless of 
philosophical commitments, should be committed to open borders?
46
  If Carens intends 
his argument to apply to all governments, regardless of commitments, then Carens must 
provide an argument for why the commitments of liberalism should prevail over other 
kinds of commitments.  On the other hand, if Carens intends his argument to apply only 
to liberal governments, then he has failed to acknowledge and resolve the great 
differences in the views that liberals hold regarding borders.  Why is Carens’ view 
regarding borders the correct view rather than the ones held by Steiner, Walzer or Miller?  
In either case, this makes Carens’ argument incomplete.  Meilaender writes: 
However we choose to understand it, then, Carens’s [sic] argument 
remains incomplete.  If it is really only intended as an argument for people 
who are already liberals, then the reader expecting a case for genuinely 
open borders is bound to be disappointed; furthermore, it then seems 
obliged to return to and address the broad, continued disagreement within 
liberalism.  If, on the other hand, it really is what it claims to be, an 
argument for open borders, then we must conclude that its reliance on and 
reflection of certain liberal principles and certain interpretations of them, 
even, leave it with little to say to countries that do not already share these 
principles.  One of the two arguments is incomplete: either the argument 
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I am not convinced that these problems cause Carens’ argument to suffer in ways that 
undermine it significantly. 
 Carens argument begins from liberal principles, a point which Meilaender readily 
concedes.  These principles, although not always well defined, are well known.  They 
provide a starting point for theorists to explore what a community would be like if it 
shared and applied this particular set of values.  Carens’ argument claims that open 
borders is the correct position for liberal communities to hold.  But his argument intends 
to reach farther than just liberal communities.  It does apply to all countries.  In 1992, 
regarding human rights, Carens writes “From a liberal egalitarian perspective all states 
are obliged to respect such rights…”48  Liberal philosophy is committed to pluralism, but 
pluralism within liberalism, not a pluralism that lies outside liberalism.  Pluralism outside 
liberalism would deny the universal aspect of liberal principles.  Once the broad 
commitments of liberalism are recognized, then the acceptance of many conceptions of 
the good life, or comprehensive doctrines in Rawls’ words, is required.  But these 
conceptions of the good life cannot lead to the rejection of the political world envisioned 
by liberalism.  Although in the nonideal world, Carens owes us an argument for why 
nonliberals should accept the liberal conclusions regarding borders and immigration, this 
ideal work does not require it.  The perspective of the nonideal world is a larger, more 
difficult argument to make, and lies outside the requirements of Carens’ project.  That 
Carens is making an argument about open borders from the perspective of liberal political 
philosophy is recognition that there is, or might be, disagreement over what the correct 
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conclusion might be from this perspective.  Carens is arguing that open borders should be 
the conclusion regarding borders that extends from liberal principles.  This is a matter in 
which there is no possibility of pluralism because justice demands open borders.  I am not 
persuaded that Meilaender’s critique undermines the argument of Carens if the limited 
scope of Carens’ project is properly understood.   
 
Open Borders and Single Principle Arguments 
 
Freedom of Movement and Open Borders 
 
The work of Carens discussed thus far, represents his first approach to the 
problem of liberal egalitarianism and borders, one about which he has expressed some 
uncertainty and hesitation.
49
  In a subsequent work, “Migration and Morality: A Liberal 
Egalitarian Perspective,” Carens develops an argument based upon the principle of the 
freedom of movement that he believes is not subject to the problems of the consensus 
argument.  In this argument his claim is that, “Liberal egalitarianism entails a deep 
commitment to freedom of movement as both an important liberty in itself and a 
prerequisite for other freedoms.”50  Therefore, movement should be as unrestricted as 
possible and the burden of justification rests with those who would place restrictions 
upon it.  Carens makes no attempt in his argument to take account of the complexity of 
the idea of freedom of movement and how it might legitimately be constrained.  I will 
take up this issue in more detail below. 
The basic structure of Carens’ arguments looks like this: 
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1. Liberal egalitarians care about human freedoms, such as the ability to pursue 
individual projects. 
2. Liberal egalitarians care about equality of opportunity with access to social 
positions determined by talents rather than arbitrary characteristics. 
3. Liberal egalitarians seek to keep actual inequalities (economic, social, and 
political) as small as possible. 
4. Freedom of movement is necessary for achieving each of these liberal 
egalitarian goals. 
5. Therefore, liberal egalitarians support unrestricted freedom of movement. 
Although Carens claims that freedom of movement is important in itself, the argument 
provided finds value only in its instrumental characteristics.  Freedom of movement is 
important because it is required to achieve other goals that liberal egalitarians care about.  
If those goals could be achieved through other means, then it is unclear from Carens’ 
argument whether we would still care about freedom of movement.  It also needs to be 
recognized that the first three claims in the argument are not absolute.  The first claim is 
limited by the recognition that individual projects are constrained by the requirement that 
these projects not interfere with the legitimate claims of other individuals to likewise 
pursue their own projects.  Individual projects may be constrained because of their effects 
upon others.  I have also glossed over the nuances of the relationship between freedom of 
movement and the concerns of liberal egalitarianism.  Carens has expressed the 
relationship as “closely connected” for the pursuit of individual projects, “essential” for 
equality of opportunity, and as “would contribute” to achieving various types of equality 





although my use of “necessary” might be stronger than his claim, it represents in a 
reasonable manner the full force of Carens’ argument.  Freedom of movement is 
necessary for the achievement of liberal egalitarian concerns, and denying such freedom 
undermines the central concerns of liberal egalitarianism. 
 To this main argument, Carens adds four additional reasons why liberal 
egalitarians should care about freedom of movement that are tied to illiberal 
consequences of not supporting freedom of movement.  The first is the feudal practice 
argument which was also mentioned as part of the common conclusion argument.  
Restricting movement across borders because a person is born in one country rather than 
another is like the constraints placed upon an individual’s life in feudalism.  Carens 
writes: “Citizenship in the modern world is a lot like feudal status in the medieval world.  
It is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to change by the individual’s will 
and efforts; and it has a major impact upon that person’s life chances.”51  In feudalism a 
person’s prospects in life were largely determined by the status a person was given at 
birth.  Born into a landed aristocratic family and one could expect do fairly well.  Born 
into a peasant family bound to a lord and one’s life prospects were greatly limited.  
Liberal egalitarians object to feudal practices, so also, they should object to constraints on 
movement which are bounded by one’s citizenship as established at birth.52     
A second reason offered is the problem of the asymmetry of the right to exit and 
the right to enter.  The right to exit (and return) is enshrined in international documents of 
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human, civil and political rights.
53
  But it is possible that the right to exit might be only 
formal, rather than substantive.  Consider the case where an individual has both the desire 
and the means to leave a country but cannot do so because all countries refuse entrance.  
The right to exit is meaningless for this individual, indicating that an unrestricted right to 
exit without a corresponding unrestricted right to enter is meaningless.  If both rights are 
required for the rights to be meaningful, then liberal egalitarians must support 
unrestricted movement.  The failure to do so is to treat people illiberally and make their 
rights meaningless. 
A third reason, for which Carens offers no justification, is that individuals should 
be able to change their citizenship at will, a position known as jus nexi.  Carens defends 
the practice of granting citizenship based upon birth (jus soli) as being required as part of 
a community’s recognition of ties to others.  But this initial determination of citizenship 
should not constrain the ability to change one’s citizenship as one desires. 
 The final reason offered is the comparison of internal movement to external 
movement.  Within most countries in the world a person is free to move within the 
boundaries of their country and the right of internal movement is contained in 
international rights documents.
54
  However, most of the reasons that motivate people to 
move within a country also might motivate people to move internationally.  People fall in 
love, seek new jobs, or seek new associations.  If the motivations for internal and external 
movement are the same then the right to move should also be the same.  Like the right to 
exit and return, movement within states is often treated as a moral imperative and 
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necessary civil right.  The treatment of external movement as a matter of national 
political decision is therefore, unjustifiable. 
This freedom of movement argument, like the common conclusion argument, is 
problematic in many ways.  The most significant problem in the argument is that Carens 
has failed to give careful consideration to what the principle of freedom of movement is.  
Before I turn my attention to that substantial problem, however, I want to address the 
other reasons Carens offers.  The feudal practices analogy is only partially effective 
because Carens overplays the comparison.  Feudal practices were much more stringent 
than contemporary practices restricting international movement.  Feudal practices might 
keep one from moving from one village to another or even retaining the fruit of one’s 
labor.
55
  Feudal constraints were based upon the ties between individuals requiring 
permission from the ruling individual for movement to occur.  International constraints 
on movement do not carry these same kinds of constraints.  Constraints on movement, 
where they exist in contemporary society, are not tied to movement but to other aspects 
of the constraining society, such as security or issues of social welfare.  The permission 
required to move is granted by states rather than a single individual whose own well-
being is affected by movement.  Contemporary constraints on movement might be 
troubling, but it is not because they are comparable to feudal constraints on movement.  
Individuals today retain far more autonomy over their lives, even in circumstances in 
which they can’t move, than did most individuals in the medieval period.  Further, his 
commitment to a jus nexi approach to citizenship overstates the conclusion of his 
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  One could grant freedom of movement without granting the right to change 
citizenship at will.  Even if one admits that states cannot deny citizenship to individuals 
who have integrated into the community because it leaves this individual in a 
disadvantaged position, it doesn’t follow that one must be allowed to change citizenship 




Carens is not alone in criticizing the asymmetry of the right to enter and exit.  
Leah Ypi, in her recent work,
58
 has also argued that any grounds used to justify limiting 
entry must also be applicable to exit.  But to argue in this manner is to ignore the real 
effects of movement and the problems caused by the uncoordinated movement of people.  
As Carens and others readily admit, sending countries are many but receiving countries 
are few.  Large numbers of people moving to the same or a limited number of locations 
can be problematic.  States struggle to provide the social services required to support 
migrants, both short term and long term.  Teaching large numbers of new people a 
language, laws, or the role of social institutions requires vast resources from a limited 
pool of resources.  There are economic impacts as larger numbers of people compete for 
a limited number of jobs.  The effects of movement and the actions states must take to 
accommodate such movement are different in sending and receiving communities.  This 
difference justifies treating the two kinds of movement differently, at least in some cases, 
and perhaps in all cases. 
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Finally, the comparison of internal and external movement also falls short.  I have 
already discussed the problems encountered by Carens in arguing that individuals behind 
the veil of ignorance would choose to move.  If all movement is to be treated the same, 
Carens is obligated to offer up an account of political authority and obligation that would 
support such movement.  What obligations do immigrants take on when they move?  To 
their old community?  To their new community?  What rights of authority do states retain 
over citizens who leave?  What rights do receiving states have over new immigrants?  It 
is not the case that one can’t be offered; Carens just doesn’t offer one.  The claim that 
internal movement between different political jurisdictions within the same country is 
similar to international movement fails to recognized one significant fact:  different 
jurisdictions within the same larger political jurisdiction have only limited political 
autonomy.  Their actions are subject to the constraints of the national government.  Utah 
cannot limit movement from those in other states because the higher political authority 
does not permit it.  But international movements cross autonomous political jurisdictions 
that do not answer to any common authority.  Their decisions are independent and not 
constrained by other authority in the way internal jurisdictions are.  The parallel between 
the two kinds of movement are different and Carens must explain how political authority 
and obligation are to work in this environment.  On this problem Bader writes, 
The argument by analogy – that international free movement should be 
treated exactly like internal free movement – is not convincing: it either 
neglects moral principles of democratic self-determination completely, or 
it neglects the importance of democratic states among other unite in 
emerging democratic multi-level polities.
59
   
Presumably Carens intends for movement between countries to work similar to 
movement between states, but one can argue that this internal movement works because 
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of the shared political authority above the local jurisdictions.  Without this shared higher 
authority in the international arena, it is not obvious that movement can function in the 
same manner.  The governance issues related to shared practices without enforcement 
authority have been evident in recent years in the European Union in both movement and 
the euro.  Member states determine policy that affects the shared practices without the 
ability of other states to constrain that policy even as they are affected by it.  If we 
remove the problem by establishing a single authority, Carens cannot make the claim that 
this condition applies to the case of multiple authorities.  Global authorities come in for 







Carens is not the only contemporary theorist to claim unrestricted movement 
based upon a principle of freedom of movement.  Chandran Kukathas, writing from a 
libertarian perspective, claims an even more unrestricted right to international movement 
than Carens does.
63
  Understanding the problems of migration as principally one of 
competition for state resources between immigrants and natives, Kukathas argues for an 
unrestricted right to movement as a robust expression of freedom, which entails 
redefining the modern state.  Restricting movement is foremost a denial of freedom and 
requires a strong justification.  People denied the opportunity to move are denied 
opportunity to create the lives they desire, flee from tyrannical regimes (and if people 
can’t leave, why should these regimes reform), and denies to people their freedom to 
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associate, whether the reasons for association be family, love, work or worship.  Denying 
people these things through the denial of freedom of movement is difficult to defend. 
The common reasons offered for denial of movement are, on Kukathas’ account, 
easily rebutted.  The economic impacts associated with affects upon employment are 
difficult to measure.  But Kukathas claims, without support, that the effects of 
immigration are “at best, positive, and at worst, only mildly negative.”64  If we expand 
our view to a global perspective, then the effects will be positive as well from the 
beneficial redistribution of labor throughout the world.  While it is possible to quibble 
over the statistics that might support this claim, Kukathas offers a more extended moral 
argument related to the economic effects of migration. 
People within nations hold a privileged position under the current international 
system.  They have access to a wide range of benefits and opportunities denied to those 
outside the local political system.  These benefits and opportunities are of two types.  
First, there is access to local economic markets for employment and exchange.  Secondly, 
there is access to state provided benefits, such as welfare.  Are such privileges morally 
warranted?  Kukathas claims they are not, because even though opening markets 
disadvantages natives, those denied access are also disadvantaged.  “Restricting access to 
markets certainly benefits some people, but at the expense of others, and generally to the 
disadvantage of all.  If particular privileges should be accorded to some because of their 
state membership, the justification cannot be economic…”65  Open markets benefit all, 
closed or control markets benefit a more limited group of people.  Markets should benefit 
all by being open to all.  The problem of benefits accorded by the welfare state presents 
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different problems.  The main problem to address for the welfare state is the movement of 
poor people, those who utilize benefits without contributing.  This means that at least rich 
people should have unconstrained movement.  But Kukathas believes this is problematic 
and that the poor should also be allowed to move with the possibility of being excluded 
from the welfare system.  Even though the moving poor are disadvantaged in such a 
scheme, their lot may be better off than if they were denied the opportunity to move.  
Kukathas recognizes the difficulties that migration presents for the welfare state and the 
moral challenges of different levels of membership.  The obvious choice for many is to 
restrict migration.  Kukathas raises a different question: “While one obvious response to 
this is to say, ‘so much the worse for open immigration,’ it is not less possible to ask 
whether the welfare state is what needs rethinking.”66  In other words, if open 
immigration is problematic for the welfare state, then perhaps it is the welfare state that 
must change (or go away), rather than open immigration. 
 Carens and Kukathas both raise significant challenges to closed borders based 
upon claims of freedom of movement and the associated affects of constraining 
movement.  Claims of equal moral worth for all individuals do raise questions regarding 
the justification of differential treatment.  But one central problem here, is that both 
Carens and Kukathas rely upon a vague specification of the principal of freedom of 
movement.  I want to turn to that problem now and then revisit their arguments. 
 
Specifying the Principle of Freedom of Movement 
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Although I have already offered critiques of the different arguments for open 
borders based upon a principle of the freedom of movement there remains one significant 
problem with this argument.  There is no specification of exactly what the principle of the 
freedom of movement is.   
For a principle that is so widely appealed to, it is unsettling to be unable to find 
any conceptual consideration or specification of this principle.  It is appealed to with the 
assumption that its meaning is obvious.  This stands in stark contrast, for example, to 
such principles as the Harm Principle or the Precautionary Principle in engineering.  Both 
of these principles have received substantial consideration resulting in precise 
characterizations of these principles.  Unfortunately, this is not the case for the principle 
of the freedom of movement. 
The following is a common formulation of this principle. 
Every person has the right to move from one location to another. 
Three things stand out in this claim.  The first is that the locus of this right is the 
individual.  It is something each of us has, presumably because we are independent and 
rational creatures.  The second is that this is a right, something which we can claim of 
others.  However, in this formulation it is somewhat uncertain what we can actually claim 
of others – noninterference, or something more.  It is also uncertain of whom it is we 
should claim this right – simply of others or from institutional bodies.  In an apolitical 
world we would claim this of others; in a political world it necessarily is a claim against 
both individuals and institutions and governments.  Finally, this right is about spatial 
movement, although it does not require that the space be significant.  My exercise of the 





missing from this statement is any consideration of the purpose of my movement or the 
effect of my movement.  A person may move for the most trivial of reasons, to move out 
of the sun into the shade, or for the most significant reasons, to build a better life. 
 The principle as stated is the form behind the libertarian commitment to freedom 
of movement used by theorists such as Chandran Kukathas, and is easily shown to be 
inadequate.  As David Miller notes, there are all kinds of constraints on our ability to 
move.
67
  I cannot choose to move into the space which you occupy (at least not without 
interfering with your right to be in that space or the integrity of your body).
68
  More 
significantly, I cannot move in to your house and make myself at home.  Common 
definitions of private property make such movement inappropriate.  If we accept the 
principle as we have characterized it so far, we are not far from a Hobbesian state of 
nature.  I am free to move wherever and for whatever purposes I wish, constrained only 
by your ability to prevent me from moving to these spaces.  Within civilized society such 
a principle is not very useful. 
   Let me offer a modification that takes into account these kinds of considerations. 
 Every person has the right to move from one location to another provided that 
movement does not interfere with the prior rightful occupation of that space by 
another person. 
A few comments on this version of the principle are in order.  The principle now 
recognizes that movement should not affect others already in the space to which I wish to 
move, provided their occupation of this space is appropriate (and perhaps even if the 
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occupation of that space is not appropriate).  A person cannot move into the physical 
space I occupy if I am already rightfully there.  If I stand on the sidewalk you cannot 
come and push me aside in order to stand where I was.  You cannot move into my 
dwelling provided that I am rightfully in that dwelling.  If my own occupation is 
inappropriate, then I am without grounds to complain about your occupation of that 
dwelling.  We are both in violation of someone else’s right to that property.  I can only 
claim that you not push me from the physical space I occupy.  What it means for 
occupation of a space or a dwelling to be prior and rightful needs exploration beyond my 
purposes here, other than to say that it at least means chronologically prior and that 
occupation means my physical presence in some cases, and something other than my 
physical presence in others. 
But there is potentially a problem in this definition as well.  Suppose for a 
moment that I am standing still on the sidewalk.  As you walk by you stumble in such a 
manner that you push me aside and end up occupying the place where I was on the 
sidewalk.  This seems fundamentally different from the case where you intentionally 
push me from my spot and take it over.  While I certainly am not happy about being 
accidentally removed from my spot, I recognize its accidental nature and hopefully do not 
take too much offense.  In all likelihood you apologize and return my rightful position on 
the sidewalk to me.  But in the intentional case, I take greater offense because of its 
intentional nature.  Although this case is trivial, it seems to point to the idea that it may be 
appropriate to make intention part of our principle.  Distinguishing between intentional 
and unintentional actions anticipates that our response to the effects of inappropriate 





modify the case slightly such that instead of just being pushed aside I am pushed in front 
of a passing vehicle and suffer injury.  Now it is not only intention that comes into play 
but the consequences (negative) of the action.  Even in the case of an accidental push, I 
want take into account the effect of the action.  That I suffer harm, even unintentional, is 
a relevant factor. 
  Let me now suggest a new set of revisions. 
 Every person has the right to move from one location to another provided that 
movement does not interfere with the prior rightful occupation of that space by 
another and that movement does not result in either intentional or unintentional 
harm to others. 
I have now built both intentions and consequences of movement into this principle and it 
is nearly adequate.  Two problems remain to address.  The first is whether the principle 
should address intention without effect.  This is often the focus of security claims and 
offered as a reason for preventing someone from entering.  It raises significant issues, as 
intention is often difficult to assess.  It is further complicated in that in some cases it may 
be intentional to move me from my spot, but not to cause harm (assuming the movement 
itself causes no harm).  The other problem remaining to address, looking forward to the 
problem of migration, is the problem of groups.  A principle that is useful for individuals 
might not be useful when applied to group movement, be it coordinated or uncoordinated.  
This notion is well recognized in moral and political literature.  It is the caveat we find in 
the phrase “compatible with a similar right for all.”  The principle can now be modified 





 Every person has the right to move from one location to another provided that 
movement does not interfere with the prior rightful occupation of that space by 
another and that movement is not for the purposes of harming others, does not 
result in either intentional or unintentional harm to others, either as the result of 
single actions or cumulative actions, and compatible with an equal right to 
movement for others. 
 
Carens and Kukathas Revisited 
 
 From the perspective of the principle of the freedom of movement just developed, 
liberal communities do not have to support the unconstrained freedom of movement 
claimed by Carens and Kukathas.  Movement will be constrained in ways that supports a 
system that minimizes harm to others while still respecting the rights of those who wish 
to move.
69
  This kind of system requires controls and the opportunity to evaluate the 
intentions of movement as well as the effects of movement, sometime simultaneous to, 
and other times in advance of movement.  Such a system will utilize empirical data to 
evaluate how movement effects the functioning of institutions in receiving countries and 
whether there are resources available to integrate immigrants into new social 
circumstances.  For security purposes the movement of some individuals might be barred, 
either for specific reasons or because there is inadequate information available to make 
informed decisions.  It does not matter for my argument that this principle might result in 
different immigration control systems than those in use today.  The development of a 
migration system that responds to the principle of the freedom of movement that I have 
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specified here might increase or decrease movement, but it will do so based upon the 
effects of the movement rather than for other more troubling reasons.  What is important 
for my purposes here, is that the unconstrained principle of movement utilized by Carens 
and Kukathas cannot be defended from a liberal point of view when it is given close 
consideration. 
 
Freedom of Association and Open Borders 
 
Other principles beyond freedom of movement are available for use in grounding 
a liberal argument for open borders.  Writing from a left-libertarian perspective, Hillel 
Steiner has offered at least two principled arguments supporting open borders.  Left-
libertarianism needs to be distinguished from right-libertarianism (represented by Nozick 
and Kukathas in this thesis).  Both approaches characterize rights as property rights 
subject to control by the individual understood by the concept of self-ownership.  In both 
accounts individuals own their bodies, their labor and the artifacts they produce using that 
labor.  The difference between the two accounts is evident in the approach to the 
ownership of natural or raw resources, those things that exist without human intervention.  
Whereas right-libertarianism holds that natural resources were initially unowned and can 
be freely appropriated to private ownership in accordance with some principle (e.g., 
Locke’s labor mixing principle), left-libertarianism holds that natural resources are 
jointly owned by all, including posterity, in an egalitarian fashion.  Privatization of 
natural resources requires compensation to any who are denied access to or use of the 
natural resources being privatized.  Only when such compensation has been paid can 
natural resources be privatized.  Vallentyne summarizes this succinctly: “Left-libertarian 





owned in some egalitarian manner.”70  Steiner’s first argument utilizes the shared 
perspective of both forms of libertarianism, arguing that the right of freedom of 
association leads to a commitment to open borders and will be discussed in this section.  
The second argument reflects the distinct commitments of left-libertarianism, arguing 
that borders deny people access to their rights to resources and requires either that 
borders be open or that people be compensated appropriately.  This argument is covered 
in the next section. 
In a short passage in “Hard Borders, Compensation and Classical Liberalism,” 
Steiner argues in rebuttal to Walzer that freedom of association requires that borders be 
open.
71
  Walzer claims that emigration and immigration may be treated asymmetrically 
because the latter respects the voluntariness of actions, whereas to constrain the former 
replaces commitment with coercion,
72
  a practice that requires justification in liberal 
communities.  In other words, the decision of immigration, in which the migrant 
voluntarily decides to leave and the receiving community decides to admit the migrant, is 
accepted because it is voluntary on the part of both parties.  Emigration on the other hand, 
represents the voluntary decision of a person to separate from the community and 
denying that separation is to coerce that person into remaining part of the community.  
The decision to stay is not voluntary.  It is a principle of autonomy and respect for 
autonomy that justifies the distinction between immigration and emigration.  Steiner 
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believes this argument of Walzer’s is flawed because it assumes that all individuals 
within a community share identical commitments, a condition that is unlikely to obtain in 
a pluralistic community.  Members of the community will hold different levels of 
commitment to the various values held within the community.  In the case where no 
member of the community desires to associate with outsiders, then Steiner holds it is 
acceptable for the state to control the borders in a manner that denies entry to all.  
However, if any member desires to associate with an outsider, denying that member the 
opportunity to do so is to coerce that member and deny the exercise of freedom.  This is 
unacceptable within a liberal community.  Walzer’s argument fails because it doesn’t 
recognize the different manners in which members can be coerced.  Walzer’s argument 
focuses upon coercion related to leaving a country, neglecting that those who stay may be 
coerced in ways not tied to leaving the country.  If coercion is presumed to be wrong 
because it violates autonomy and personal respect, then one must examine all of the ways 
in which people are coerced by states related to migration before forming a policy 
regarding migration.  Constraining people from associating with those outside of the 
country by denying admission also coerces those who live in the country and this 
coercion is on par with the coercion Walzer identifies. 
If this is the case, then how hard can borders be?  Steiner’s claim is that national 
borders may only be as hard as the softest private (individual) domain.  Each person has 
the right to the control of his or her own private property, doing business or associating 
with whomever is chosen.  Borders for these private domains are set individually and are 
morally justifiable based upon the concept of self-ownership.  In order for the state to not 





rigid than the weakest of these private domains.  If the national border is more rigid than 
the weakest private domain, then the community members are denied their right to 
freedom of association.  Suppose that A desires to associate with people from countries 
X, Y and Z, but B desires to only associate with people from countries X and Y.  The 
national border should be controlled in a manner that satisfied the desires of A, the 
weakest private domain, rather than B which is a stronger, or more restrictive domain.  If 
the borders are controlled in accordance with B’s desires, A’s rights to associate are 
being denied because people from country Z are not admitted to A’s country.  In the 
cases where national borders are harder than the weakest private border, Steiner 
maintains that the state is no longer representing the interests of all the members of the 
community; rather, it is representing the interest of some group within the community 
that desires the harder borders.  These harder borders, however, violate the rights of 
individuals who wish more open borders and without compensation are unjustifiable.  
Steiner does not address the problem that by using the weakest private domain he forces 
people with stronger private domains to be forced in some way to associate with those 
they do not desire to associate. 
The problem with Steiner’s argument is, as I noted also with Carens on freedom 
of movement, it sets up any individual’s interest as a trump to state interest or the interest 
of other groups in the community.  In the example above, A’s desires will always be the 
determining factor because they are the least restrictive.  In a pluralistic community this 
will create the situation where the state is hamstrung because it must always implement 
the least restrictive domain,
 73
 unable to make any but the most trivial of decisions out of 
                                                 
73
 The phrase “least restrictive” is perhaps misleading.  Steiner’s view is that the largest group of rights 





respect for each individual opinion.  If state policies are limited by the lowest level of 
commitment of any member, then the state cannot, in fact, exist because it is doubtful it 
will have any authority at all.  All that is required is for one person to have some desire 
that runs counter to all other desires.  It is that single desire that must then become policy.  
Even in the case where one might claim, as in a social contract situation, that the 
members of the community have surrendered their rights in some particular area, Steiner 
asks why it would be necessary for the state to have a border control policy.  Would not it 
be acceptable for each member to exercise his or her individual commitment?  
Theoretically such a circumstance is conceivable but raises significant questions about 
what the nature of the state is and whether what results from such a scenario could be 
considered a state.  Ultimately, this claim by Steiner is inadequately considered and 
ignores the considerations of Nozick regarding border crossings discussed above that 
enable the state to act in advance of actual violations of rights or the case of those unable 
to defend their own property.  Steiner’s argument from the freedom of association, 
included here in anticipation of Wellman’s argument for closed borders from the freedom 
of association considered in the next chapter, is inadequately developed and lacks force 
within the open borders debate. 
 
Resource Entitlement and Open Borders 
 
In the same article in which Steiner presents his brief argument for open borders 
based upon freedom of association, he also presents a more robust libertarian argument 
based upon individual entitlement to resources.  Setting the stage for this argument is 
Steiner’s commitment that any argument offered must focus upon the rights of outsiders 





For the concern of human rights violations that, for classical liberals, 
constitutes the acid-test of policy permissibility, has thus far figured in our 
discussion only with reference to the rights of insiders….But outsiders, 
too, have human rights…classical liberal theory can be shown to assign 
them (other) rights which have a direct bearing on the permissibility of 
their exclusion by hard borders.
74
   
 
Conceivably, insider’s rights might never be violated by hard borders.  The rights of 
outsiders, however, may always be violated by hard borders and it is this violation that 
receives inadequate attention in the liberal argument for closed borders.  Classical liberal 
commitments to the equality and rights of every individual, however, obligate us to give 
equal consideration to both insiders and outsiders.  When equal consideration is given to 
outsiders and insiders, then a different kind of argument must obtain in order to support 
hard borders.  Steiner argues for open borders and then proposes how it is that borders 
might become closed. 
I will recount Steiner’s argument in a different form than Steiner himself offers it.  
I do this to offer a clearer view of what feature in the world obligates states to a policy of 
open borders because it is this feature that is disputable and exposes the weakness of the 
argument.  Steiner’s construction of the argument first claims outsiders and insiders will 
view private property conventions differently.  Steiner then offers an argument that relies 
upon the notion of shared ownership of all world resources to demonstrate that hard 
borders can be implemented only if outsiders are compensated for the loss of their share 
of ownership in the world.  In my reconstruction I will present the argument of ownership 
first, and then consider the argument of insiders and outsiders.  In this manner it will be 
more evident how Steiner reaches the conclusion of open borders.  The issue of 
compensation is then plainly seen as rectification of a rights violation. 
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Steiner argues that in the state of nature all property is jointly owned by all people 
who thereby, hold a share of the resources.  In propositional format, the argument is as 
follows: 
1. Property appropriation rules and national borders are derivative of individual 
rights. 
2. Locke’s appropriation rule utilizes labor (indicative of self-ownership) mixed 
with land, constrained by the Lockean proviso of “enough and as good as” to 
justify the private appropriation of unowned land. 
3. The Lockean proviso entails that each person holds an entitlement to an 
equivalent portion of land.  (1, 2) 
4. This entitlement provides ownership in all land prior to appropriation.  (2, 3) 
5. Kant’s appropriation rule utilizes human autonomy, the a priori concept of an 




6. All persons are shareholders in the land prior to private appropriation.  (5) 
7. Therefore, all unowned property prior to private appropriation is owned by all 
individuals.  (4, 6) 
The end result of this argument is that each and every person holds an undifferentiated 
and equal share in all of the natural resources of the earth.  In Locke’s argument this 
share is evident in the proviso.  Steiner interprets the proviso’s commitment that everyone 
should have “enough and as good” as recognition that each holds ownership and does not 
surrender this ownership without granting permission or receiving appropriate 
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compensation.  Ownership also means the ability to use the land productively or to 
receive an appropriate share of the proceeds from that land.  Kant’s commitment is to an 
abstract conceptualization of the community outside of history in which land is unowned 
but becomes owned as the result of an agreement of the general will.  Steiner’s strong 
claim is that each of these demonstrates the classical commitment to the idea of world-
ownership. 
Building on this view of world ownership, Steiner’s argument for open borders is 
as follows. 
1. All individuals hold ownership in land prior to private appropriation. 
2. The concept of border violations requires exclusive entitlement to a piece of 
property (private property). 
3. Such exclusive entitlements require the existence of rules of appropriation. 
4. These rules of appropriation are conventional.76 
5. To be conventional means that these rules are either nonrational or nonuniversal. 
6. If the rules are conventional they are only binding upon those for which they are 
the convention (insiders).  (4, 5) 
7. Outsiders have no reason to respect conventions not their own. 
8. Therefore, outsiders are justified to venture onto, without moral objection, 
property that others view as private, because they are owners of that property.  (1, 
2, 3, 6) 
9. Denial of property to a person entitled to that property is unjust. 
10. Hard borders deny property to individuals who own that property. 
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11. Therefore, hard borders are unjust.  (8, 9, 10) 
In a standard libertarian approach to property, when a person is unjustly denied 
access to something to which rights are held rectification must occur.  One common form 
of rectification is compensation.  Recognizing this, Steiner develops a global fund by 
which people that have unjustly been denied their rightful access to property can be 
compensated.
77
  In this manner, states might justify borders, but only if appropriate 
compensation is made available to those denied access to their property.  Steiner believes 
such a fund might serve to reduce global inequalities significantly.  I believe that this 
fund is deeply flawed conceptually and instrumentally and would fail to achieve any of 
the ends which Steiner believes it will.  However, critiquing this fund lies outside the 
scope of my primary concerns and I will not consider it further.  Let me return now to 
problems in the main argument. 
 The idea of world ownership as justified by Steiner is difficult to accept.  It relies 
upon two different arguments that point in this direction, but as with all such inductive 
arguments it is possible to undermine the conclusion by either presenting a form of liberal 
argument that does not lead to world ownership or to demonstrate that the argument 
offered in support of a liberal claim regarding world ownership is not the correct one.  I 
will do both of these. 
The most obvious liberal approach to utilize here for the purposes of denying 
world ownership is that of Nozick.  Nozick’s entitlement theory consists of three 
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components: justice in acquisition, justice in transfer and rectification of injustice in 
holdings.
78
  People come to hold unheld things, and once those rights have been 
established they are entitled to hold or transfer that property in accordance with their own 
desires.  It is only by these two means that people come to hold things.  Possession that 
does not occur in accordance with the principles of acquisition and transfer is unjust.  The 
principles of rectification of injustice in holdings are then invoked to return possession or 
provide compensation to its proper owner.  Although Nozick left most of entitlement 
theory unspecified, he did not leave unspecified the status of property prior to acquisition.  
Things prior to being held are unheld
79
 and one may justifiably come to own things to the 
exclusion of others.  The inclusion of a Lockean proviso does not undermine a system of 
private property but only constrains certain kinds of actions.  It is not the initial 
acquisition that is unjust using Locke’s proviso, but the initial acquisition and all of the 
subsequent transfers that must violate the proviso.  Nozick maintains that in a free market 
system the proviso is unlikely to be violated except in the case of catastrophe.
80
 
It is possible to claim that Nozick sidesteps the issue of ownership through his use of 
the term “holdings.”  But in context and given the strong rights people have to their 
holdings, there can be little doubt what Nozick has in mind is ownership.  Arguments 
about holdings are arguments about ownership.  My argument against Steiner’s claim of 
shared ownership has two points.  The first is that when Nozick discusses distribution he 
makes the claim that there is no central distributing agent.   
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There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all 
the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out.  What each 
person gets, he gets from others…There is no more a distributing or 
distribution of shares than there is a distributing of mates in a society in 




This passage implies that things prior to specific holdings are unheld rather than held by 
anyone or by all.
82
  If they were held by all there would be some person or person with 
control to portion out the property and subsequent transactions would be subject to the 
principles of justice in transfer rather than those of acquisition.  This is not what happens.  
Rather, people come to hold unheld things in accordance with the principles of justice in 
acquisition.  Nozick identifies for us what questions justice in acquisition must answer 
but chooses not to answer them for us.
83
  Justice in acquisition needs to identify the kinds 
of things that can be held and it could be that property is not one of these things.  But in 
building upon the Lockean proviso, which is plainly about property, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Nozick would include land as something that can be owned.  When Nozick 
begins his consideration of the problems the proviso causes for justice in acquisition his 
examples include land as the kinds of things that can be owned.  As Nozick points out in 
his discussion, there are different ways to interpret the proviso and what it means to leave 
“enough and as good.”  It is this possibility to interpret the proviso differently than 
Steiner that provides my next critique. 
 The second strategy for undermining the argument is to demonstrate that Steiner’s 
claim of world ownership attributed to either Locke or Kant is not correct.  I believe that 
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there is an alternative and better conclusion to draw regarding the Lockean proviso than 
the ownership approach that Steiner uses.  Recall that Steiner interprets the phrase 
“enough and as good as” to entail that each individual has an entitlement to all property 
in the world.  This entitlement means the right to use the property productively in some 
way, either directly or by the resources the property contains.  This entailment, however, 
only seems appropriate if ownership is the focus of Locke’s concern in this section of the 
Second Treatise.  But ownership is not the important focus of this section of the treatise. 
Locke, at the beginning of Chapter V, acknowledges that it is possible to argue 
that since God gave dominion over the land to Adam that subsequent ownership of the 
land is either common or belongs to a single sovereign.  Locke denies this is the case and 
proceeds “to show how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which 
God gave to mankind in common, and that without any express compact of all the 
commoners.”84  Locke intends to show how starting from a point of common ownership 
of natural resources the world may become carved up into pieces owned by individuals 
without express permission or compensation paid to others.  This is precisely the kind of 
process that Steiner denies is possible.  The focus of Locke’s argument is upon the right 
of people to provide for their own preservation (“support and comfort of their being”85), 
which is known by natural reason.  Without holding property, a person cannot use it for 
support: “there must of necessity be a means to appropriate to them some way or other 
before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man.”86  The pathway 
of appropriation for Locke was the mixing of labor with whatever is removed from the 
state of nature.  This appropriation may continue as long as others may also appropriate.  
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But the important emphasis here is not upon ownership that results in equal shares of 
property, but upon the ability of individuals to provide for themselves.  Locke, in the 
example of picking up acorns, argues that we appropriate without the consent of all in 
this and it would be foolish to think this appropriation is disallowed unless the approval 
of all is required.  If this approval was required, people would starve despite the plenty 
that is available.   
The other concern in allowing appropriation is that some might appropriate too 
much, leading to waste.  But this is plainly disallowed on Locke’s account.  People may 
only acquire that which can be used without spoilage.  These laws of nature that apply to 
the goods of the earth apply to the earth itself: “But the chief matter of property being 
now not the fruits of the earth…but the earth itself…that property in that too is acquired 
as the former.”87  Appropriation of land is constrained by the same proviso as these goods 
and will limit the accumulation of large sections of land by a single person.  So long as 
others may procure and support themselves, appropriation is acceptable.  Locke believed 
that there was so much land that there would always be adequate land for others and as 
long as there was, people could not complain about the appropriation of property 
constrained by the spoilage problem.
88
  The subsequent creation of money eventually 
enabled people to bypass the problem of spoilage and thereby accumulate more than 
could be individually used.  But Locke’s focus is on the ability of persons to support 
themselves from the land, not on ownership in common.  Locke’s argument, while 
holding to original ownership in common as well as the possibility of ongoing ownership 
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in common, nonetheless supports private acquisition as necessary for individual 
provision.  This process of acquisition became institutionalized by local communities 
which then reached agreements with other communities recognizing their distinct 
boundaries.  By this process people gave up the right to property that is held commonly 
in other communities: “expressly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land in 
the others’ possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to their natural 
common right.”89  By this process that which was once held in common has now become 
private without requiring compensation. 
In returning to Steiner’s argument we see that he cannot appeal to Locke to 
support common ownership.  Locke explicitly argues that people may appropriately 
acquire land for their support without consent or compensation to others.  This process 
establishes borders on the individual property.  The purpose of political society is to 
protect those rights among those who form the political community.  The government 
Locke envisions extends coincident with the rights of the individuals governed by that 
government, which implicitly establishes borders, borders which are justifiable even to 
those outside the community.  Hence, Steiner’s argument has been weakened and does 




 What I have sought to show in this chapter is that although there are a number of 
different arguments for open borders based upon the commitments of liberal political 
philosophy, none of them are conclusive in the manner that their proponent intends. Each 
of the arguments is incomplete or substantially weaker than believed.  Carens’ inductive 
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argument is not as strong as he believes.  Although it may, under some circumstances 
give rise to wide-open borders, it is equally likely to result in an argument for (partially) 
closed borders.  In other words, the commitments of liberal political philosophy Carens 
considers seem not to lead to uncontrolled borders but to controlled borders, although 
those controls might have different justifications and implementations than those that are 
routinely offered.  This critique is stronger than the one offered by Meilaender as it 
undermines the particulars of the argument, rather than claiming the argument needs to 
justify its commitment to liberalism or its particular form of liberalism.  Whatever 
argument we make regarding borders faces the problems that Meilaender identifies.  This 
problem also exists for any argument extending from liberal principles.  Why should 
nonliberals accept any argument made by liberalism?  This is a broad question, one 
Carens need not answer here, particularly in light of the fact that the arguments he has 
made cannot make the claim liberalism requires a commitment to open borders.  Carens 
arguments regarding the freedom of movement has also been shown to be inadequate 
because it fails to specify the principle, and when this principle is specified it is one that 
includes constraints of a type common in liberal political philosophy and therefore, 
should not be troubling.  Arguments based upon other principles, such as freedom of 
association and world ownership have also been undermined, at least in the forms in 
which they are currently offered.  The position we are left with, unfortunately for those 
arguing for open borders, is that there is not, at the present time, a conclusive argument 
that the commitments of liberal political philosophy require a concomitant commitment 
to open borders.  In order to hold to that position new arguments that can eliminate the 





LIBERALISM AND CLOSED BORDERS 
 
 
The liberal argument for open borders emphasizes the priority of the individual 
over political systems.  The individual is prior to the state, and the rights and interests of 
the individual have priority over the rights and interests of the state.  The state is created 
by individuals to serve individual purposes and is always, or nearly always, constrained 
by individual interest.  From this perspective, each and every individual becomes a 
constraining factor on state action.
1
  This is, however, not the only manner in which to 
consider the relationship between individual and state within liberalism.  The state can be 
prior to the individual in a manner in which the possible interests of the individual are 
shaped and given meaning because the individual lives within an existing community. 
Individuals are not born isolated in an empty world.  Rather, each person is born into a 
community that necessarily shapes the individual in powerful ways.  If the state is prior 
to, but not necessarily more important than, the individual, the question of open borders 
is commonly answered with the claim that border controls are established at the 
discretion of the individual state.  The resulting degree of openness, with some 
exceptions, is always determined by the state. 
The liberal argument that borders may be closed at the discretion of the 
community takes three different forms.  The first, and initial expression, is the classic 
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membership argument of Michael Walzer in Spheres of Justice.  Walzer argues that 
citizenship is like membership in various institutions, and just as membership may be 
managed by the existing members, so countries can control who is eligible to participate 
in the state and thus, in the distribution of the social goods in that state.  The second form, 
and closely associated with the first, is the national identity and culture arguments of 
David Miller, among others.  Miller argues that citizens of countries have national 
identities which they rightfully care about and desire to maintain.  Often the people who 
share these identities aspire to self-determination, to be independent and govern 
themselves.  Immigration changes these identities and poses problems to achieving self-
determination and therefore, is subject to control as the existing community seeks to 
control the rate and type of changes that occurs to their identity.  The final form, which in 
approach looks more like the single principle arguments for open borders, takes a 
principal that is of central concern to liberal political philosophy and argues that this 
principle justifies the possibility of closed borders.  A prime example of this argument is 
found in the recent work of Christopher Wellman.  Wellman argues that liberal 
individuals have the right of freedom of association, including the right of disassociation.  
This right justifies our ability to decide with whom we associate.  Open borders 
undermine this right because others can force existing citizens to associate with the 
immigrant.  In order to honor the right to the freedom of association, liberal communities 
must allow that borders can be closed in order to prevent this forced association. 
This chapter will present and analyze these arguments and review some of the 
common critiques.  I will also present a new critique of both Walzer and Wellman.  As 





satisfactory even though they contribute in meaningful ways to the debate.  I will 
examine each of the arguments in the order in which they were mentioned above.  
 
The Membership Argument 
 
Membership and Walzer’s Theory of Goods 
 
The membership argument of Michael Walzer is found in Chapter 2 of his 
Spheres of Justice.  Walzer uses the relationship between individuals and clubs, 
neighborhoods and families as analogies for our relationship to the state as political 
community.  Although, as Philip Cole has noted in his Philosophies of Exclusion, each of 
these arguments raises questions, it must be remembered that this is an argument of 
analogy, and that permits some aspects of belonging to clubs, neighborhoods or families 
to not be relevant.  It is also important to understand that the membership argument as 
made by Walzer rests upon his understanding of human nature, the role of community, 
and the distribution of social goods which leads to his notion of complex equality.  This 
understanding is “imminent and phenomenological,”2 mapping onto particular people at 
particular times rather than presenting some ideal plan applicable to anyone, anywhere, at 
any time.  Walzer is concerned with justice in the world in which people live rather than 
in an artificially constructed world.  Given the nature of Walzer’s argument, if we are to 
understand the membership argument, it is with Chapter 1 of Spheres of Justice that we 
must begin. 
 The concern of Spheres of Justice is the problem of distributive justice.  
Following on the heels of the vigorous discussion regarding this topic initiated by the 
divergent views of Rawls and Nozick, Walzer considers the question how should social 
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goods be distributed within a community.  Any possibility of answering this question 
requires a theory of goods; that is, we must identify the nature of that which is being 
distributed as well as the nature of who is doing the distributing.  It is the failure to 
answer these questions or to answer them incorrectly that Walzer believes leads many 
astray.  The common answer is that individuals are born into a world unconnected to 
others or things.  The same is held of various goods: they too appear in a world 
unconnected to other goods.  Not only are these two answers wrong, but they lead to 
another problem: the neglect of nonmaterial social goods that are distributed just as 
surely as material goods and with just as great an impact upon individual well-being.  
What is needed, therefore, is a different theory of goods. 
 The standard theory of goods, on Walzer’s account, is this: “People distribute 
goods to (other) people.”3  This approach to goods emphasizes two characteristics.  
People are seen only through the process of giving and taking goods from one another, as 
participants in a transaction of limited scope.  Further, these goods are items to exchange 
on whatever basis people choose.  Missing from this picture is that people produce and 
consume the goods that are subject to exchange.  There are reasons why a community 
chooses to create some goods rather than others and why people in that community desire 
to possess one good rather than another.  These reasons are tied to the meanings and 
values that are placed upon various goods by the community in which we are situated.  
Although it is possible that these meanings might be available in other communities as 
well, it is because they are part of the community in which the individual is situated that 
the individual desires those goods.  Although we choose to produce or consume particular 
goods, that these goods are ones which we can choose has its foundation in the 
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community valuing of these goods.  Communities define, in a complex and historical 
process, what goods are deemed valuable.  Individuals who focus upon different goods 
find their relation to the community around them both stressed and constrained in various 
ways.  Recognizing these features of our actual situation leads Walzer to propose a 
different theory of goods:  “People conceive and create goods, which they then distribute 
among themselves.”4  The focus has shifted from the pattern of distribution (Rawls) and 
the process of exchange (Nozick) to the process by which goods receive their meaning 
and become of value to people.  This process is necessarily communal:   
Goods don’t just appear in the hands of distributive agents who do with 
them as they like or give them out in accordance with some general 
principle.  Rather, goods with their meanings – because of their meanings 
– are the crucial medium of social relations; they come into people’s 
minds before they come into their hands; distributions are patterned in 





The important feature of this theory of goods is the recognition that all goods have social 
meanings that have been developed within a group of people.  It is these social meanings 
that determine distribution, not abstract principles such as equality (Rawls) or the strict 
adherence to a specified process (Nozick).  These goods, and people’s possession of 
them, express social relationships.  The exchange of goods between people is not 
arbitrary but is bound to the meanings that society has given to those goods.  It is not 
possible for people to be free of these meanings and to have relationships without them; 
people are necessarily bound to those social meanings.  Even the rejection of a socially 
meaningful good is tied to those meanings and will affect social relationships.
6
  If we 
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understand goods in this manner, that is, that goods should be distributed in accordance 
with their meaning, the result is what Walzer calls “complex equality” rather than the 
more common “simple equality.”   
Walzer’s account of justice as a system of complex equality requires that different 
principles of distribution be utilized within the sphere of each of the various social goods 
produced by society.  Some goods might be distributed on the basis of a principle of 
equality (opportunity) whereas other goods might be distributed on the basis of need 
(medical care) or desert (public recognition).  It is not unjust for a member of society to 
possess large amounts of any one kind of good.  It is only unjust when a member of 
society is able to turn the possession of one kind of good into another kind of good that 
requires a different standard of distribution.  The different kinds of social goods must be 
stovepiped, so to speak, and the possession of one good should not inappropriately 
influence the distribution of other goods.  For example, the ability to turn money into 
political power is unjust.  Given the influence of money in political contests, individuals 
with great wealth can unduly influence the outcome of elections.  Constraining the use of 
personal wealth in elections in favor of government financed elections is one way of 
preventing the inappropriate influence of money on political power.  In those cases where 
one good enables a person to obtain more of other goods, the first good is said to be 
dominant.  When a person possesses large amounts of one good it is possible to speak of 
monopoly.  In Walzer’s words: “Dominance describes a way of using social goods that 
isn’t limited by their intrinsic meanings or that shapes those meanings in its own image.  
Monopoly describes a way of owning or controlling social goods in order to exploit their 
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dominance.”7  Dominance and monopoly lead to social conflict as exemplified in the 
current “Occupy Wall Street” movement. 
Three kinds of social conflict arise from this understanding of monopoly and 
dominance.  The first case is when members of society claim that some dominant good, 
whatever it is, needs to be more equally distributed.  This is the case of the unjust 
monopoly: a small number of people hold too large a share of the good.  A second case 
arises when people claim that there should be no constraints on the distribution of goods 
– all goods should be distributed autonomously.  This is the case of unjust dominance: no 
good should give a person control over other goods.  The final case argues that some new 
good should replace the dominant good.  This argument claims simply that the existing 
patterns of dominance and monopoly are unjust and should be replaced with a new 
structure, dominated by some new good monopolized by some new group.  This last 
category doesn’t necessarily lead to patterns of justice for the new pattern may be as 
unjust as the previous pattern, but in different ways.  Walzer’s concern in achieving 
complex equality is with the second case, the problem of unjust dominance.  By creating 
different distributive schemes for different goods any particular good is prevented from 
becoming dominant. 
 Walzer’s theory of goods raises questions about the nature of the group that 
creates, maintains and changes these social meanings.  The claim that all goods are social 
goods implies the existence of a society.  The standard theory of goods that underlies 
distributive justice leads most philosophers to neglect an important question:  How is this 
society constituted?  The common assumption is that it is already established and fixed.  
But this is not the case.  Membership in the group is just as surely a social good 
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distributed by society as are material goods.  Who has and who does not have this 
membership must be explored.  Walzer’s claim is that the correct boundary to focus upon 
in considering membership is the political boundary.  Political communities are, in 
Walzer’s words, “the closest we can come to a world of common meanings.”  Deviating 
from the political community as the boundaries for the distribution of social goods, either 
because the goods should be distributed to smaller groups within the political community 
or to larger groups of which the political community is only part, are themselves political 
decisions made by the existing political community.  Further, when the distribution of 
social goods is subject to claims of justice it is the political community that enforces such 
justice claims.  Once it is recognized that the creation of social goods requires bounded 
communities, the question of membership, who is in and who is out, naturally arises.  It is 
in exploring this question that Walzer turns to the issue of membership and the three 
analogies. 
 Walzer begins his exploration of the nature of political communities by claiming 
that most people have no direct experience of what it is to be a member of a country, or 
of the very nature of a country.  The use of analogies is an attempt to compensate for this 
lack of experience by appealing to those things of which we do have experience: 
neighborhoods, clubs, and families.  Each of these analogies contributes a unique 
perspective on the nature of political communities and the problem of admission and 
exclusion.  It is important to emphasize that boundaries are an essential part of political 
communities prior to Walzer undertaking the membership argument.  The membership 
argument isn’t used to justify admission and exclusion but to understand how it operates.  





communities.  Political communities exist prior to the question of membership as 
schemes of cooperation.  These cooperative arrangements are established among people 
who already have regular contact with one another.  The question of membership applies 
to those existing outside these cooperative arrangements.  When faced with contact with 
these individuals how should we respond?  Boundaries are not created by answering the 
question of membership; boundaries already necessarily exist.  Their justification is that 




 Neighborhoods are informal associations, existing without rules and conditions 
regarding who can live in them.
9
  Individuals choose a neighborhood on the basis of its fit 
to their desires – it is close to work, it has good schools, it is close to the beach.  When 
people move into a neighborhood no one asks for their membership card.  They just move 
in and find they either are welcomed or not welcomed.  In the latter case, the new 
neighborhood will undoubtedly fail to meet their expectations.  All of this seems rather 
obvious and uncontentious.  But Walzer’s claim is that neighborhoods can only work this 
way because there is some larger unit encompassing the individual neighborhoods which 
is closed.  This closure provides some bounding of society that enables neighborhoods to 
be open.  This provides (reasonable) assurance that those who enter the neighborhood 
share the relevant understanding of social goods, although in the case of neighborhoods 
as indifferent associations this shared understanding is not very deep.  Without this larger 
boundary, the smaller units would be at risk and would seek to create their own strong 
boundaries in order to protect the social goods they distribute.  As Walzer puts it, “Only 
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if the state makes a selection among would-be members and guarantees the loyalty, 
security and welfare of the individuals it selects, can local communities take shape as 
‘indifferent’ associations, determined solely by personal preference and market 
capacity.”10  Human nature, the need for loyalty and security and the obligations of 
welfare, can only exist if they are limited.  Humans cannot live in completely unbounded 
communities where anybody is able to become part of the local community, and 
therefore, the right to enter communities is constrained at some level. 
 The right to constrain entry, however, does not lead to the right to constrain exit.  
Communities exist on the basis of commitment.  Those already here are already part of 
the community and expected to participate in that commitment in the same way that those 
who might be admitted are expected to be committed to the community.  When some 
individual wishes to be free of that commitment, he or she must either be coerced into 
participation or permitted to exit.  Coercion necessarily violates the scheme of complex 
equality Walzer envisions by compromising individual autonomy and is not permitted.  
Although society chooses the social goods and their meanings, individuals then utilize 
those goods.  When those social goods no longer hold meaning for the individual, the 
individual must be allowed to leave when they choose because there is an irreparable 
break between the individual and the community.  This is demonstrated in the 
understanding we have of clubs.  Members of clubs make a commitment to one another 
in relation to the purposes of the club.  Existing members make decisions about who can 
join, but do not constrain those who wish to leave (provided they do not have binding 
contractual commitments that must be met first).  Such constraint undermines the very 
nature and purpose of the club by forcing participation and increasing the likelihood of 
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destructive factions developing.  Clubs, therefore, are like states, albeit with a limited 
range of social goods to be distributed and fewer powers to enforce those distributions.  
What we all understand about clubs is that those outside have no right to be inside unless 
permitted by those already inside.   
 When clubs select new members, they do so for various reasons.  The person 
applying is desirable and will contribute much to the activities of the club.  Any club 
which uses this as the sole criterion for membership selection will not be morally 
troubling.  But when we look at the state, with the wider range of social goods that are 
distributed, such policies are troubling because of the profound effect upon people’s lives 
by being denied access to these goods.  There are certain social goods, such as kinship, 
that pull us to admit people as members simply because of their relation to someone who 
is already a member, regardless of what that person brings to the state.  In this sense 
states are like families.  When we choose to be related to one person (such as through 
marriage), we also become related to others, sometime nameless others, without our 
choosing.  These unchosen relationships arise because of the manner in which we 
conceive family relationships and thereby create moral obligations that have not been 
specifically chosen.  In this manner, the family to which we are obligated is larger than 
just the person we choose.  Similarly, the obligations we have as members of our political 
community are extended to others outside our community with relationship to members 
of our community.  Sometimes these obligations are extended to those outside the 
community based upon kinship, as is often seen in states built through immigration, and 
on other occasions it is based upon nationality, where a state with a homogeneous 





emphasis for Walzer’s argument is not that states have obligations based upon kinship, 
but that states recognize that in some cases their obligation of membership extends 
beyond the community.   
 The result of the use of these analogies is that we should now have a better grasp 
of what it is to be a member of a country, a political community.  The neighborhood 
analogy demonstrates the role of borders, the club analogy demonstrates the manner in 
which states are closed while the family analogy demonstrates the manner in which states 
are open.  Communities must be closed at some level to function in a manner compatible 
with human nature.  Those who are already within the boundaries of closure have a role 
in the creation of social goods and their meanings.  Those who are already members 
already participate in the exchange of these goods.  But those who are outside, desirous 
of sharing in those goods, must be admitted by the members of the country before they 
participate in the goods.  Without this decision process, communities will be unstable, the 
meanings of social goods changes or are lost, and even the possibility of creating these 
kinds of meanings will be undermined.  States must have boundaries, creating members 
and nonmembers.  The state then controls the admission of new members, admitting 
some and rejecting others.   
 The state, envisioned in this manner, cannot be otherwise according to Walzer.  It 
isn’t that there aren’t other models; it is just that those models have not and cannot, at 
least at this time, exist.  One alternative to discrete communities with unique social goods 
and meaning is a global community.  While this is certainly a possibility, if communities 
are determined by the social goods and meanings that are shared, the global community 





alternative is a world without these kinds of social meanings, in which every individual is 
in some sense isolated from all others.  In the absence of community, justice amounts to 
the hoped for good behavior of others and there is nothing to be said about it.  The pursuit 
of justice, therefore, requires that we understand the nature of countries and the rights that 
attain to them because the state is the arbiter of justice. 
 
Cole’s Critique of Walzer 
 
 The most significant direct critique of Walzer’s membership argument is found in 
Philip Cole’s Philosophies of Exclusion.  Cole’s broad concern in this work is the 
legitimacy of attaching significance to borders from the perspective of liberal political 
philosophy.  The descriptive claim that people do attach significance to borders is not 
debatable.  However, Cole finds this practice indefensible and is troubled that this 
commonplace practice of ordinary people also finds itself entrenched in liberal political 
theory.  Cole writes, “most of the work in political philosophy that does address the 
question of membership boundaries…treads an uneasy path between the assertion that 
people just do attach significance to (national) boundaries, and the assertion that they 
ought to.”11  Political philosophy, and particularly liberal political philosophy, is a 
normative task.  The justification of borders and its most significant manifestation in 
membership, both in practice and conceptually, cannot be assumed.  It must be 
demonstrated.  The question for Cole then is whether the modern state, built upon a 
liberal political philosophy, can justify excluding people from membership.  His 
conclusion is that the modern state cannot justify excluding people from membership 
without violating liberal principles: 
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With its universalist commitment to the moral equality of humanity, 
liberal theory cannot coherently justify these practices of exclusion, which 
constitute “outsiders” on grounds any recognizable liberal theory would 
condemn as arbitrary.  And yet at the same time the liberal project depends 
upon these practices: the existence of a liberal polity made up of free and 
equal citizens rests upon the existence of outsiders who are refused a share 




The situation then, is one of contradiction between liberalism’s “universalism and its 
concealed particularism.”13  Resolving this contradiction requires opening borders and 
memberships to all comers if liberal political communities are to be true to their 
commitment to the equal moral worth of all people.  As part of this larger argument Cole 
analyzes the structure of each of Walzer’s analogies and argues that not only is the 
analogy incorrect, but the structure of Walzer’s argument in each case is incorrect.  
However, before undertaking this task Cole addresses a general issue of membership in 
states that Walzer assumes: that it is existing members who determine the rules of 
membership. 
 Discussions regarding membership often begin by discussing the nature of 
membership rules, specifically issues regarding their application.  A common argument is 
that members should not apply rules to others that did not apply to their own 
membership.  If this is the case, then membership rules should be static and never change 
and if one became a member through random or arbitrary procedures or conditions then 
there should be no membership rules at all.  Cole believes this is easily rebutted on two 
fronts.  The first is that we can distinguish between formative members, those who create 
the organization, and subsequent members, those who join after the organization has been 
created.  The two circumstances are so radically different that it is reasonable for 
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different rules to apply.  However, when we examine the modern state it can be claimed 
that everyone is a subsequent member, and therefore, should only apply to others 
membership criteria applied to themselves.  On another view, however, it can be argued 
that all members are formative members because the state is in a constant state of 
creation; every action undertaken by the current members is creating the state.  Hence, 
the rules that applied to them might not make sense, particularly if it becomes understood 
that the rules previously utilized were immoral.  If one becomes a member based upon 
skin color, then members should have the possibility of changing the rules of membership 
to be more inclusive.  This reasoning demonstrates that Walzer is correct that existing 
members should determine the rules and that they should not be constrained to use the 
rules applied to their own membership.  However, the lack of this constraint does not 
mean there are no constraints of any kind.  Cole will eventually argue that the 
commitments of liberal political philosophy provide significant constraints.  After 
defending Walzer’s purpose in considering membership, Cole turns directly to the 
analogies in the reverse order that Walzer presents them. 
 Cole begins by noting that families vary in their nature, based upon a variety of 
connections, including genetic, legal and conventional.  Families are usually a mixture of 
all three types of connections.  Families are not always chosen and when chosen they 
often include members not specifically chosen.  Further, these connections often do not 
rise to the level of relationships at all; they are simply connections with no practical force 
(e.g., relatives who have never met).  This mixed nature of families means that when an 
appeal to families is made we must pay attention to which aspect of the family, 





families is being used, families as an analogue for the state will no longer be useful: 
“Once we take into account the degree to which families are chosen and constructed, it is 
no longer a useful analogy.”14  Cole is claiming that the important aspects of family are 
those which are chosen and constructed through voluntary means.  Families as 
connections can be considered a natural entity whereas families as relationships are 
constructed.  Once the focus of concern becomes relationships, we have issues of ethical 
significance subject to our concerns as liberals.  Concluding that the state is a natural 
entity can lead to significant moral issues associated with extreme forms of nationalism 
to which liberal political philosophy objects.  If the state is a constructed entity of 
relationships we must understand the moral foundation of those relationships.  In this 
latter case, which Cole claims is the proper case,
15
 Walzer’s argument will not hold up to 
liberal scrutiny because our choices will be based upon arbitrary factors (to whom we are 
related naturally by birth) from the liberal viewpoint.   
 Cole further argues that there is a disconnect between the argument that Walzer 
appears to make and the argument that he actually makes.  Cole reconstructs Walzer’s 
apparent argument like this: 
1. Political communities are like families. 
2. Families involve ethical relationships with others that are not chosen. 
3. Therefore, political communities have ethical relationships with others that are 
not chosen. 
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In this case, the conclusion only follows from the premises if political communities are 
like families in all respects.
16
  This is simply not the case (Cole admits Walzer would 
agree) and therefore, the argument cannot work as it is offered.  Cole offers the following 
reconstruction of the actual argument: 
1. Families involve ethical relationships with others that are not chosen. 
2. Political communities involve ethical relationships with ‘outsiders’ that are not 
chosen. 
3. Therefore, families and political communities are alike in this respect. 
This is not, Cole claims, an argument at all, but a description.  As a description it has no 
normative force and “it is obvious now that we cannot deduce anything about the nature 
of political communities from the nature of families.”17  The difficulty of this argument is 
made plain by the problem of refugees.  Walzer’s approach justifies choosing between 
needy people based upon our existing connections to them.  If faced with two groups of 
refugees, Walzer’s account permits deciding whom to help based upon our natural 
connections with them,
18
 if we must choose because we cannot help all.  A needy group 
to whom we have no connections may be neglected in favor of those to whom we do 
have connections.
19
  These kind of natural connections are rejected by liberal philosophy 
as arbitrary and incapable of serving as moral justifications.  If those choices cannot be 
justified for refugees they also cannot be justified in less demanding circumstances. 
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 The club membership model is the most significant for Walzer and Cole aims to 
undermine it in several ways.  The first avenue of attack is to claim that Walzer uses a 
simplistic understanding of clubs in that Walzer assumes that clubs always decide freely 
upon their members.  In practice this is just not the case.  The membership policies of 
clubs are often subject to both legal and moral review, with objectionable policies being 
cast to the side, or, members who belong to clubs with objectionable policies receiving 
public scorn.  Cole proposes understanding membership differently.  A moral 
understanding of club membership will result in policies in which the only ground for 
rejecting a membership application is that the admission of this prospective member 
prevents achieving the goals of the club.  This applies to both the corporate goals of the 
club and the individual goals served by that individual’s membership in the club.  Clubs 
will only be permitted to refuse membership if the admission of any individual prevents 
the accomplishment of either of these goals.  Clubs will also only be permitted to deny 
membership based upon the number of members if there is some number of members 
beyond which the goals cannot be achieved.  This approach to club membership places 
significant limitations on the ability of clubs to deny membership.  If this is the correct 
model for club membership, it will apply only to states if states have specific purposes 
and the citizens of those states have legitimate individual purposes.  This places an 
obligation upon the proponent of closed borders to identify the specific purposes of the 
state, the legitimate individual purposes of its members and show that any particular 
admission undermines those purposes.  Cole claims that these requirements will result in 









 A second avenue of attack for Cole is Walzer’s claim that a self-conception of a 
political community is essential to its survival and therefore, political communities have 
the right to protect it.  Cole does not dispute that political communities have such a self-
conception.  His disagreement is with the claim that political communities have the right 
to control and protect this conception from outside forces.  Under the model of clubs 
presented thus far by Cole, such protection can only be justified by Walzer arguing that 
such a conception is required to fulfill either some purpose of the state or some legitimate 
individual purpose of its members.  This argument is not offered by Walzer and Cole 
claims that there is no reason we should expect that such an argument is even available.
21
  
If a shared self-conception is not required by political communities then there is no more 
justification for protecting that self-conception by restricting membership.  Further, the 
example of clubs cannot help here as it is not obvious that clubs must have such a shared 
self-conception to function or that where such a self-conception exists that clubs must 
protect it to survive.  The club analogy breaks down and does not support Walzer’s claim 
in the manner that Walzer needs, much in the same way that the family analogy does not 
support Walzer’s claim for restricted membership.  
 Finally, Cole turns to the neighborhood model.  In reconstructing this argument 
Cole reaches far beyond the simple uses to which Walzer uses neighborhoods in order to 
build a more complex argument.  Walzer’s limited claim is that neighborhoods can only 
exist as indifferent associations, where people are free to come and go based upon their 
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own preferences and the availability of resources within the neighborhood, if states 
containing the neighborhood are at least partially closed.  Cole interprets this as a claim 
about movement; movement is desirable and the fostering of local movement is best 
achieved by constraining wide movement.  If people do not have confidence in who can 
move into their neighborhood they will act to create local controls on movement.  To the 
limited claim of Walzer’s, Cole adds as a premise in the argument a further claim that the 
distinctiveness of cultures require similar boundaries of closure as do the protection of 
liberty, welfare and political systems.  Since each of these elements requires some kind of 
closure the state is entitled to the control of borders. 
To demonstrate their illegitimacy Cole recounts the circumstances of a Hasidic 
community in England celebrating Purim.  The celebration expresses their own identity 
but is open to all who wish to come and enjoy the celebration.  Cole’s claim is that 
groups give neighborhoods a distinctive character without border controls.  Membership 
in the group itself is tightly controlled; residence in the neighborhood is not.
 22
  This is in 
fact, the ideal of city life in which diverse groups maintain their own identities while 
intermixing with those with different identities.  What happens at the local level can also 
be found at the national level.  Just as the Hasidim do not control who comes through 
their neighborhood at Purim, so states do not need to control who comes through the 
country.  Although neighborhoods and states open in this manner might be considered 
fragile in their character, closing the neighborhood or state is not necessary for the 
identity of the neighborhood to exist and those groups contributing to this character are 
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free to relocate when necessary.  As a result, neighborhoods fail as a model for the 
modern state and its control of borders just as the other analogies have also failed.   
 Cole’s critique of Walzer on membership is forceful and requires careful 
consideration.  I believe, however, that Cole’s critique goes wrong on several accounts.  
The first problem is general and conceptual.  Cole claims Walzer uses the analogues as 
models, which assigns too much importance to each example.  Models are things we 
pattern off of, analogues are things we use to understand.  If the family is a model for the 
state then the state is patterned after the family and should implement the kinds of 
relationship and functions that the family serves.
23
  As an analogue, however, some 
feature of the family is elucidated in order to understand a similar feature in the state.  
This is precisely the argument that Walzer makes.  Walzer’s claim is that it is difficult to 
understand exactly what it is like to be a member of a state.  Walzer identifies some 
feature of the state and then uses the different analogies to help us understand this feature 
of the state.  The state is the way it is not because it is patterned from these models but 
because of the theory of goods Walzer relies upon in which communities are cooperative 
arrangements in which various goods have shared meanings.  It is not that political 
communities need a shared identity to be successful as Cole claims Walzer argues,
24
  it is 
that they already have one, without which the community would not exist in the first 
place.  Cole reverses Walzer’s argument, making Walzer’s premise his conclusion.  The 
inversion of the argument by Cole undermines his critique. 
  Rejecting Cole on the basis of his use of models rather than analogies does not 
let Walzer off the hook.  Cole could have criticized Walzer on the basis of the problems 
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associated with arguments from analogy, such as the great distance between the analogue 
and that which is being understood.  This critique might claim that each of the analogues 
is too far removed, that it is different in too many aspects, from the state to be of use.  
There are more aspects of the family, club and neighborhood that do not apply to the state 
than do apply.  This might indicate that the analogue is too far removed from the target 
and should not be applied.  Walzer, however, is careful to not appeal to too much in the 
analogy.  He does not claim that the family (or club or neighborhood) is a particular way 
and therefore states must be that same way, or that because the family and state are alike 
in one aspect they are alike in other aspects as well.  Rather, he starts with the descriptive 
claim of how states are and uses the family to help understand this.  The normative force 
of the argument derives not from the claim of how families are, but from our 
understanding that for families (and states) to not be this way undermines the institution 
in a fatal manner.  Families (and states) can be no other way and be functional.  Walzer 
escapes the standard critique of arguments from analogy because his argument does not 
overreach in its use of the analogy.  But what of Cole’s critique of particular aspects of 
the individual analogies? 
Cole’s argument regarding neighborhoods is shallow and doesn’t really reflect the 
problem of membership.  My enjoyment of dancing and food as part of a religious 
celebration doesn’t make me a member of the community, nor does it demonstrate that I 
share in the social meanings of the celebration.  Although I share in the superficial 
aspects of the celebration I do not share in the substantive meaning of the celebration 
because I do not share in the meanings attached to the social goods that underlie the 





community would be rebuffed.  Cole notes that the Hasidim do tightly control 
membership in their community.  Cole claims that this undermines Walzer but it can also 
be interpreted to support Walzer.  The Hasidim control membership in their religious 
community which allows the physical space of their neighborhood to be open while the 
social space of their neighborhood is closed.  Tamir recognizes how this is accomplished: 
“National and cultural groups wishing to preserve their uniqueness thus draw invisible 
frontiers between themselves and all ‘others,’ and create closure by constructing 
ideological, religious, linguistic, and mainly psychological barriers between members and 
nonmembers.”25  The claim is that closure can be psychological as well as physical.  
Closure at one level (physical or psychological) supports the openness at another level.  If 
both levels were to be open (membership in the Hasidic community and participation in 
the public celebration), it is doubtful that the celebration to which Cole refers could 
continue to have the same social meaning because it is tied to a shared history that 
nonmembers do not share.  Walzer’s strong claim is that the openness of neighborhoods 
is dependent on closure at some level.  Walzer treats this need for closure as an element 
of human nature: 
Neighborhoods can be open only if countries are at least potentially 
closed.  Only if the state makes a selection among would-be members and 
guarantees the loyalty, security, and welfare of the individuals it selects, 
can local communities take shape as “indifferent” associations, determined 
solely by personal preference and market capacity…To tear down the 
walls of the state is not…to create a world without walls, but rather to 




The alternative to state control of borders is either a Hobbesian state of nature with no 
controls or a global neighborhood.  If Walzer is correct that these are the alternatives, 
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then Cole’s rejection of the neighborhood argument will not hold because he doesn’t 
consider that analogy as expressing something in human nature.  Cole’s suggestion 
regarding regional models of membership, in which the state exercises authority over 
those in a geographic region but not who can be in that region, does not address Walzer’s 
claim regarding the human need for closure which is not just about security and welfare, 
but about identity.   
 Cole also critiques Walzer’s use of the family as relying upon an understanding of 
the family as being primarily natural, by which Cole means that that the relationships are 
based upon a kinship principle, it is blood that ties people together and creates 
connection.  That is not enough from the liberal perspective because such connections are 
considered morally arbitrary from the liberal point of view.  But Walzer is not bound by 
the understanding of the family as a natural entity.  Families bind us together, whether 
they are natural or constructed; so also our common way of life binds us together.  It is 
not the kinship that binds people together in political communities, but the commonness 
of their way of life.  That commonness is not natural in the sense that it is tied to our 
biology.  It is only natural in the sense that humans live within communities that create 
common ways of life.  So just as in families, we find ourselves connected to people we 
have never met, so also members of nations find themselves connected to people never 
met but to which the connection creates obligation.  Walzer doesn’t need the family to be 
a natural entity any more than he needs a nation to be a natural entity.  Cole has again 
overstated Walzer’s use of the analogy.   
 My rejection of Cole’s critique of Walzer argues that Cole holds a fundamental 





analogues is intended to assist in the understanding of political communities.  However, 
Cole extends the use of the analogies too far.  Of the analogues Cole writes, “These three, 
then, become models of membership which can, or cannot, be applied to the community 
itself.”27  The analogues are not used as models which are intended to be applied in total 
to develop political communities.  Rather, they are applied in part to help us understand 
the concept of political community of which most people have only a vague awareness.  
Walzer’s argument uses the analogues to understand the nature of political communities, 
but the nature of the political community is based upon his theory of goods and 
understanding of human nature.  Therefore, any disconnect between the membership 
models Walzer uses and the nature of political communities is only problematic if Walzer 
makes use of the features that are not relevant or if Cole can demonstrate that the feature 
of the membership analogue is not actually the way that Walzer understands it to be.  
Cole achieves neither of these ends.  Nor does Cole offer a critique of Walzer’s theory of 
goods that might undermine Walzer’s argument.  If Coles wishes to undermine Walzer’s 
understanding of membership he must focus his argument upon Walzer’s theory of 
goods, a task to which I will now turn. 
 
The Problem of Membership as a Dominant Good 
 
 Walzer’s approach to justice as a system of complex equality is based upon his 
theory of goods.  Membership is just one of the goods which communities create and 
distribute.  Cole’s critique of Walzer is based upon problems he finds in the relevance of, 
or difficulty in, the analogies that Walzer uses.  There are three additional approaches to 
critiquing Walzer’s approach to membership that are more comprehensive, none of which 
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Cole has considered.  The first is the argument from the nature of political community, 
either that political communities are where we should focus for justice or that political 
communities must be the way Walzer envisions them.  Liberal concerns for justice and 
equality, however, make this a difficult argument to make.  If justice is to be more than 
just hoped for outcomes there must be an authority adequate to enforce the criteria of 
justice.  Although some religious organizations do this, when they do they are 
functioning in a manner similar to states, but have restricted their scope to members.  
Justice across a geographically wide and pluralistic community seems to require the state, 
or something like a state, to enforce the commitments of justice (however they are 
understood) across the different groups.   
A second possible approach is to claim that the entire system of complex equality 
is somehow faulty.  Richard Arneson writes, “complex equality is a very weak brew, in 
which any element of anything that could plausibly be identified with egalitarianism is so 
diluted as to be virtually undetectable…Walzer seems not to notice how little equality 
remains in his ‘complex equality.’”28  Arneson argues that the autonomous distribution of 
goods within spheres is troubling because it allows some individuals to accumulate large 
amounts of some goods while others have little of that same good.  This inequality cannot 
be made up by those with little in one sphere having more in another sphere.  Complex 
equality, thereby, creates inequality rather than equality.  Ronald Dworkin argues that the 
entire system is incoherent because the shared meanings of social goods that Walzer 
relies upon do not exist in pluralistic societies such as ours.
 29
  Of significance is that 
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there is no shared meaning of justice to which Walzer can appeal to defend his own 
theory.  On such a model justice ends up relativistic and cannot be achieved.   
The third approach is to focus on the problem of membership as a gateway social 
good.  I will focus upon this latter argument as the one that bears the most promise for 
undermining Walzer’s argument for my concerns in this thesis.    
Recall from my earlier discussion that Walzer’s account of justice within a system 
of complex equality requires that different principles of distribution be utilized within the 
sphere of each of the various social goods produced by society.  Members may possess 
large amounts of any particular good relative to other members so long as the distribution 
is in accordance with the meaning of that good.  If the meaning of that good, for example 
medical care, is tied to one’s need for the good, then medical care could be distributed in 
unequal amounts based upon one’s need for medical care.  That one person receives 
substantial medical care is not unjust so long as there is a need for the medical care.  
Injustice occurs when an individual possesses large amounts of a good outside the 
relevant distribution principle or when possession of any good can be turned into 
possession of another good outside the control of the relevant distribution principle.  
Walzer’s primary concern of justice is to prevent dominance, the circumstance in which 
any particular good can be turned into other goods contrary to the appropriate distribution 
principle.  Membership, however, appears to escape from these distributive constraints in 
a very significant way. 
Membership functions as a gateway social good.  Only members, and those 
permitted by members, participate in the distribution of social goods.  Without 





Membership functions not only as a gateway social good, determining who gets in and 
has access to all other goods, but may also be understood as the social good that can 
legitimately be turned into every other social good.  Membership becomes a dominant 
social good, convertible in some way to all other social goods.  This problem has been 
observed by den Hartogh:   
[I]n every domain he discusses, access to the goods of the domain is 
reserved to the same category of members.  It follows that the sphere of 
membership cannot be fenced off from the other spheres in the way 
required by the nondominance principle:  the possession of membership 
determines or codetermines one’s share in the other spheres.30 
 
Den Hartogh claims this problem makes the principle of nondominance vacuous and 
undermines the principle of autonomous distribution, making Walzer’s system 
incoherent.  Den Hartogh resolves the problem by postulating that goods fall into two 
types of spheres: P-spheres in which the social good is distributed in accordance with 
some principle and D-spheres in which the social good is distributed in accordance with 
the meanings of the good or the principle identified in a P-sphere.  Membership is a 
distributive principle and thereby, defines a P-sphere that is operative across all D-
spheres.  This approach to understand Walzer substantially reorganizes the relation 
between spheres in a manner that seems to be in conflict with Walzer’s base theory of 
goods.  It also seems to minimize the relevance of Walzer’s principles of nondominance 
and monopoly.  However, since Walzer requires the principle of nondominance for 
complex equality to work, it is better to recognize that on Walzer’s account of complex 
equality the role of membership is unjust.  The question to be asked is whether 
membership can be modified such that it no longer functions as a dominant good. 
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One obvious solution is to eliminate membership altogether so that the 
distribution of social goods occurs to those who are entitled to any particular good based 
upon the relevant distribution principle which will no longer include membership as a 
relevant factor.  Goods are just distributed to anyone who is willing to participate in the 
exchange.  Potentially this approach undermines Walzer’s theory of goods in which 
goods obtain their meanings and their social roles from the community in which they 
operate.  It is unclear what meanings goods would have if the community is unbounded.  
This problem may not, however, be as serious as it appears.  The community may no 
longer be bounded in a legal or specified manner but still be bounded in a very real, 
practical way by those who choose to participate in it, similar to the Hasidic community 
presented by Cole.  The use of goods by those who participate in the community will help 
social goods obtain their meanings.  Participation, rather than membership, becomes the 
relevant factor.  This is perhaps a subtle distinction from the idea of membership but it 
reflects the activity of the individual rather than the status of the individual.  Participation 
can be open to all who choose to participate by their actions.  One risk associated with 
open participation is that the meanings of goods may be shaped by new participants in 
ways objectionable to existing participants.  Meanings attached to social goods are 
always subject to change, but in an open scenario the rate of change may become 
unacceptably quick or the direction of the change may be contrary to the desires of 
existing members.  It is unclear how to address this problem without utilizing 
membership and controlling who becomes a member.  Certainly those who object to the 
rate of change have the option of forming new groups and controlling the goods within 





goods.  Separating the goods from political communities doesn’t change the way in 
which goods function, it only changes the available enforcement mechanisms.  
Controlling change to the meanings of social goods by controlling participation (e.g., 
deciding who can participate) returns us to the original problem in which membership 
functions unjustly as a dominant good because controlling participation in this sense is 
the same as controlling membership. 
One might also simply think of membership as a precondition, rather than as a 
good to be distributed.  In this sense one is or is not a member in the same manner in 
which one might be of age, or not of age, to vote.  This approach, however, seems to 
undermine the emphasis that Walzer wishes to put upon membership as a good that can 
be distributed or not to others.  When age is a precondition, it is achieved as a result of a 
natural process.  If membership is a precondition, it is uncertain how one obtains it unless 
it is a good that can be distributed.  If it only results from a natural process, such as birth 
to those who are already members, then membership cannot be granted to those who are 
born to nonmembers because it is not a good to be distributed.  The precondition 
approach is actually more restrictive than Walzer’s approach because it is difficult to see 
how one meets the precondition if one does not already possess the relevant attribute. 
 Within Walzer’s scheme of complex equality it does not seem possible to truly 
eliminate membership as a gateway good.  What is possible is to change the conditions 
under which membership (or the benefits thereof) is granted or denied.  Under Walzer’s 
understanding, membership rules are established based upon the desires of the 
community without other moral constraint.  However, it is possible to develop rules of 





desires of the community members.  I do not intend to identify all such possible 
constraints, but certainly an obvious constraint would be the functionings of social 
institutions. 
 Suppose that a bounded community has determined to establish a public 
education system that includes publicly funded early education and a robust and 
integrated arts program among other possibilities.  Such education programs are highly 
attractive to many people today.  In order to gain the benefits such programs must be 
adequately funded and operated in particular ways, including low teacher-student ratios 
and the provision of supplies.  Metrics could be established to indicate when this 
education system is functioning properly.  When these standards are met, then 
membership would be open.  When the standards are not met, membership could be 
closed (or growth limited) until such time as the standards could be met.
31
  Such a system 
is not perfect and could be open to xenophobic manipulation.  However, the idea at work 
is that the community is justified in ensuring that important aspects of the community 
work as intended and are unaffected by changes in membership.  Membership, therefore, 
remains a gateway good, but one that is more easily accessible to those who do not 
already possess it.  I will explore this idea further below in Chapter 5. 
 
National Identity and Culture Arguments 
 
 The problem of cultural homogeneity and political organization has a long history 
in political theory.  It is widely believed that in order for people to form a cohesive and 
functional political organization there must be a cultural base shared among the members 
                                                 
31
 An alternative way to consider this is as a problem of scarcity.  When the educational system is 
functioning adequately the good of this type of education is not scarce; when there are problems in its 





adequate to provide a common framework and create trust between members.
32
  This 
shared cultural base, when it shapes a community in significant ways over long periods of 
time, becomes a national identity.  National identities may or may not coincide with 
states.  States may be composed of a single national identity or multiple national 
identities.  Similarly, national identities may be split between two or more states.  
Regardless of these types of problems, closed border theorists claim that states have an 
identity that shapes and molds the people who live within that state.  The strong influence 
of this identity upon the residents of any country gives those residents an interest in 
maintaining, or at least attempting to control change to, that identity.  It is the legitimate 
interest in maintaining the national identity in which one participates in which the second 
type of argument regarding closed borders is found.  The best known proponent of this 
view is David Miller.  In an alternate approach to this problem, Meilaender claims the 
first question states must face in developing immigration policies is, “Who are we?”  
Until, and unless, a country knows what it is and who it is, it cannot determine how to 
respond to those who wish to enter.  Meilaender’s argument varies from Miller’s in that it 
starts with the state rather than the nation.  Rather than a shared culture it is political 
authority that is shared.  When that authority is confronted by those outside its authority, 
the question that arises is about identity.  However, the end point of both views, that 
shared identity creates a presumptive right to control borders, is similar. Collectively 
these views are widely referred to as “liberal nationalism.”33  I will begin with Miller’s 
view. 
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Miller on National Identity and Culture 
 
 Miller has a robust body of work focusing upon the problems of nationality and 
national identity and the roles these two concepts play in both social justice and global 
justice.  They influence social justice because compatriots have special obligations to one 
another that they do not have to those outside the country.  It is not that citizens of a 
country have no obligations to noncitizens; rather, the obligation set for each is different.  
The two concepts influence global justice because they help to understand the kinds of 
obligations we have to those outside one’s country, including the question of whether 
people have the right to cross borders without constraint.  Miller’s understanding of these 
concepts and the role they play in justice leads to the conclusion that would-be 
immigrants do not have the right to enter a country of their choosing and that countries, 
with constraints, are acting morally when they choose to control their borders and deny 
entry to some, or even all, individuals. 
 Nationality is a distinct concept from state.  State represents a political 
organization with a monopoly of power in a particular geographic region.  Nations, 
however, represent a group of people with a common way of life who conceive of 
themselves as sharing this common, and presumably, unique way of life.  Miller 
emphasizes this twofold nature of nationality: “So if we say of a set of people that they 
compose a nation, we are not merely saying something about their physical 
characteristics or their behavior, we are also saying something about how they conceive 
                                                 
such a culture it is doubtful that any life could be meaningful.  Therefore, people have a right to a culture 
which also entails the right to preserve the culture.  Tamir has little to say about the problems of borders 
and migration.  It has also been questioned whether Tamir is a nationalist at all since in portions of her text 
she argues for the demise of the state in favor of regional associations (See Ronald Beiner,  Introduction to 
Theorizing Nationalism, edited by Ronald Beiner (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), 





of themselves.”34  It is possible for people to share a common way of life, as much of the 
contemporary West does, and not conceive of themselves as a nation or as people who 
share the same political organization.  Miller therefore indicates the difference between a 
nation and a state:  “nation must refer to a community of people with an aspiration to be 
politically self-determining, and ‘state’ must refer to the set of political institutions that 
they may aspire to possess for themselves.”35   
 When we keep these two concepts separate,
36
 it is possible to explore in further 
depth the different aspects of nations that lead to the existence of a national identity.  
Miller identifies five: belief, historical continuity, active identity, geographical place and 
a common public culture.  The legitimacy of the features of nations that lead to national 
identities in turn provides justification for the claim to political self-determination.  The 
legitimate claim of political self-determination in turn provides the justification for 
controlling borders.  When this process
37
 fails to meet the requirements of legitimacy, 
political self-determination and the corresponding right to control borders will fail to be 
justified. 
 Nationality requires a belief that a group exists in which the members hold special 
obligations to one another and self-awareness that one is a member of this group and 
therefore, holds these special obligations.  Miller writes, “National communities are 
constituted by belief: nations exist when their members recognize one another as 
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compatriots, and believe that they share characteristics of the relevant kind.”38  
Nationality is not something that can be recognized by the outsider; it must first be 
recognized by those inside the group.  If they fail to identify as a community, then there 
can be no nation regardless of what those outside the group may think.  This 
identification must be one of mutual recognition; it is insufficient for a single individual 
to feel these obligations, they must be felt by many.  This recognition of identity is also 
not tied to observable characteristics, such as language, religion or race.  It consists 
principally of a felt identity.  This self-awareness has built into it the idea of insiders and 
outsiders, that those within share something that is not shared with those outside.  This 
belief does not have to be objective, verifiable by those outside.  Although problematic 
because it admits of the problem of fictitious nations, Miller claims it is enough that those 
inside hold to this belief.  This self-awareness, therefore, is highly subjective and may be 
transient.  The nation exists only so long as the people hold the belief.  If the belief is no 
longer held, then the nation passes out of existence. 
 This transience leads to the concern that nationalities can pop in and out of 
existence.  The second aspect of nationality is intended to eliminate this problem.  
Nations must have some kind of historical continuity.  Nations stretch back into the past, 
sometimes into the “mists of time.”  People who are nations have shared passage through 
different kinds of events: wars, natural disasters, successes and failures.  Through these 
events the community held a shared sense of obligation to one another to participate in 
the struggles of the community.  These struggles are intended to build something better 
than what is, and therefore, nations reach forward to the future.  People who are nations 
share a vision of the future together, and in Miller’s language, a future that cannot be 
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  This historical continuity, while intended to mitigate the problem of 
transience is not intended to indicate the absolute permanence of national identities.  
Identities come and go, but they do so slowly. 
 Nations do not just have continuity into the past and the future, they are active 
today.  Nations live together, making decisions that shape and mold their community in 
the present.  These actions are made with a complete awareness that they build on the 
past and reach for the future, tying the past and future together.  It does not matter what 
the content of these actions is, whether at some future time these actions will be looked 
upon favorably.  The actions of today may be considered shameful at some point down 
the road.  What matters is that there is a current attempt to do things together, to respond 
to both internal and external events as a community, continuing to shape itself by the 
decisions it makes today. 
 Nations, although first and foremost composed of people, are also tied to a 
geographic region.  There must be a place to which the nation is tied in the past and in the 
future.  Even if the present is a diaspora, there is somewhere from which the nation has 
been dispersed and longs to go back to.  This attribute importantly creates the aspiration 
to be a state as well as a nation, to exercise political power in that area that is perceived as 
the homeland.  The denial of control of this land may be long term, but it doesn’t 
undermine the recognition of to which land this people belongs.  The ties to a geographic 
area and the present activity of a group provide for Miller the two features that separate 
nations from other groups, such as sports teams, or religions, with which people often 
closely identify. 
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 Finally, this self-aware group of people must share what has been referred to as 
“national character” but Miller prefers to call it “a common public culture.”40  A common 
public culture is “a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its 
life together.”41  Among the necessary characteristics are shared political principles and 
cultural ideals such as religious beliefs or language.  There is no need for monolithic 
cultural edifices; nations can tolerate diversity and subcultures provided that there is a 
shared way of life.  Public culture doesn’t eliminate all, or even most, variation in private 
culture.  Neither must this common public culture be explicit and identifiable by each of 
its members.  In some cases one may only recognize that there is difference between 
oneself and others of a different nation.  Miller explicitly brackets out shared biological 
ancestry as an acceptable element of the common public culture because it leads to 
problems of racism.
42
   
 Nations, so conceived, have a right to self-determination.  Three reasons provide 
justification for this claim.  The first is that this conception of national identity creates 
obligations, including those of distributive justice.
43
  “Nations are communities of 
obligations, in the sense that their members recognize duties to meet the basic needs and 
protect the basic interests of other members.”44  These obligations are best identified, 
fulfilled and enforced within a state.  When nations are split between states or share the 
state with other nations, the obligations recognized by the national culture encounter 
                                                 
40
 Ibid., 25. 
41
 Ibid., 26. 
42
 This perfectionist element seems out of place in Miller’s conception of identity.  Although biological 
ancestry may lead to racism, it seems completely consistent that it could be a part of a common public 
culture with the other elements of national identity, especially the aspects of belief and historical continuity.  
Miller provides inadequate grounds at this point to eliminate biological ancestry as an unacceptable 
element of public culture. 
43
 Ibid., 83-85. 
44





substantial obstacles to their fulfillment.  Secondly, this shared way of life, which shapes 
both individual lives and lives together, is important and subject to protection.  National 
identities provide the background within which most people develop their own identity.  
Individuals do not come into the world in a manner devoid of community, but rather are 
part of a community that shapes their identity from the moment of birth.  It is not that 
national identity is the only cultural resource available to people; but it is the first and one 
that for most people remains significant throughout their lives.  To deny the right to self-
determination to nationalities is to deny the nationality its very existence.
45
  Finally, there 
are reasons of autonomy.  The liberal conception of the person presumes that individuals 
have interests which include shaping their relations with those with whom they associate 
and identify.  Groups of people who identify with one another also share this interest of 
shaping their relations.  Political self-determination provides one avenue of recognizing 
this interest.  Nations are, therefore, entitled to decide how to express this national 
identity and how this identity may be shaped.   
Miller recognizes that this claim of self-determination and political autonomy 
requires the further justification of political autonomy.  The general right of a state to 
exercise authority within a particular geographic region requires justification.  If this 
cannot be justified, then nations can have no right to self-determination and political 
autonomy.  Further justification is also required as to why any particular state exercises 
authority over this particular geographic region. 
The modern state fulfills a wide range of functions which cannot be fulfilled 
without authority over a defined geographic area.  The justification for the existence of 
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authority and the boundaries of that authority is utilitarian: they enable both people and 
the state to accomplish what would not otherwise be possible.  “Assuming that such 
activities are broadly advantageous to citizens, the justification for states having the right 
to exercise their authority over a given territory is utilitarian in character:  everyone 
subject to such authority can expect to benefit from its existence.”46  The implication is 
that any person standing in a particular spot is subject to whatever government exercises 
authority over that spot because of the benefits the person receives.  Miller is silent here 
regarding the case in which the activities of state are not advantageous to the citizens; but 
this does not undermine his argument.  The authority of the state must include who can 
stay “since a system of territorial authority cannot function without some control over 
who falls within its scope.”47  The number of people in a state determines the kinds of 
benefits that can be offered, how these benefits are to be provided and the burdens placed 
upon those who provide the resources associated with those benefits.  Since many of 
these benefits are viable only over longer periods of time or stable population bases, high 
levels of fluctuation in population undermine the ability of the state to plan and carry out 
its functions as do demographic shifts in population, such as aging.  Assuming that the 
level of benefits provided reflects some aspect of the national identity held by these 
people, changes to the ability to provide the same benefits will influence the national 
identity.  The boundaries of authority also enable individuals to know to whom they are 
subject and what their obligations are.  This in turn enables individuals to conduct 
individual projects that would otherwise be at risk. 
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As to the second problem of why this state in this territory, Miller’s first response 
is that international law generally recognizes a state’s authority if the exercise of that 
authority is effective and respects human rights.  One reason to stop here, is that to raise 
the bar higher is to invite irresolvable arguments over specific borders.  But because there 
are lots of examples of creating and consolidating countries, some further justification of 
territory is required.  Miller’s answer is the contractarian notion of consent of the 
governed: “States can only claim territorial rights, in my view, as representatives of the 
peoples that they govern: such rights, in other words, belong fundamentally to the people 
collectively and are exercised on their behalf by the state they have authorized to do 
so.”48  The combined conditions of effectiveness and consent, however, are not adequate 
for they do not provide any real limits on geography.  To provide limits upon the 
geographical reaches of state Miller will appeal to the interaction of nations and the land 
they occupy. 
Consider the case where a nation over a long period of time occupies and 
continues to occupy in the present a piece of land.  Over time, their culture has interacted 
with the land to shape the culture; the culture has also shaped the land.  These people 
have rights to a territory:   
It has become the people’s home, in the sense that they have adapted their 
way of life to the physical constraints of the territory and then transformed 
it to a greater or lesser extent in pursuit of their common goals…this is 
sufficient for us to say that the nation is responsible for the eventual 
character of the territory it inhabits.
49
   
 
From this story the nation has legitimate claims to the enhanced value of the land which 
cannot be separated from the land.  Retaining that enhanced value requires retaining the 
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land.  However, this Lockean notion that a right of possession is obtained by mixing 
one’s labor with something is not the only grounding of the claim to territory.  The 
significance of the land to the people is more than just its economic value; the land 
possesses symbolic significance:   
Living on and shaping a piece of land means not only increasing its value 
in an economic sense, but also (typically) endowing it with meaning by 
virtue of significant events that have occurred there, monuments that have 
been built, poems, novels and paintings that capture particular places or 
types of landscapes.
50
   
 
This emotional attachment to place, which contributes to the identity of which these 
people are aware, both creates and justifies political authority over a place.  The strength 
of such claims may vary and are not always straightforward, but generally this process, 
which Miller calls “the occupancy/transformation basis for territorial rights,”51 is 
adequate to justify political authority over some region. 
Miller recognizes that there are several standard objections to his justification of 
the state and its authority over a geographic region.  It might be claimed that occupancy 
and transformation only count if the occupier has a right to the property to begin with.  
Analogous to the theft of property, an unjust occupation shouldn’t generate legitimate 
property claims.  Miller’s response:  For short time occupancy this is correct.  But over 
the long term an occupier who expels an original occupier may come to have claim to the 
property, although they may still owe compensation to the original and expelled occupier 
as based on Miller’s account of historical responsibility.  A second response is to think 
about who might actually have an unblemished right of access to any land.  The 
conditions for such unblemished rights would be so difficult to achieve that no one would 









have rights to any land, given the length of time in which most portions of the world have 
been occupied.  Therefore, the claim regarding rights to property has historical limitations 
that prevent it from being anything beyond a prima facie moral principle. 
Another objection is that the analogy to private property rights is not appropriate.  
Immigrants have the right to enter land to save their lives.  Miller’s response:  This is a 
kind of remedial right, held against all people or countries who can meet that right.  The 
territorial rights are not absolute, but neither are the immigrant’s rights.  An immigrant in 
need of refuge has the right to that refuge but not the right to demand who provides it:   
…the immigrant cannot demand admission to any particular state:  his 
rights do not trump rights to territorial integrity, even though they cast a 
shadow over the rights.  The shadow they cast is that a state that claims 
legitimate authority over a territory must also take reasonable steps to 
protect the human rights of those whose position is worsened by the 
boundaries it defends – which might mean, in special circumstances where 
there is no alternative, allowing them to come …In other words, it cannot, 
ethically speaking, defend its boundaries and do nothing else in a world 




The rights a state holds regarding boundaries must look in two directions, both inward 
and outward, to measure the effects of its control.  The control of borders is not a right to 
be exercised without regard for its effects. 
There is also another possible objection which Miller does not seem to consider:  
Why is it not adequate to say the scope of authority is whoever is in the land?  This 
concept is readily accepted by many.  For example, Hobbes accepts that people move and 
when they do they come under the authority of the state that is there.
53
  Miller, I believe, 
conflates the problem of state legitimacy with the conceptualization, justification and 
limitation of state authority.  State legitimacy is concerned with the justification of 
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particular political institutions.  Why do these political institutions have a claim to 
exercise power in this area?  Contemporary theory generally grounds political legitimacy 
in the consent of those governed.  State authority is grounded in the political legitimacy 
of the state.  States without political legitimacy wield authority without justification and 
there is no presumption that citizens should obey that authority.  Where there is political 
legitimacy there remains the question of the limits of the authority exercised by political 
institutions.  What actions are political institutions justified in taking?  States require 
some kind of authority simply to function as a state.  If this is the case, then the grounds 
of authority is in state function, which still leaves the problem of justifying the scope and 
means of that authority.  On the regional model of authority the state exercises its 
authority over whoever is in its territory.  When one crosses a border, regardless of 
intention or duration of stay, one becomes subject to the sovereign in that area.  This 
seems to be a fairly unproblematic approach.  However, this approach still would require 
some distinction between those who intend to take up residence with its accompanying 
benefits and obligations and those who only intend a short stay and therefore require a 
smaller set of benefits and obligations appropriate to the duration of their visit.  A further 
complication is the negative effects of large and unexpected movements.  Such 
movements might stress the ability of state institutions to fulfill their functions.  Many 
state functions require long range planning which could be undermined by unconstrained 
movement.  The significance of this discussion is not to claim that a regional model could 
never work; rather, it is that regional models can face the same negative effects of 
movement that the state will desire to control in a manner similar to Miller’s national 





One final question remains for Miller to answer: If it has been justifiably 
established that immigrants do not have, generally, a right to enter, and that states can 
justify their right to territory, should (ought)  states exercise that right, and if so, how 
should (ought) they exercise it?  The state needs to justify its exercise of that right under 
particular conditions.  “An adequate explanation will be one that links immigration policy 
to the general goals of the society in question.  These goals will reflect existing national 
values and will ideally be set through a continuing process of democratic debate.”54  This 
debate, which will be ongoing and occur under different circumstances, will lead to 
different decisions regarding immigration control that reflect those circumstances on 
different occasions.   
My claim here is not that the interests of current citizens will always 
outweigh the interests of those who would wish to immigrate, supposing 
we could find a neutral metric by which these interests could be compared.  
I am appealing instead to the value of self-determination, to the 
importance to a political community of being able to determine its future 
shape, including for example the balance it wishes to strike between 
economic growth and environmental values, and pointing out that question 
of membership are intimately involved in such decisions.
55
   
 
This position recognizes the claims of would be immigrants, but doesn’t let those 
interests trump (be lexically prior to) the interests of the receiving state.  What is unclear 
here, in Miller’s argument, is how it would not be the case that the interests of the 
receiving state will always trump the interests of the would-be immigrant.  It appears as if 
all of the power resides in the hands of the receiving state unless some better standard for 
determining the outcome of the democratic deliberation is developed.  Miller assumes 
that democratic debate will limit the ability of the debate to be completely parochial, but 
it is not inconceivable for groups to only consider their interests.  It is also the case that 
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one can reach this conclusion permitting border controls via a different path, one 
acceptable to liberals: the protection of liberal institutions themselves.  On this account 
Whelan writes:  
A liberal may properly compromise liberal principles in practice, in the 
nonideal world, when this appears to be necessary in order to preserve or 
strengthen them…In this spirit a liberal might…uphold the traditional (and 
admittedly nonliberal) sovereign power over borders…but might also 
support restrictive policies on these matter.
56
   
 
Liberals will care about how borders are justified, which might lead them to reject 
Miller’s national identity argument and accept Whelan’s protection of liberal institutions 
argument.  The result, however, is the same, and to the extent that liberal institutions 
form a part of the national identity, the arguments are very close to the same. 
 Miller’s argument utilizing national identity is based upon a descriptive account 
of national identity: he examines what is in order to give his account of national identity.  
This descriptive project is then used to provide the foundations for a normative argument 
justifying the different treatment of those who do not share that identity because they do 
not share this identity.  This approach bears the risk of committing the is-ought fallacy, 
concluding that because something is that it is also what should be.  That people hold 
national identities is without dispute; that they are entitled to hold and protect these 
identities seems to require a more robust defense than what is offered.  This concern is 
evident in Cole’s critique of Miller’s argument and it is to that critique I now turn. 
 
Cole on Liberal Nationalism 
 
 The sole sustained critique of the accounts of liberal nationalism related to 
immigration is found in Cole’s Philosophies of Exclusion, where he takes up a multi-
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pronged attack upon both Miller and Tamir’s accounts of closed borders.  The general 
thrust of Cole’s argument is that neither Miller nor Tamir can maintain a project that 
successfully defends the status of states as ethical communities adequate to justify the 
exclusion of outsiders without resorting to an ethical relativism that is indefensible from 
the liberal viewpoint. 
 Miller, in parts of his argument that I have not reviewed here, appeals to the 
distinction between ethical universalism and ethical particularism.
57
  Ethical universalism 
makes the claim that moral principles must be equally applied to all persons and that the 
particulars of relationships and circumstances are not relevant to our moral obligations.  
Ethical particularism, on the other hand, claims that our moral obligations are such that 
questions of whether we have obligations in particular cases or to whom we have more 
demanding or prioritized obligations is influenced or determined by the relationships we 
have with people.  Miller writes, “Ethical particularism…holds that relations between 
persons are part of the basic subject-matter of ethics, so that fundamental principles are 
attached directly to these relations.”58  In Miller’s account the nation is an ethical 
community that creates ethical obligations to members of the nation without creating 
similar obligations to those outside the nation by drawing upon the sentiments we have 
for compatriots:  “ethical life must be a social institution whose principles must 
accommodate natural sentiments towards relatives, colleagues, and so forth and which 
must rely upon a complex set of motives to get people to comply with its requirements.”59  
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 Cole’s interpretation of ethical universalism and ethical particularism is found in 
two principles.  Ethical universalism is made manifest in a principle of humanity, 
whereas particularism results in a principle of community.  These two principles appear 
in Cole’s work as exclusive and irreconcilable to each other.  Liberal nationalism makes 
the principle of community outweigh the principle of humanity.  Liberalism’s 
commitment to egalitarian principles requires the principle of humanity to outweigh the 
principle of community.  Cole’s concern is that the arguments leading to the conclusion 
of liberal nationalism results in one of two things: a thick ethnic identity that excludes 
outsiders but is indefensible to liberalism or a thin civic identity that is defensible to 
liberalism but has no nationalistic character to it.  In either case, liberal nationalism fails 
to be what it claims: a form of liberalism that justifiably excludes outsiders (by 
integrating the two principles). 
 Cole’s argument against Miller’s form of liberal nationalism in detail is this: 
1. Liberal nationalism rests upon moral communitarianism, in which the principle of 
community outweighs the principle of humanity. 
2. For this to hold as a liberal perspective, it must be demonstrated that the nation as 
community has moral value compatible with the liberal tradition. 
3. Miller’s justification of the nation as an ethical community appeals to the idea that 
communities are by definition ethical because they include relations of 
reciprocity. 
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4.  This claim permits the relations of any community to outweigh the demands of 
liberalism as expressed in the principle of humanity. 
5. Some such communities, e.g., racist communities, are for purposes contrary to 
liberal principles. 
6. Therefore, the appeal to the nation as community is inadequate to ground ethical 
obligations that exclude outsiders compatible with liberalism. 
Cole’s concern in the arguments is twofold.  The result is either a kind of ethical 
relativism in which moral obligations are just whatever various communities determine 
them to be or we find ourselves in a position in which there can be no moral evaluation 
about the kinds of communities there are.  All communities have to be accepted, which 
undermines the central moral and egalitarian concerns of liberalism.  When this position 
is then applied to the problems of immigration, any control policies developed either 
cannot be justified to those outside the community or collapse into a kind of national 
conservatism because they are based in controlling the numbers of problematic peoples 
admitted or require a kind of pious commitment to the receiving nation.  Both of these 




 The argument of Cole against Miller rests upon the conflict between the 
commitments of the principle of humanity and the principle of community.  Without 
argument Cole assumes that these two principles are incompatible, that one must choose 
either to extend moral obligations universally, to each person equally and without 





no moral obligations to those outside the community.  This is a debate about the role of 
boundaries in moral obligations.  Cole writes regarding particularism:  
From the particularist perspective, we have seen that we begin our moral 
reasoning from relationship facts about ourselves and others: our rights 
and duties, expectations and obligations, arise from these relationships.  
Therefore, these relationships generate moral principles…those who are 
not in the relationship are excluded from the rights and responsibilities 
that arise from it; moral duties and expectations cannot extend beyond the 
relationship.
61
   
 
What Cole finds operative in this understanding are principles of legitimation and 
principles of distribution.  Legitimating our moral principles extends only to members of 
the community as also does the application of these moral principles.  To those outside 
the community members owe nothing. 
 This is, however, too strong a claim.  Miller’s argument from particularism can 
ground obligations to those outside the community to the extent that those within the 
community are in relationship with those outside the community.  But Miller also 
recognizes that we have duties to people simply based upon their humanity: “The duties 
we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we 
own to human beings as such.  That is not to say that we owe no duties to humans as 
such.”62  These duties are best understood in terms of “basic human rights” rather than in 
terms of welfare.
63
  The claim of Miller is not that there are no obligations to those 
outside, but that they are different obligations.  Different relationships ground different 
obligations.  People in close, enduring relationships ground more demanding obligations 
to one another, whereas people in distant, transient relationships ground less demanding 
obligations.  The nation, which has significant influence upon the meanings in life is a 
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community of close and enduring relationships and therefore, grounds demanding 
obligations.  Relations with those outside the nation ground less demanding obligations.  
But obligations to compatriots and noncompatriots can be understood as duties of justice.  
Justice demands one thing of us domestically and another globally.  This should be 
understood in two ways.  The first is the priority of provision.  The protection of rights 
and provision of well-being falls first to compatriots and secondarily upon 
noncompatriots.  When societies are unable or unwilling to protect rights domestically 
the burden of protecting those rights may fall on outsiders.  The second understanding is 
the extent of the rights and well-being provided.  Global justice does not demand global 
equality of whatever measure we are concerned with (e.g., resources, opportunity, 
welfare).  Inequality can exist on a global level so long as some “global minimum that is 
due to every human being as a matter of justice” is provided.  Different obligations and 
duties to compatriots and noncompatriots may coexist.
64
  
It is also not the case that the community can ground just any obligations and that 
these obligations are not without scrutiny by other moral principles.  This has two 
aspects.  The first is that we have obligations to those outside our community, such as 
refugees.  But there is a variety of ways to fulfill those obligations.  It is not 
inconceivable that nations can close their borders and still fulfill those obligations.  Miller 
also notes that states should have some latitude in responding to asylum requests because 
making the request lies in the hands of the refugee who may pass over some legitimate 
opportunities thereby causing a disproportionate burden upon a single country.
65
  The 
second is that some principles that are external to the community, when understood as a 
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nation, are still applicable to the nation as community.  The principle of harm, rooted in a 
particular view of human nature and natural rights rather than in a particular community, 
can be applied to the obligations of the community and limit obligations that arise from 
the community.
66
  Obligations to not harm others prevent one from performing certain 
actions that might benefit one’s compatriots.  Miller’s conceptualization of responsibility 
and its application to national responsibility seeks to make this claim.
67
  The claim I am 
making here is that both the principle of humanity and the principle of community can 
give rise to moral obligations.  It might be that the two principles are necessarily 
exclusive, but I believe that that argument is difficult to make and Cole does not make it.  
I will, in Chapter 5, develop an argument that does attempt to encompass both principles 
in relation to immigration. 
 
Arguments from Single Principles 
 
Freedom of Association and Closed Borders 
 
 The final kind of liberal argument defending the state’s right to close its borders is 
the argument from single principles.  These arguments, like the arguments from principle 
in the open borders school, take some liberal principle and explore its meaning and then 
demonstrate that when understood in a particular way, this principle defends the state’s 
right to close its borders.  The most prominent example of this in the closed borders 
school is the 2008 article “Immigration and the Freedom of Association” by Christopher 
Heath Wellman. 
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 Wellman’s article, awarded the Kavka Prize68 in 2011, focuses upon the freedom 
of association, the right of people to choose with whom they wish to associate.  Wellman 
draws a strong conclusion, claiming that “every legitimate state has the right to close its 
doors to all potential immigrants, even refugees desperately seeking asylum.”69  This is 
an extraordinarily strong conclusion to draw from a single principle and I will argue that 
Wellman overstates the claim of his argument. 
 The freedom of association is widely regarded as an important right for the 
individual.  Wellman points out that this right has two faces:  it not only includes the right 
to associate but it also includes the right to not associate, or to disassociate.
70
  We come 
together with others and we refuse to come together with others.  This right is particularly 
important in self-regarding affairs, such as marriage and religion.  While it once was the 
case that marriages were arranged, in liberal communities it is widely believed that one 
should choose one’s own spouse.  Similarly, one should be able to choose (or not choose) 
a religious affiliation based upon the meaning that religion provides for the individual 
life.  Both of these examples demonstrate the right to disassociation as well.  One has the 
right to choose one’s own spouse, but others have the right to refuse an offer of 
matrimony.  Similarly one has the right to choose with whom one wants to worship but 
no group is obligated to permit anyone who wishes to worship with their group.
71
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The step from the individual right of association to the state’s right appears 
straightforward at this point: “just as an individual has a right to determine whom (if 
anyone) he or she would like to marry, a group of fellow-citizens has a right to determine 
whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into its political community…a state’s freedom 
of association entitles it to exclude all foreigners from its political community.”72  
Although this conclusion appears straightforward, Wellman points to two possible 
objections. 
 The first objection claims that there are substantial moral differences between 
groups and individuals such that what is true of the individual is not true of the group.  
The second objection is that if it is possible for groups to have rights and interests, 
perhaps the interests of groups should receive less priority than the rights and interests of 
individuals.  Wellman deals with each of these quickly.  Using the examples of Augusta 
National Golf Club’s exclusion of women and the Boy Scouts of America exclusion of 
homosexuals and atheists, Wellman points out that the concern with membership in these 
cases isn’t that the groups shouldn’t determine their own membership, but that in certain 
cases the presumed right to self-determination can be overridden by more important 
social needs.
73
  The presumption remains that groups still have a prima facie right to 
determine their own membership in most cases.  After all, as White notes, “What makes 
it their association, serving their purposes, is that they can exercise this ‘right to 
exclude.’”74  It is only in rare cases that the interests of society to require inclusion will 
override the presumptive right of the group to determine members, which includes the 
possibility of excluding some who desire to belong. 
                                                 
72
 Wellman, 110-111. 
73
 This position is similar to the argument of Cole in Chapter 2. 
74





However, perhaps states are still different than groups because citizenship is not 
an autonomous choice – it is received by one’s status at birth.  Wellman rejects this claim 
as well by exploring the implications of denying the right of association to states.  
Imagine the circumstances where Canada might be compelled by others to join NAFTA 
or Slovenia to join the European Union.  It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
either could be forced to join these organizations or the conditions in which the 
organization would be required to admit either of the states.  Such a move violates the 
state’s right to self-determination, a right which enables each individual state to 
determine with whom it wishes to associate or not.  In an even more extreme example, 
Wellman claims that the only thing that prevents unilateral annexation of one country by 
another is the recognition of the right to self-determination.  If this right does not exist, 
then there are no grounds for objecting to any annexation provided that it is peaceful and 
does not violate the other rights held.  The only ground by which unilateral annexation is 
understood to be wrong is the right to self-determination of countries.  Hence, the right of 
groups to self-determination and to control their membership still stands: “Freedom of 
association is not something that requires an elaborate justification, then, since it is 
simply one component of the self-determination which is owed to all autonomous 
individuals and legitimate states.”75 
 The crux of this argument requires understanding that the right of association 
belongs to both individuals and states.  Even if the right of association for individuals for 
purposes such as marriage is more important than the right of members of groups to not 
associate, it does not lead to the conclusion that groups (and states) do not have this right.  
The claim that one may not ever actually associate with some member also does not 
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undermine a group’s right to association.  Newly admitted members have a say in how 
some group will be in the future, and how the group will be in the future is something 
that existing members legitimately care about.  Hence, existing members care about how 
new members might affect the future of the group. This perspective regarding groups 
applies to states, as has already been demonstrated above in Miller’s argument regarding 
national identity and character.
76
 
 What of the second objection?  Is it not possible that an individual’s interest in 
entering a country ought to outweigh the group interest of the state in keeping someone 
out?  Wellman points out that membership in one’s own country is important, for many 
reasons.  Since people care about their membership in other kinds of organizations they 
care about, it is only natural that they care about the membership of their state, and in 
fact, we find that people care a great deal about their countries and recognize that the 
membership of the state affects the policies the state promulgates.  The fact that most 
citizens never associate personally with most other members of the state is irrelevant 
because together they make decisions that affects each other’s lives.  Given the 
possibility of this effect, citizens care about the composition of the state, and rightfully 
so.  If people and groups have the right to self-determination, an important part of that 
right is determining who makes up the “self” in the case where the “self” is a composite.  
Hence, as part of both individual and group self-determination, states have the right to 
determine who is admitted and allowed to become a member. 
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Wellman’s conclusion is that states have the right to control membership, whether 
or not they in fact do so.  States may find themselves in a position where their interest is 
to open their borders, whereas at other times it is in their interest to close them.  Both 
positions are justifiable.  The argument is not strictly consequential or utilitarian 
regarding open borders.  It isn’t a claim that either open or closed borders brings about 
some best outcome.  Such a decision is contextual and empirical.  The argument is 
deontological in nature; states have the right to make the decision regarding association 
and there is no right decision.  Wellman is also careful to distinguish his argument from 
that of culture and identity associated with David Miller.  The important distinction is 
that the freedom of association tied to self-determination is available to anyone, not just 
to those groups who have a particular history or form of association.  In Wellman’s 
understanding then, his argument encompasses everyone, whereas Miller’s argument is 
less inclusive.  This, then, leaves Wellman with a presumptive argument in favor of 
closed borders, unless weightier arguments can override it.  Wellman’s examination of 
those arguments, which I reviewed earlier in this chapter in considering Miller’s national 
identity argument, does not override Wellman’s presumptive argument. 
 I do not find, however, Wellman’s argument to be fully persuasive for two 
reasons.  The first is that Wellman routinely appears to either conflate the ideas of self-
determination and freedom of association or he readily assumes that freedom of 
association is constitutive of self-determination.  That this is the case is not obvious.  My 
second objection is that Wellman fails to give proper regard to the problem of 





 In my review of Wellman’s argument it is possible to note the transition of his use 
of freedom of association to self-determination.  In the early part of his argument, in 
considering actions which are self-regarding, Wellman consistently uses the phrase 
freedom of association.  Similarly, his appeal to others (e.g., White) on the subject relates 
to freedom of association.  The context of these claims is self-regarding actions, those 
that have a significant impact upon the course of one’s own life, even though in most 
cases the actions taken also affect the lives of others.  It is in the consideration of the first 
problem in his account, the difference between individuals and states, that Wellman first 
introduces the concept of self-determination.  By the time Wellman considers the 
examples of Canada and NAFTA and Slovenia and the EU, Wellman is using the terms 
interchangeably.  Consider these two passages: 
…there are at least two reasons that this inference from an individual’s to 
a state’s right to freedom of association might strike some as problematic, 
however.  First, presumably there are morally relevant differences 
between individuals and groups, and these differences might explain why 




If legitimate states did not enjoy a right to freedom of association – a right 
which entitles them to decline invitations to associate with others – then 
they would not be in a position to either accept or reject the terms of these 
regional associations…And the reason it is wrong to forcibly include these 
countries is because Canada’s and Slovenia’s rights to self-determination 




In the first example, Wellman uses the terms interchangeably, as if there is no difference 
between the two.  In the second, it is plain that the freedom of association is constitutive 
of the right to self-determination, a position to which Wellman commits.
79
  It seems 
reasonable in the context to assume that Wellman intends the constitutive understanding 
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to the first passage as well.  There is some number of rights, of which one is the freedom 
of association, that constitute the right of self-determination.  But if this is the case, the 
first passage is problematic because if there are moral differences between individuals 
and groups then it is entirely possible that one and not the other possesses the right to 
self-determination.  It is also possible that one has a right to self-determination or 
freedom to associate that is bounded.  Finally, it might be that self-determination is 
constituted differently for individuals and groups.   
Wellman readily acknowledges that a group’s ability to determine its members is 
generally not questioned, although the manner in which it determines membership is 
often constrained by larger social purposes.  If this is legitimate, and Wellman appears to 
believe it is, then one cannot simply assume that an individual’s freedom of association 
transfers, mutatis mutandis, to the state.  An argument needs to be provided for that 
claim.  The argument Wellman presents is based upon the role of association in self-
determination, but it is easy to conceive of arguments against the claim that the rights 
constitutive of self-determination are the same for both individuals and states.  One such 
argument might claim that individuals are natural whereas states are constructed.  One 
might argue that this difference is irrelevant but one might argue that this difference 
makes all the difference.  If states are constructed, then they have only the rights required 
for fulfilling the purposes for which they are created.  Even if it is granted that both 
groups are entitled to self-determination, it may be the case that what constitutes self-
determination for each is different from how it is constituted for the other.  It is this latter 





 States and individuals are substantially different, particularly in their ability to 
affect the lives of others.  An individual decision to associate or not, in most cases, has a 
limited affect upon a person’s life.80  For most people there are adequate opportunities 
elsewhere to pursue or other people with whom to associate.  When an individual, or a 
group, chooses not to associate the effects are limited.  When the state makes these kinds 
of decisions regarding an individual, it has significantly profound and long-lasting 
effects.  If the decision of the state is to disassociate with one of its citizens (by revoking 
citizenship) then the problems for that individual, in a world of states, might be 
insurmountable.  Walzer, in his account of membership, highlights this problem: 
Men and women without membership anywhere are stateless persons.  
That condition doesn’t preclude every sort of distributive relation: 
markets, for example, are commonly open to all comers.  But non-
members are vulnerable and unprotected in the marketplace…They are cut 
off from the community provision of security and welfare…Statelessness 




If, as Wellman maintains, the freedom of association includes the freedom of 
disassociation, there is good reason to deny this kind of right as part of national self-
determination.  In fact, that a country cannot disassociate itself from a natural born citizen 
is part of several international documents, including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
82
  If 
the case is that states may not disassociate from their own citizens, perhaps they cannot 
deny association with noncitizens as well (this is one way to understand the claim of the 
open borders school).  If the international community has determined that the right of 
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association is bounded, then Wellman must give more consideration to what these 
constraints are and their legitimacy.
83
  In addition to the individual perspective, 
Wellman’s approach to state freedom of association would appear to justify the White 
Australia Policy in which Australia, in pursuit of creating a pure Anglo country, denied 
admission to those who were not Caucasian.  This policy, long abandoned by Australia, 
has been considered indefensible by those on both sides of the open borders debate.
84
 
If my analysis here is correct, then Wellman has not created the presumptive case 
for a state’s right to control immigration by using an important principle of political 
liberalism.  That is not to claim that it cannot be done, or that it cannot be done from the 
freedom of association or the right of self-determination (although Steiner’s use of the 
freedom of association to argue for open borders casts doubt upon the possibility).  My 
limited conclusion here is that Wellman has not provided a fully persuasive argument, 
leaving open the possibility of providing one.  However, I believe it is highly likely that 
any such attempt will encounter similar difficulties in trying to ground such a significant 




 This chapter has considered the liberal arguments for the position that states have 
the right to control their borders.  Walzer’s argument, based in his proposed theory of 
goods, argues that all goods are social goods to which meanings are attached by the 
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community.  The community retains the right, in fact must have the right, to control to 
whom these goods are distributed in order for them to retain their social meanings.  
Although I have rejected Cole’s analysis of this argument as inadequate, I have offered a 
new critique that claims membership, as a gateway good, functions as a dominant good in 
a manner that makes membership unjust on Walzer’s theory of goods.  Membership, 
therefore, must be reconceived, most likely to be less restrictive, than Walzer claims.  
Miller’s argument from national identity and ethical particularism in which communities 
give rise to more stringent ethical obligations than other relationships and permits the 
nation to control its membership was reviewed.  Cole’s analysis of this argument was 
also rejected, claiming that without argument Cole assumes that the position of liberal 
nationalism must see the community as the only source of moral obligations.  Rather, it is 
possible to argue that the principle of humanity and the principle of community ground 
different types of obligations that must be reconciled or integrated.  I then offered a 
critique of Miller claiming that it is this reconciliation and integration in which Miller’s 
argument is found wanting.  More work must be done to determine how these two 
principles work together.  Finally, I examined the single principle argument of Wellman, 
based in the right of freedom of association, critiquing this argument as being inadequate 
because the principle of disassociation, understood from the perspective of the individual, 
does not transfer to the state in the manner in which Wellman envisions, because the 
effects of the states disassociation is fundamentally different than those of individual 
disassociation.  The conclusion then, is that arguments for exclusive control of borders do 





weaker than envisioned.  The question to be asked, which I will take up in Chapter 5, is 





NONIDEAL ARGUMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
 
 
In the previous two chapters I have examined theoretical, or ideal, arguments for 
open and closed borders.  These arguments aim for theoretical consistency and coherence 
without regard for the actual conditions in the world or whether the end claims are 
achievable in the world.  Problems exist in each set of arguments preventing the 
conclusion that either set is persuasive to those not already committed to the position.  
There is a further problem with these ideal approaches.  While theoreticians debate about 
the proper understanding of borders and whether it is morally permissible to control 
borders from the liberal point of view, real people want to cross those borders in order to 
have better opportunities or to escape suffering felt in the present.  They cannot wait 
another decade or two, or longer, for a theoretical agreement to be reached.  These people 
want to move now. 
This chapter considers two kinds of nonideal arguments that seek to resolve the 
problem now, creating more open borders for some, without regard for answering the 
question whether liberal polities are justified in controlling borders.  The first approach, 
labeled nonideal approaches, examines how the ability to cross borders might resolve 
very grave problems in the world today and concludes that opening borders will alleviate 
that suffering.  I shall look first at the nonideal argument that immigration is superior to 





examination of the claim that migration is preferable to aid as a means of resolving 
disparities in global well-being provides a useful summary for considering this claim.  It 
remains the view most often cited in the migration literature.  Shelley Wilcox offers a 
different approach by focusing on the problem of harm.  She develops a Global Principle 
of Harm in which those causing harm must remediate the harm caused.  Open borders is 
one such way to repair the damage done to poor countries (and individuals) by wealthy 
countries.  The result of these arguments is not a claim that borders cannot justifiably be 
closed, but a claim that the borders should be substantially more open than they are now, 
and in some cases must be more open, as a matter of justice. 
The second approach included in this chapter, which I have labeled international 
regimes, includes a strong economic rationale, focusing upon the problem of labor 
distribution in a globalized economy, coupled with pragmatic political concerns.  Thomas 
Straubhaar proposes a General Agreement on the Movements of People.  This agreement, 
patterned after other existing international agreements such as the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
provides for the movement of labor between countries in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement.  Bimal Ghosh, of the International Migration Organization, proposes a New 
International Regime for the Orderly Movements of People.  This regime determines the 
kinds and rates of acceptable movement throughout the world, establishing a system of 












Since John Rawls introduced the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory 
philosophers have come to use these terms freely.  However, the terms are often used in a 
manner distinct from the original understanding of Rawls and before examining the 
nonideal arguments associated with the open borders debate, I need to clarify how the 
term “nonideal” is used within the open borders debate. 
Rawls split his theory into two pieces: ideal and nonideal.
1
  Ideal theory focuses 
upon the problems of justice that occur within a setting in which people are reasonably 
committed to following the principles of justice.  The utilization of this kind of “ideal” 
setting was intended to permit the clear examination and development of principles of 
justice which were to be achieved, if possible.  Nonideal theory is the consideration of the 
principles of justice outside the ideal circumstances to determine how the principles 
should be applied when there are significant challenges to the principles, such as less 
extensive liberty or societies with histories that leave them burdened such that they 
cannot achieve justice without assistance.
2
  Nonideal theory then considers how to work 
towards achievement of the principles of justice, looking for what is politically possible 
and recognizing that justice will most likely be achieved gradually.  In the open borders 
debate nonideal theory is focused upon existing circumstances in the world that are 
perceived to be unjust in some way.  Philosophers then focus upon solutions to this 
particular injustice rather than trying to figure out how to achieve a theoretical system 
                                                 
1
 The basic discussion is in Theory of Justice, 215-218 and 308-309.  It is repeated in Law of Peoples, 89-
91.  For a useful examination of Rawls’ approach, see A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 38(2010). 
2





that completely characterizes a just society.  Carens has labeled these two approaches 
realistic and idealistic.  He writes, 
The former [realistic] is especially attentive to the constraints which must 
be accepted if morality is to serve as an effective guide to action in the 
world in which we currently live.  The latter [idealistic] is especially 
concerned with issues of fundamental justification and inclined to 




There are two distinctions to highlight between these two usages of the term nonideal.  
The first is the starting point.  For Rawls, nonideal theory extends or applies the ideal 
theory with which one starts.  For the open borders debate the starting point is the 
obvious injustice and how to resolve it within the current context.  The second distinction 
is what drives the solution.  For Rawls, the solution is driven by the goal of making the 
ideal actual and maintaining theoretical consistency.  For the open borders debate the 
solution is driven by what resolves the problem, without regard for how it fits into some 
wider scheme of justice or morality.  With that distinction in mind, I will now turn to the 
two nonideal arguments under consideration here. 
 
The Question of Aid or Immigration 
 
The first approach from the perspective of nonideal arguments evaluates the value 
of immigration over the use of aid as a means of improving the status of those living in 
poverty throughout the world.  Frederick Whelan offers a reconstruction of this argument 
that could be made by those who want to argue for open borders from a point of view that 
includes the actual circumstances in the world.  Writing in the mid-1980’s, Whelan 
characterized the state of the world as one in which many traditional concepts, including 
the sovereign state, citizenship, and individual freedom were not only being reexamined 
                                                 
3
 Joseph H. Carens, “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration,” International 





philosophically, but were also being stretched by the actual circumstances in the world.  
The fundamental question Whelan examines is, “what (if any) justifications can be 
offered for the power universally claimed by states to exclude foreigners from their 
territory – especially from permanent admission – or to control and restrict alien 
admissions in any way they choose.”4  The need to answer this question rises within the 
liberal philosophical perspective and its concern for the equal rights of individuals.  This 
concern leads liberals to argue for an open admissions policy in which individuals are 
permitted to move freely between states and take up residence in whichever state they 
choose.  Whelan expresses concern that the vision of state required to support this view is 
problematic and offers justification for the state compatible with liberalism.  The 
conclusion Whelan reaches regarding states is that it is possible to “support the moral 
permissibility of exclusion in principle.”5  The reasons that support exclusion “also 
constitute objections to the view that states…are morally required to be open to the entry 
of foreigners.”6 
Whelan understands the objection to state control over borders as originating in 
two schools of thought.  The first is abstract liberalism of the kind associated with John 
Rawls.  Examining the two principles of justice (three, if one separates out the difference 
principle as Whelan does), Whelan asserts the plausibility of Rawlsian support for open 
borders of the sort asserted by Beitz,
7
  as either an expression of the rights of individuals 
or as an issue of distributive justice.  I examined this argument in Chapter 2 and will not 
consider Whelan’s version of it here.  The other strand of liberal thought is the nonideal 
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thread initiated by Singer in his 1971 article, “Famine, Affluence and Morality.”8  This 
utilitarian argument claims that those in affluent countries have an obligation to relieve 
the suffering of those less fortunate in the world if it can be done without sacrificing 
something of comparative moral value.  Since the only thing of comparative moral value 
to a life is a life, the obligation to aid the poor in the world is a very strong obligation.  
This argument has been made in various forms both for individual and for state 
obligations to aid.  In this discussion migration becomes a possibility as simply a variant 
of the normal aid scenario: rather than bring the resources to the people, the people are 
moved to the resources.  The effect is the same: those who are in extraordinarily 
unfortunate circumstances find their lot in the world extremely improved.   
Whelan’s summation of the argument consists of five observations that make 
migration preferable to aid.
9
  First, the need for aid is created by the current distress of 
people but international aid runs into significant problems because of state to state 
problems.  State to state aid is inefficient and subject to the not insignificant problem of 
corruption and waste.  Anything that reduces this problem is beneficial and should be 
preferred to state to state aid.  Second, migration is preferable to aid as the only means by 
which refugees can be helped.  A person’s status as a refugee is an indication that the 
state is no longer a possibility as a channel for aid.  Either there is no functioning state, or 
actual conditions prevent the state from providing aid or the refugee might be part of 
some oppressed or persecuted group within the state.  In such circumstances state to state 
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aid is not able to resolve this person’s need.  Aid must come from elsewhere and bringing 
the person to the aid has many advantages.  Third, migration solves problems of needs 
without creating unknown impacts upon the international system of goods.  Those who 
focus upon the problem as simply one of the distribution of goods fail to recognize that 
when the principles of distribution change, so the system of production also changes 
because the incentives to produce have changed.  The presence of free goods through aid 
undermines the incentive to produce those goods locally and thereby undermines the 
position of the local resident, including those who do not require aid.  Migration leaves 
intact the system of production and consumption, although moving people to different 
places within the system changes the levels of production and consumption in any local 
circumstance.  These local changes must be accommodated, but they do not undermine 
the economic system in the manner that free goods through external aid does.  If, 
however, this movement is considered solely from the perspective of moving labor to 
where it is needed, this not only doesn’t change the economic system of production and 
consumption, it improves it by moving labor from where it is not needed to where it is 
needed.  Fourth, aid, especially personal aid, faces significant problems in the burden it 
places upon individuals.  Consider Singer’s argument in which one should contribute to 
aid those who are suffering to the point of one’s own marginal utility, without regard for 
whether others are helping or not.
10
  Migration, because it takes people to a new 
community, enables the creation of a cooperative response in which all members of the 
community can participate, minimizing the impact upon any particular individual.  
Finally, migration, if accompanied by unrestricted movement, increases the presence of 
freedom in the world and when conceived as a negative right places little burden upon 
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individuals or states because all that is required of them is to not interfere.  Increasing the 
presence of freedom in the world is desirable from the liberal point of view.  Hence, 
immigration can be understood as preferable to aid as a means of relieving the very real 
suffering in the world. 
The conclusion of the nonideal argument is that migration is preferable to aid 
because it promotes equality, creates a more just distribution of goods in the world and 
relieves extreme hardships for people.  Williams neatly sums up the heart of the argument 
with less sophistication than Whelan:  
Rather than spending billions of dollars establishing infrastructure in poor, 
undeveloped regions, this money would seem better spent on relocating 
the world’s severely poor to regions with the developed infrastructure they 
need to overcome poverty in the long run, and on expanding this 
infrastructure so it can accommodate the influx of people.  For it is less 
expensive to expand existing infrastructures than to establish it anew.
11
   
 
What troubles Whelan about this argument is that it is divorced from the realities of 
political life.
12
  It is the realities of political life that create a problem for Whelan.  How is 
it possible that liberal philosophy can be so clear regarding morally permissible actions 
that run counter to the positions of most people in the world?  Both states and common 
opinion in the world continue, through many different avenues, to support the principle of 
state sovereignty and the accompanying control of borders without regard to a nation’s 
wealth or poverty, political system or standing in the international system of states.  This 
circumstance leads Whelan to call the philosophical conclusions of liberalism regarding 
migration “paradoxical”13 because they run counter to overwhelming common opinion.  
If all varieties of states are committed to the system of states and the sovereignty that it 
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accords to them, Whelan thinks we should be hesitant to accept so quickly the 
conclusions of the liberal view.  Perhaps there are relevant factors to consider that have 
been missed. 
One of those factors is that in the context of the argument for migration over aid it 
is routinely assumed that migration is always from poor to wealthy states.  But it is also 
possible that movement will occur between poor states, in the case where both states are 
poor, but the discrepancy in poverty is adequate to induce movement between 
neighboring poor states.
14
  Borders also provide a sense of protection in a world still 
mindful of aggression by states seeking more room for their own populations.
15
  
Although these reservations about the argument are not alone adequate to reject the 
argument for immigration over aid, they do raise significant questions about its viability 
in a world of states.  When coupled with the defense of states from the perspective of the 
value of states in people’s lives (states enable self-determination, cultural and economic 
variability, the realization of a robust understanding of civil rights),
16
 immigration over 
aid, Whelan argues, appears to be an unacceptable argument for the case of open borders 
from a nonideal perspective. 
More, however, should be said about the claim that migration should be 
encouraged over aid.  Whelan’s response is a moral response.  It seems that if the concern 
is to improve the plight of real people in the world that there should be an empirical 
question to answer.  Either immigration does or does not, improve the situation of the 
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people in the world that are the focus of nonideal theory.  It turns out that that question is 
harder to answer than one might think. 
The problem of empirically determining the effectiveness of immigration over aid 
turns on our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of both.  Evaluating the effectiveness of 
aid is complex.  Hassoun, in a recent article, claims that the evaluation must occur on two 
levels: a macro-level and a micro-level.  The macro-level provides data about the 
effectiveness of aid across regions or whole countries, typically by evaluating measures 
such as growth in GDP and similar aggregate measures.  The problem with macro-level 
measures is that they don’t really provide any insight into the effects of economic growth 
on impoverished people.  Economic growth occurs, but may be concentrated in ways 
such that the poor receive few, if any, of the benefits.  Hassoun writes:  
…the evidence about aid’s impact on growth cannot tell us what impact 
aid has on the global poor.  Even if aid increases growth, it may not reduce 
poverty.  Growth can increase even as the poor become poorer, so long as 
the rich or middle class gain more than the poor lose.  Furthermore, 




Aggregate measures are therefore inadequate to answer the empirical question of whether 
aid improves the plight of the poor.  But even the interpretation of macro-level data 
becomes controversial.  The World Bank, in its Assessing Aid report, advocates aid for 
countries with good economic policies
18
 because these good policies ensure that the aid 
will be as effective as possible, that is, create the greatest economic growth.  However, 
the report is not without controversy even though the World Bank continues to stand by 
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its conclusions.  These critiques include concerns that growth is not the only measure of 
aid effectiveness, disagreement regarding what constitutes good policies and the kind of 
data issues that Hassoun is concerned with at the micro-level.
19
   
Micro-level assessment seeks to determine if particular aid programs affect the 
impoverished in positive ways.  Two problems occur in this assessment.  The first is the 
type of assessment being conducted.  Often the case both for and against aid utilizes what 
Hassoun calls nonexperimental or quasi-experimental methods.  Anecdotal evidence, the 
stories people tell of effective or ineffective aid, form the nonexperimental category.  
Quasi-experimental aid programs do not use random selection methods and therefore, run 
the risk of selection bias in picking program participants because the researcher may 
influence who participates and how they are assigned to aid programs.  These two 
methods of assessment are utilized in the majority of empirical studies regarding aid, 
raising questions about the validity of the empirical data we have about aid programs.  
The second problem is determining what standard of poverty to use for measuring 
whether the aid is effective or not.  Although there are defined standards, such as 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) or the Human Development Index (HDI), the validity of 
these standards have been questioned for a wide variety of reasons.  If these standards do 
not appropriately or accurately measure the poverty status of people because they 
measure the wrong attributes or measure them incorrectly, then any assessment of the 
effectiveness of aid will be incorrect.  The bottom line of Hassoun’s argument is that the 
kind of data we want, experimental data with a high degree of internal validity, is not 
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widely available to assess the value of aid.  Hassoun argues that what data there is that 
can be classed as truly experimental with high levels of data validity, indicates that aid 
does at least some good and that, “[e]ven if aid is generally a bad idea, we should not 
neglect the good we can do for some, even if we cannot completely ameliorate 
poverty.”20  Hassoun’s conclusion is that aid is useful in at least some cases, especially to 
those individuals who receive it.  If aid is useful, how do we compare it to immigration? 
There is no doubt that for those in dire circumstances who are able to move that it 
is possible to improve the quality of their lives, for at least some of those who move.  But 
how does this possibility fare as a policy solution to poverty?  Pogge has argued that it 
doesn’t fare well at all, and while Pogge supports the idea that wealthy countries should 
open their doors to admit more poor people, he believes that pursuing this as a significant 
policy objective is not useful.  The central problem is that the number of people in 
poverty who could benefit from migration is so large that it dwarfs the number of people 
receiving countries could receive under optimal conditions.  Pogge writes:  
…the number of desperate foreigners whom the rich countries now admit 
every year, and also the larger number of desperate foreigners they might 
conceivably come to admit under the best of circumstances – these 
numbers are ridiculously small in comparison to the number of those who 




But the fact that for every person helped by movement there will be thousands left behind 
is not the only problem.  Those people whom the rich countries will admit are not the 
ones who are most in need of moving.  They are, in many cases, educated and privileged 
in their home countries such that “the truly worst-off always compete at a great 
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disadvantage against more privileged persons from the poor countries.”22  Given these 
circumstances, Pogge argues that people motivated by the deplorable circumstance of the 
poor around the world should advocate for aid over migration as a means to provide both 
short and long term relief. 
The nonideal argument that aid is ineffective and should be abandoned in favor of 
a greater rate of immigration is found wanting by Whelan, Hassoun and Pogge.  
Immigration levels could never rise to the level needed to eliminate, or even ameliorate, 
the problem of global poverty.  It is difficult to claim that borders should be more open as 
a means of significantly reducing suffering in the world. 
 
Wilcox and the Global Principle of Harm 
 
The debates about the relation between individual and state cannot hide that 
around the world many people live in extreme poverty, a poverty that is often aggravated 
and sometimes (or largely) caused by the policies of states.  Shelley Wilcox, in her 
“Immigrant Admissions and Global Relations of Harm,”23 argues that immigration is one 
avenue for ameliorating some of these problems.  Wilcox is sympathetic with the 
cosmopolitan ideals represented in the work of Carens.  However, she recognizes that 
Carens’ ideal approach is problematic, particularly in its freedom of movement 
formulation.  Chief among its problems is that it provides inadequate normative guidance 
for immigration policies that must provide guidance for choosing from among 
prospective immigrants when not all can be admitted.
24
  Cosmopolitan arguments, such 
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as that of Carens, typically acknowledge that at least under some conditions border 
controls are justified.  The existence of such conditions indicates the need for justified 
principles for determining the priority of conflicting immigration demands in the 
nonideal world.
25
  Carens provides no principles useful for resolving these kinds of 
conflicts.  A further problem with the arguments of Carens is that the appeal to the 
freedom of movement cannot establish priorities between prospective immigrants 
because it claims the right to immigrate as a universal right in which there is no priority 
of claims and ignores the possibility that there might be other grounds, such as immediate 
threat to life, upon which people claim the right to immigrate.  In the case that at least 
some restrictions on immigration may be justified, the question of who should justifiably 
have priority becomes a relevant question.  In light of these deficiencies, Wilcox 
develops an argument, compatible with but not dependent upon, the cosmopolitan 
arguments of Carens, that “develops a new principle for establishing immigrant 
admissions priorities in the nonideal world.”26  Wilcox argues for an extension of the 
Harm Principle, which she calls the Global Harm Principle (GHP), in which states have 
duties to admit particular immigrants that are lexically prior to establishing admissions 
related immigration policies that reflect the interests of their own citizens. 
The Harm Principle is universally accepted as guidance for identifying duties and 
obligations related to liberty in liberalism.  Wilcox understands the Harm Principle as 
consisting of a primary duty and two derivative duties.
27
  The primary duty is to refrain 
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from harming others by any means.  The derivative duties are that in the case that harm is 
or has occurred, the perpetrator has the additional duties to cease the harmful actions and 
provide compensation to the victim.  A straightforward extension of this principle, to 
both states and the world, results in the claim that states should not harm noncitizens and 
when they do they must cease those actions and provide compensation.
28
  Liberal 
egalitarian commitments mean that these duties apply to both citizen and noncitizen 
alike.  The state is not permitted to ignore the effects of its actions just because those 
affected are not citizens. 
Understanding what constitutes harm in a multicultural context poses challenges.  
Therefore, harm must meet two criteria to be acceptable in this context.  It must be 
substantive enough so as to prevent harms to individuals but not so substantive as to 
prevent states from fulfilling their functions out of fear of harming others (since policies 
affect individuals differently).  It must also utilize an understanding of human welfare 
that is compatible with a wide variety of understandings of human flourishing.  An 
understanding of harm that meets these two criteria will be acceptable in a diverse 
international community.  Building upon Joel Feinberg’s conceptualization of harm as a 
setback to interests,
29
  Wilcox claims that a state harms an individual when it engages in 
conduct or establishes policies that result in a human rights deficit for individuals.
30
  The 
focus upon human rights as the focus of human interests aims at utilizing a widely 
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acceptable standard of harm, one that focuses upon basic welfare interests rather than 
upon “aspirational” interests that are attached to particular individuals.  This approach is 
in contrast to much of the open borders work where the examples cited as motivations for 
movement are often aspirational, such as marriage or to enjoy particular cultural 
activities.  The use of deficit rather than violation captures the idea that some actions 
create contexts where the achievement of human rights is not possible and it is these 
circumstances with which we should be concerned. 
Having identified what counts as harm Wilcox must undertake a second and more 
difficult task.  How do states actually harm individuals in ways that would invoke her 
Global Harm Principle?  Wilcox’s approach identifies five general conditions, which, 
when met, indicate that a state has, or is currently, engaged in harmful conduct.  The state 
is then collectively responsible for any human rights deficit that results from that action.  
The first two conditions set the criteria for causal responsibility, the next two prevent the 
standard of causal responsibility from becoming unacceptably demanding, and the final 
condition sets the claim of collective responsibility.  These conditions, where A and B 
represent autonomous ethical agents belonging to different states, are: 
1. A’s conduct is causally relevant to the production of B’s human rights deficit. 
 
2. A’s conduct is a critically necessary causal factor in the production of B’s human 
rights deficit. 
 
3. A could reasonably avoid producing B’s human rights deficit in the sense that 
alternative conduct would not produce comparable harm. 
 
4. A’s conduct foreseeably gives rise to B’s human rights deficit. 
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These conditions do several things.  The emphasis upon a “critically necessary causal 
factor” in the second condition eliminates the failure to mitigate existing human rights 
deficits as a case of harm subject to the GHP.  Countries cannot be held responsible for 
existing harm just because it did nothing to eliminate harm that it did not cause.  For the 
GHP to be relevant the deficit must be directly caused by A’s action.  Further, the 
conditions are intended to distinguish between culpability, which is attributed to A, and 
accountability, which is attributed to C.  The actions of A directly caused the harm but C 
(the members of society who did not commit the action, although A is included because 
A is a member of C) is responsible for compensating B or removing the deficit.  C’s 
responsibility represents a form of “collective vicarious responsibility” that can apply to 
individuals (e.g., parents and children, where parents are responsible for the actions of 
their minor children) or to groups of people such as democratically elected governments.  
Office holders represent voters and act in their name; therefore, citizens in democracies 
become collectively responsible for the actions of those office holders.
32
  In some 
manner, most likely through government action that remediates or compensates B, the 
members of society C must eliminate the harm that A has caused. 
The problem of ameliorating the deficit is contextual; different circumstances will 
require different actions to make the affected whole.  However, the state is required to 
desist from its actions causing the deficit and to set the circumstances right, understood 
on the legal principle of status quo ante (the way things were before the state’s harmful 
actions).  Wilcox argues that in some cases the most effective action will be admission of 
the harmed individual as an immigrant, and in cases where admission is the only possible 
remedial action, it will be mandatory.  The effect of Wilcox’s GHP is to reorder national 
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immigration policies to favor affected people over nonaffected people who also wish to 
immigrate, in those cases where limits on immigration are justified. 
Wilcox recognizes the limits of her GHP, admitting that it is but one of several 
normative principles required as part of a just liberal immigration policy.  At first glance, 
it appears that those eligible for priority admission under Wilcox’s proposal are also 
entitled to mutual aid (aid based upon their humanity rather than their membership in a 
community and therefore, extended to nonmembers) as envisioned by Walzer and Miller.  
However, the claim that their entitlement to priority is due to direct harm it creates the 
situation where the obligation is stronger than that of mutual aid. 
Wilcox’s proposal takes the open borders debate in new directions in that her 
argument is intended to be compatible with principles reached through ideal 
considerations, but applicable to the nonideal conditions of the world.  But her argument 
is troubling in many ways.  It is not at all clear that the relationships of A, B and C are 
adequate to engender the kind of collective responsibility that Wilcox calls for.  The 
relationship between A and C is overly broad and inadequately specified.  Why should 
the actions of A, a citizen of some country, which result in some kind of human rights 
deficit for an individual, obligate A’s legal compatriots.  Suppose A is an ex-patriot living 
abroad who has effectively terminated all but the legal relationship to his native country.  
A then engages in some action that systematically creates a human rights deficit for 
people in the country in which A lives.  The link between A and C is tenuous and it is 
unclear why members of C should be obligated to make amends for A’s actions.  Or, why 
should actions committed by A, while travelling in a foreign country, obligate A’s 





others to compensate those harmed without a stronger relationship between A and A’s 
compatriots.  Wilcox might be able to respond here that A must be acting on behalf of, or 
as an agent of, a particular country in committing the offending actions.  The examples 
used by Wilcox, Agent Orange defoliation and the My Lai Massacre from the Vietnam 
War, are situations in which the government or agents of the government are involved.  
In these cases, collective responsibility seems appropriate and if she intends to limit the 
application to cases such as these, her definition of A must be made more explicit.  In 
cases where an agent acts independently, however, it would be more appropriate to treat 
the incident as a criminal action with appropriate individual punishment of either a 
criminal or civil nature.   
Further, it seems unlikely that a single actor can create the conditions in which 
human rights deficits occur.  Human rights deficits of the kind Wilcox is concerned with 
are systemic, caused by large events such as natural disasters, drought and war, or by the 
inadequacy of social institutions, be they economic or governmental, to provide an 
adequate baseline to achieve the welfare interests associated with human rights.  It is the 
joint action of people, typically acting as governments or other kinds of institutions 
(nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international financial institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and corporations), that create the 
systems resulting in widespread human rights deficits.  These actions typically result in 
policies affecting social institutions.  Wilcox’s appeal to the work of Thomas Pogge is 
appropriate for these kinds of circumstances, but not for many circumstances that meet 





separation) will not have a direct causal agent and therefore, fall outside the scope of her 
GHP.  Additional principles will be required for these circumstances. 
The requirement that B must be a foreigner, defined as “non-citizens who have 
not been granted legal permanent residency status,”33 is in conflict with the liberal 
egalitarian principles Wilcox intends to support.  If her intent is to apply this only to 
foreigners, her principles leave open the possibility of permitting harming actions against 
citizens that result in human rights deficits for those citizens.  Environmental degradation 
that affects foreigners counts, but the same activities in which the effects are confined 
within national borders would be permitted.  A state could imprison its own citizens in 
ways they could not imprison foreign citizens.  This is certainly not the intent of Wilcox, 
but it demonstrates the difficulty of constructing principles intended to give priority to 
individuals of one group over those in other groups.  These principles appear to make 
illiberal distinctions between those in need, and will be inadequate to create priorities 
down to the individual level in the event that all those with human rights deficits cannot 
be admitted to another country.  It is unclear, therefore, what a GHP gains us in the 
pursuit of a more just world. 
Finally, as her proposal provides just one principle among many required, it is an 
incomplete proposal that cannot be fully assessed.  Wilcox indicates that at minimum 
principles regarding the distribution of migrants among liberal states when admission is 
for humanitarian reasons rather than reasons of harm, family reunification and immigrant 
integration are required.  Without some indication of what these might be and what 
additional principles are required, it is possible that her GHP might be modified or 
constrained in significant ways by these other principles.  For example, the GHP is 
                                                 
33





intended to prioritize admissions for those suffering human rights deficits over voluntary 
economic admissions.  But who receives priority in the case in which candidate 
immigrants are suffering rights deficits, some from agent caused actions and others from 
natural causes such as earthquakes or drought.  Who receives priority?  If priority is given 
to those suffering from natural forces induced deficits over those suffering from agent 
induced deficits, in the circumstances of limited admissions, it is possible that agent 
caused deficits will never be addressed.  While in many cases unlimited admissions are a 
possibility, in others it will not be possible.  In order to argue for mandatory admissions 
in some cases Wilcox must have a more robust view of the principles that control such 
obligations.  Further, debates over direct causal harm, which take place in political rather 
than philosophical discussions, are likely to be extensive and end in circumstances in 
which very few individuals are admitted because no state will admit culpability and there 
is no adequately empowered global agency to determine culpability.  This circumstance 
would leave immigration policies significantly intact, a problem unsatisfactory to the 
liberal egalitarian.  Without something close to the set of principles that Wilcox would 
consider complete, it is not possible to identify what conflicts might exist between 
principles and how those conflicts might be resolved or fully assess the impact of the 
principles upon immigration policies.   
The proposed Global Principle of Harm attempts to specify conditions under 
which a state would be required to admit immigrants, regardless of its existing policy.  
Although the idea that global institutions can harm people is well established, identifying 
the conditions under which particular agents, be they individuals, government or other 





Wilcox’s proposal is too broad in the relation of causal agent to accountable society and 
requires clarification.  The scope of application also needs clarification so as to not 
support domestic actions not permitted internationally.  Like many of the arguments 
related to open borders,, Wilcox’s proposal brings valuable issues to light but needs 





 International regimes are ways of institutionalizing behavior in the international 
arena.  The term was originated in 1975 by John Ruggie
34
 and became a central focus of 
the field of international relations during the 1980s as a way of understanding 
international organization.  Although there are a variety of ways in which to define 
international regimes, the standard definition of an international regime is “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”35  The 
most expansive definition claims there is a regime behind any kind of patterned behavior 
because patterned behavior necessarily results from principles, norms and rules.
36
  In this 
case, regimes exist but may not always be identified.  The most restrictive definition 
claims that international regimes only exist when specific multilateral agreements have 
been signed and ratified by states.  These agreements explicitly define permissible and 
impermissible actions within some particular sphere of behavior, typically with some 
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kind of injunction for violation.
37
  International regimes then are like social structures; 
ways of doing things between states that may or may not have explicit rules written for 
them and may or may not create international organizations to manage the regime.  
Common examples of international regimes are the Bretton Woods System related to 
monetary systems, the Kyoto Protocol for controlling environmental change, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade controlling international trade.  Although all of 
these represent explicit regimes, theoretically, a regime may be implicit.  Whether the 
principles and norms of international regimes are made explicit is often the result of 
competitive advantage gained by leaving them either implicit or explicit.
38
 
 In this section of the dissertation I will examine two proposed international 
regimes related to migration.  Although not directly philosophical in nature they are 
important because they represent the kind of international agreement related to migration 
that might reasonably be expected to be reached.  The two regimes are economically 
motivated but recognize the political ramifications of such movement.  I will review the 
proposal and assess them from the perspective of the commitments of liberalism. 
 
The Global Agreement on the Movements of People 
 
Unlike all of the previous arguments examined thus far, Thomas Straubhaar’s 
argument for a General Agreement on the Movements of People (GAMP) is not intended 
to be primarily a moral argument.  However, it has moral aspects and the proposal as 
presented would serve to eliminate some of the practical problems faced by states and 
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reduce the urgency of the problem of borders as understood by liberal political 
philosophers, especially those working from a nonideal perspective.  The context that 
drives the concerns of Straubhaar is economic globalization.  Economic problems that 
have traditionally been understood as national problems are becoming international in 
character and therefore require international solutions.  Trade is no longer local in 
character.  Goods are exchanged between different countries in ways never before 
realized.  Historically, according to Straubhaar, nations have been efficient at minimizing 
costs related to economic development with the resulting benefits accruing to the nation.  
That is no longer the case as large countries break up into smaller countries; countries 
organize themselves into local trading regions while others organize themselves into 
larger units, both political and economic.  This changing game requires a new set of laws 
to guide this new kind of trade.  In Straubhaar’s words: “global games need global rules.  
The era of globalization calls for an international framework to regulate international 
movement of people efficiently.”39  Developed independently of, but included as part of 
the larger New International Regime for the Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP) 
project discussed below, Straubhaar proposes the development of the GAMP, patterned 
after other similar international agreements such as the General Agreement on Trades and 
Tariffs (GATT) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
40
 as a means 
toward making the international movement of people “more orderly, manageable, and 
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efficient for both sending and receiving countries.”41  The argument appeals to both 
theoretical and empirical considerations. 
 The effects of globalization driving economic changes have also had an impact on 
the movement of people.  The strength of Straubhaar’s argument lies in his economic 
analysis of migration.  Three factors are of importance here:  changes in global 
infrastructure, a little understood preference for not moving (Straubhaar refers to this as 
“immobility”), and the self-regulated dynamic created by the first two factors.  In the last 
50 years the economic factors in the cost of production have dropped dramatically, 
principally transportation and communication costs.  In a world in which one can 
communicate instantly with those around the world and meet face to face in a matter of 
hours, businesses face not only a world of new possibilities but a world in which business 
can do more and spend less.  The advances in transportation and communication affect 
people as well, making it cheaper and easier for people to move around the world and 
stay in contact with those left behind.  The result is the beginnings of a global, rather than 
a local, labor market.  The effects of the global labor market are experienced differently 
by different classes of workers.  Unskilled labor is affected directly by competition with 
unskilled foreign workers and indirectly by the import of goods now manufactured 
elsewhere because shipping costs are less than the labor savings.  Highly skilled workers, 
on the other hand, are able to search for the best return on the investment they have made 
in their skills.  Global demand for these skills outpaces the supply, enabling these 
workers to often find better work options away from home.  Despite these beneficial 
effects, global movement in labor is restricted both by the rules of national sovereignty 
and by a preference for immobility. 
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 A large majority of workers, despite the ability to market their skills elsewhere in 
the world, tend to stay in their home country, often in the same locales.  Although poorly 
understood from an economic viewpoint, Straubhaar believes that this preference for 
immobility is driven by what he calls “location specific insider advantages.”42  People 
have advantages from their knowledge of locales.  This may be sociological factors such 
as language, culture and knowledge of local social structures, but it may also be personal 
connections.  People are tied to other people.  If the skills that provide these advantages 
are not readily transferable (e.g., the skills of an Aboriginal person in Australia aimed at 
surviving under harsh living conditions are of little use in urban environments) and are 
not compensated for by other skills, the worker will stay put even when significant 
disparities in prosperity between regions exist.  This factor also explains why most 
worker movement is local rather than global, between regions with similar characteristics 
rather than between regions with disparate characteristics. 
 These two factors, changes in the global infrastructure and the preference for 
immobility, have lead to cross border employment in which there are larger numbers of 
temporary workers, often motivated by seasonal work, an increase in service related 
workers such as managers and entertainment personnel and intrafirm transfers of existing 
staff.  Permanent movement is characterized by chain migration, in which migrants 
follow earlier migrants to the same location, because some of the location specific insider 
skills advantages (language, culture, and personal connections) retain their benefit, and 
for humanitarian reasons such as family reunification or asylum.  Irregular migration, a 
growing problem around the world, is both temporary and permanent.  Neither the “labor 
market-driven demand-determined” character of the temporary labor movement nor the 
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supply-driven character of the permanent labor movement is subject to national policies 
and controls.  Each of these features falls outside the boundaries of state control.  The 
current patterns of movement then, create a “self-feeding self-enforcing dynamic” that is 
uncontrolled.  However, states have an interest in controlling this movement and of 
necessity, must respond to it.  These two desires, historically fulfilled through national 
immigration policies, can now only be fulfilled through an international regime. 
 The conceptualization of this international regime proposed by Straubhaar draws 
on the economic understanding of voluntary associations such as clubs.
43
  Nations should 
be viewed as clubs in which citizenship is the equivalent to club membership.  Club 
membership is a thoroughly economic proposition rather than one fraught with claims of 
identity or the social meanings of goods.  If the benefits of the new club member 
outweighs the disadvantages, then the member is admitted.  In Straubhaar’s words:  “The 
‘golden rule’ is that new members should be allowed to enter and stay if their marginal 
contribution to the financing of the club goods (fees, positive external effects) is larger 
than their marginal (congestion) costs for the old members.”44  On this model all that is 
necessary is to evaluate contributions and costs to the club of the prospective member.  
As long as the net value is positive, one can be admitted.  This model helps to also 
understand the resistance to migration.  Both old and new members compete for common 
club goods.  If the perception is that new members will result in a decrease in the 
common club goods available to existing members, or that their contributions to the club 
will increase in order to keep the quantity of goods available constant, then new members 
will be resistant to new members.  Similarly, members will be desirous of having new 
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members whose contribution to the club will exceed their consumption of club goods.  
The perception of the benefit or cost of new club members is the same as the perception 
of citizens regarding immigrants and determines whether the new club members (or 
immigrants) are welcome.  If the contributions of immigrants are positive and their affect 
upon congestion is minimal, immigrants are to be welcomed in the country.  In a similar 
manner, the club analogy works for sending countries, which appear like clubs that are 
glad to be rid of members who utilize more club goods than they contribute.  Countries 
should be glad to be rid of those citizens who require more state support than they 
contribute. 
Unfortunately, the current international model based upon this club understanding 
has significant negative effects which Straubhaar treats as external hazards or negative 
externalities.  Most significantly they lead to quite divergent development paths in which 
some countries become very prosperous and others remain poor.  Further, they lead to 
“suboptimal human capital production.”45  National clubs (nations) will hesitate to invest 
in workers if they fear the workers will leave for more attractive countries.  Finally, 
national policies will seek to implement the preferences of the country (understood as a 
club), keeping out those who represent a net demand on the goods of the club.  But given 
the changes in global infrastructure, these restrictive policies are bound to fail, creating 
an undesirable difference between policy and outcome.  Properly understood, the 
economics of migration and its affect upon national interests lead to the conclusion that 
the inefficiency and inefficacy of national migration policies has made it 
clear that an independent procedure by single nation states is no longer 
adequate…What is needed is a transnational framework to balance the 
basic allocation benefits of free international migration with the 
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Labor should be viewed as a commodity to be allocated by the market.  Just as 
international monetary schemes are supportive of the free movement of capital, so there 
should be an international labor scheme to support the free movement of laborers.  With 
this understanding, Straubhaar proceeds to make concrete recommendations on what 
principles an international regime should include. 
The theoretical commitments of neoclassical economics leads to the conclusion 
that in most  cases the free movement of labor results in positive benefits for both the 
sending and receiving countries.  However, the absolute free movement of labor can also 
result in negative effects, such as the brain drain and crowding out or congestion effects.  
The international agreement then, must focus upon the conditions that lead to these 
negative effects by controlling for externalities and market failures.  Although intended to 
control for the negative economic effects of cross-border movement, the proposed GAMP 
contains both economic and political proposals.  This is necessary because of traditional 
views of national sovereignty and because it is national governments who sign 
international agreements. 
The economic proposals aim at two goals: the internalization of the external 
effects of movement and the optimal allocation of public goods on an international scale.  
Both goals can be achieved, claims Straubhaar, through the establishment of a migration 
tax, which consists of both an “exit tax” and an “entrance fee.”  The idea is that exit 
charges are set so as to discourage brain drain effects, whereas the entrance fees are set to 
compensate those affected by the crowding out effect.  Although Straubhaar uses mixed 
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terminology as to taxes and fees, he emphasizes that these are really fees because they 
don’t provide general fiscal revenues but are intended solely to offset (or internalize) the 
effects, both positive and negative, of cross-border movement.  The costs of international 
migration are borne by those who cause the effects rather than by those who are affected 
by the movement.  This proposal, which is not original with Straubhaar,
47
 will make 
migration expensive and might serve to minimize the amount of migration around the 
world. 
There is, outside Straubhaar’s primary discussion of the economic proposals, a 
second taxation proposal.  Straubhaar proposes that national taxation schemes, which are 
currently based upon residency only, be based upon residency and citizenship.  A 
Nigerian citizen working in the United States under current law pays taxes only in the 
United States.  Such a citizen should pay taxes (as appropriate) to both his resident nation 
and his nation of citizenship.  The purpose of this additional, regular tax is to create a 
sense of loyalty to one’s country of origin since one always retains the right of return.  It 
also can be understood as an “insurance fee,” compensating those left behind for their 
compatriot’s risky behavior.  This will increase the total tax burden to the worker, but is 
intended to make sending nations more open to emigration, especially that of highly 
skilled workers.  The home country will continue to benefit from the training invested in 
these workers whether those workers work in their home country or abroad. 
The political proposals are vague, but aim at discouraging governance practices 
that create the circumstances of mass migration.  Two principles are proposed.  The first 
establishes that all people may stay in their home country, including the right to return 
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home.  This principle is already widely recognized in human rights documents.  The 
second principle holds countries accountable for “bad” governance, which is identified 
solely as that which results in mass migration.  The apparent avenue to achieve this is to 
have the GAMP promote local development in order to incentivize citizens to stay.  
These measures include trade related proposals such as market access for exports, 
integration of international financial markets, technology diffusion and the promotion of 
“‘good’ governance” practices, which should include democratic tools and the 
recognition of minority rights.  GAMP will not replace existing and well functioning 
regimes such as the current international law for refugees and asylum seekers.  These 
would remain in place as a protective measure for individuals.  Notably missing from 
Straubhaar’s proposal is any recommendation or consideration of oversight or 
enforcement mechanisms. 
Straubhaar’s proposal has received little attention since its publication in 2000.  I 
suspect this is largely due to security concerns of the post 9/11 era and the economic 
declines associated with the financial crisis of 2007-2008.  But it is likely that proposals 
similar to Straubhaar’s will at some point receive consideration once again.  Although 
based upon a robust body of economics research, the GAMP remains unacceptably vague 
in its implementation details.  Conceptually the idea is simple and represents standard 
neoclassical economic theory.  Let market forces control the movement of people, by 
which what is really meant is labor.  However, market forces are unlikely to create the 
optimal allocation of labor (because of “asymmetric macroeconomic incentives” a 





order to eliminate brain drain and crowding out effects.
48
  Those sufficiently motivated to 
move, meaning the rewards of moving outweigh the costs of moving, will move.  Those 
left behind will be compensated by those leaving, through upfront fees and regular tax 
revenue.    
The general economic theory upon which GAMP is based is the commitment to 
the free flow of capital.  It is generally believed that when capital is free to move to 
where there are opportunities to be invested and a positive return on investment achieved, 
that it will create more benefits for all.  However, this once agreed upon doctrine is being 
widely questioned today, both in theory and in practice.  Consider this from the recent 
Pontifical statement on the economy: 
an economic liberalism that spurns rules and controls.  Economic 
liberalism is a theoretical system of thought, a form of “economic a 
priorism”.  It purports to derive the laws for how markets function from 
theory, these being laws of capitalistic development, but it exaggerates 
certain aspects of markets and downplays or ignores others.  An economic 
system of thought that sets down a priori the laws of market functioning 
and economic development, without measuring them against reality, risks 
becoming a tool subordinated to the interests of the countries that 




This statement questions the methodology that claims how we should think about 
economic matters should be focused solely upon the economic effects of economic 
policies without taking into account other kinds of effects.   
These same types of questions are being asked by the school known as “New 
Economics,” which raises significant questions about standard economic models, seeking 
to develop models that take into account issues of sustainability as well as social 
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outcomes, such as equality, and human well-being.
50
  Straubhaar could appeal to the 
“Washington Consensus,” a common reference to the program of ten key policies 
representing the requirements of economic reform for troubled economies as envisioned 
by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other international financial 
organizations.
51
  The term has, in popular use, come to represent a commitment to strong 
markets and includes a commitment to open capital markets.  However, increasingly 
there are calls for controls on the movement of international capital.
52
  In 2010, the IMF 
acknowledged that conditions could exist that justified the use of capital controls.
53
     
It is also possible to ask questions about who establishes the goals of such a 
program.  Dani Rodrik, Rafiq Hariri Professor of International Political Economy at the 
Harvard Kennedy School wrote recently:  
The most widely held theory of politics is also the simplest: the powerful 
get what they want.  Financial regulation is driven by the interests of 
banks, health policy by the interests of insurance companies, and tax 
policy by the interests of the rich.  Those who can influence government 
the most – through their control of resources, information, access, or sheer 
threat of violence – eventually get their way…It is a compelling narrative, 
one with which we can readily explain how politics so often generates 
perverse outcomes.  Whether in democracies, dictatorships, or in the 
international arena, those outcomes reflect the ability of narrow, special 




Although these thoughts are not constrained by academic rigor, they recognize the 
potential problems of a program such as GAMP, established by those who control 
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important social and economic institutions.  My goal here is not to review the current 
discussion regarding capital controls or to engage in a discussion regarding economic 
theory.  Rather, it is just to demonstrate that the underlying rational for GAMP, that the 
unrestricted movement of capital is always beneficial, is undergoing reconsideration.  It is 
not unreasonable to expect that the same kinds of problems that are leading to this 
revision will crop up in a policy of unrestricted movement of labor.  Straubhaar could 
respond that his proposed movement is not unrestricted.  In the same way that capital 
controls may be appropriately implemented, so also the taxation or fee scheme 
Straubhaar envisions will provide a kind of movement control.  The fee scheme can be 
adjusted in response to movement that is problematic.  But this response is going to be 
determined by economic factors rather than the noneconomic factors that have been 
considered in the last few paragraphs.  The fee scheme raises additional issues. 
Straubhaar’s fee scheme, in its implementation details, will become very 
complex.  A progressive tax scheme will be required in which the actual fee paid is based 
upon the skills the migrant possesses and the current demand for those skills.  This 
complexity has the potential to discourage movement rather than encourage movement, 
especially when it is most needed.  A worker who is desirous of emigrating now, must 
come up with fees in addition to the cost of moving.  Any worker unable to come up with 
those fees will not be able to move.  Add to this the requirement of ongoing income 
taxation and the possibility exists that Straubhaar’s proposal might aggravate irregular 
migration rather than resolve it.  Unless the migration fees are small, workers will be 
incentivized to avoid paying them.  If the fees are small, sending countries are unlikely to 





highly skilled workers.  In the case where a worker is moving to a liberal welfare state 
and will place a net demand upon the benefits scheme, the migration fee should be 
higher.  This circumstance will affect most those with the least ability to pay the higher 
fees.  Further problems exist because the migration fee is paid to the sending country with 
the intention being that some portion of it is shared with the receiving country.  To the 
extent that sending countries have corrupt governments, it is not difficult to envision 
these fees neither being split with the receiving countries or utilized for the purposes 
Straubhaar proposes.  Unscrupulous employers on the receiving side could take 
advantage of unsuspecting migrants by paying the migration fee up front and then 
exploiting the worker afterwards, as is often done today with various kinds of unskilled 
labor.  Finally, there is the problem of taxing income based upon both residency and 
citizenship.  This too will require new bureaucracies to both collect and enforce these 
new rules.  Most countries will not be willing to routinely collect revenue to be 
transferred outside their control.  Resolving these latter problems will require an 
international governance body, a proposal fraught with its own kinds of problems. 
 From the perspective of liberal political philosophy, Straubhaar’s proposals will 
be disappointing.  Liberal claims regarding the right to freedom of movement should not 
be subject to economic conditions or the payment of fees.  After all, the idea of a right is 
that one possesses it regardless of circumstances.  The establishment of migration fees 
focuses upon movement primarily as instrumental, whereas liberalism recognizes both 
the instrumental and intrinsic value of the right to movement.  The proposal, although it 
seeks to leave intact current humanitarian schemes for refugees and asylum seekers, 





Individuals whose motivation is principally noneconomic will be subject to these same 
migration fees.  Such persons may be tempted to leave on a travel visa and overstay.  It is 
likely under a program like GAMP that noneconomic motivated movement will 
eventually be relegated to a secondary status, always displaced by economic movement.  
This result would be disappointing and unacceptable to those sharing the commitments of 
liberalism. 
 In conclusion, the GAMP proposal requires significant development in order to 
make a true assessment of its feasibility.  However, there are good reasons to believe that 
it will fail to achieve its goals of balancing global labor supply and demand and 
eliminating irregular migration.  
 
The New International Regime for the Orderly  
 
Movements of People 
 
The New International Regime for the Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP) 
is a project sponsored by the International Organization on Migration (IOM)
55
 and 
directed by Bimal Ghosh.  The project is aimed at resolving the growing problems 
associated with international migration by creating a condition of “regulated openness.”56  
The project has its roots in a request of the United Nations Commission on Global 
Governance in 1993 to Ghosh to begin considering global migration issues.  The 
NIROMP project began in 1997 with Ghosh as its head under the sponsorship of the 
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International Organization for Migration.  Two meetings were held, in 1997 and 1998, 
attended by a small number of countries affected by international migration in either a 
sending, receiving or transit capacity.  These meetings served to develop the framework 
of a regime of policies to be implemented by various countries. 
The regime is organized around a set of six objectives.  These objectives include, 
as numbered in Ghosh’s summary: 
i. Enhance the capacity of governments and societies to deal with international 
movement of peoples through greater predictability and transparent policies 
and practices. 
ii. Widen the choice of the individual in migration by helping to avoid conditions 
of forced migration and enhance the confidence of the public and migrants in 
the policies and practices that form the international migration system. 
iii. Avoid negative externalities, interstate conflict and threats to domestic 
security caused by irregular and disruptive migration. 
iv. Enhance efficiency of the global economy through a more rational allocation 
of labor and skills and freer trade-related temporary movements and facilitate 
short-term inter-country cultural exchanges to strengthen common human 
values. 
v. Ensure predictable and effective protection and assistance to migrants, 






vi. Facilitate a return to countries of origin or third countries characterized by 
freedom, dignity and full reintegration back into domestic society while 
promoting cooperation between the countries affected.
57
 
These objectives represent an attempt to provide as much freedom, security and provision 
for migrants as possible while seeking to minimize the effects upon the affected 
countries.  Each of the objectives accomplishes this overall goal in some aspect.  In the 
words of Ghosh, these objectives seek to “make movements of people more orderly, 
manageable, and productive and to provide, for this purpose, a comprehensive, 
multilateral framework which combines and balances the interests of all parties 
involved.”58  The regime aims at orderly movement rather than free movement.  The 
system to emerge from the NIROMP effort is not intended to replace existing policies, 
such as the UN Convention regarding Refugees or GATS, which are functioning well.  
The regime is multilateral, representing the interests and efforts of all affected countries.  
It protects basic rights and tries to account for the root causes of migration.  Beyond 
agreement of the shared objectives, implementation of the new regime requires an 
integrated international policy structure and the establishment of an effective, 
international monitoring regime. 
NIROMP aims to create an international system for managing the movement of 
peoples, replacing what Ghosh views as an inadequate collection of discrete national 
policies.  In order to achieve this through NIROMP, Ghosh must provide two arguments.  
The first is an argument that demonstrates why the present system is truly inadequate, for 
it is possible to argue that the divergent discrete policies that countries currently have are 
                                                 
57
 Ibid., 221.  I have paraphrased the objectives, although the verbs (i.e., enhance, widen, etc.) are Ghosh’s. 
58





acceptable if they were enforced.  Until states recognize the need for a new objective in 
their policies apart from the protection of their national interests, there is no motivation to 
adopt a new regime, particularly an international regime.  The second argument is one 
that establishes that NIROMP is the correct alternative regime to adopt.  Ghosh targets 
the first need by arguing that the existing system is antiquated, designed to address the 
problems of immigration that existed at the end of World War II.  Conditions have 
changed and so must the policies.  The second argument is a consequential argument, 
based upon the gains to be made by adopting a new international policy framework. 
Migration patterns of the last two decades have changed substantially from the 
period immediately following the Second World War.  Driven by changes in the global 
infrastructure noted above in the discussion of Straubhaar’s GAMP proposal, the two 
most significant changes in migration are the dramatic increase in both the numbers of 
migrants and in the number of sending countries.  Between 1965 and 1990 foreign born 
residents, while remaining at 2.3% of the total population in the world, rose in absolute 
numbers from approximately 75,214,000 to 119,761,000, an increase of nearly 63%.  In 
both North America and Western Europe, the foreign born population nearly doubled 
during the same time frame.
59
  Current estimates of foreign born residents around the 
world are approximately 175,000,000.  Diversity in sending countries has increased as 
well.  Earlier patterns of migration often tracked to historical colonial relations.  
However, by the 1990s more countries were sending more people to more locations, 
creating new challenges of intercultural relations and integration.  In the same time frame 
there were increases in the numbers of people seeking asylum as well as significant 
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demands for new labor in growing Western economies.  The response of the receiving 
countries affected by this increased movement has been to establish more restrictive 
policies aimed at controlling movement without any attempt to address the root 
circumstances driving migration.
60
  Although not always strictly enforced, these policies 
have lead to new problems associated with irregular migration, leaving migrants 
vulnerable to exploitation.  As Ghosh writes: “when there is high emigration pressure in 
sending countries and powerful pull factors in destination countries, and especially when 
the two converge, regulatory restrictions alone cannot arrest the movements; they are 
simply diverted to irregular channels.”61  Such conditions arose in the 1990’s, indicating 
the need for a new international system for migration, one not based upon uncoordinated 
national sovereignty, but upon a set of international rules compatible with existing global 
political and economic contexts with the adequate flexibility to respond as these contexts 
change. 
If we accept Ghosh’s argument that the current global migration circumstance is 
problematic in the ways Ghosh claims, an argument must be made that NIROMP 
addresses the problems of the current system, producing a system that achieves the 
desired end.  Ghosh provides a consequentialist argument in support of NIROMP, 
claiming that it does address these problems and addresses them well.  The NIROMP 
proposal must fulfill the six objectives that Ghosh has laid out for such a proposal.   
The benefits of NIROMP identified by Ghosh can be characterized as either cost 
cutting measures or direct benefits accruing from the orderly movement of peoples.  The 
cost cutting measures are tied to the pursuit of the first and third goals aiming at 
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improving the performance of governments.  As more and more countries have been 
increasing migration controls and enforcement measures their costs have dramatically 
risen.  Reactive policies tend to be more expensive than policies associated with 
managing well controlled policies.  Establishing consistent, transparent and harmonious 
migration policies across the globe will enable states to better respond to existing and 
changing migration patterns as well as enable migrants to more easily navigate the 
system by understanding the possibilities and criteria of movement.  This should lead to a 
reduction in irregular migration with its high costs for both the migrant and the receiving 
country.  Ghosh writes: “A global system of orderly movements, which is cooperatively 
managed, combining efficiency, equity and respect for human rights, could be 
extraordinarily consequential for the future of the liberal world order.”62  Reduced 
enforcement expenditures, reduced exploitation and trafficking costs will all lead to 
reducing costs of the new system. 
It’s not just the reduction of costs that drives benefits.  Improved abilities to meet 
labor demands in developed countries will drive an increase in the global economy from 
which sending countries will participate and eventually alleviate the sending pressures in 
those countries, leading to a reduction in migration.  Ghosh cites economic studies 
indicating a doubling of global GDP in an unrestricted global labor market.
63
  The 
allowance in GATS for some providers of services to be able to provide those services in 
foreign countries rather than just remotely over phones and computers recognizes that 
there is economic benefit to the liberalized movement of workers in the world.  Studies 
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associated with GATS have shown the possibility of improved export outlooks related to 
information based services in developed countries, indicating that the benefit of 
liberalized movement goes both ways.  This benefit is largely tied to the fourth goal of 
NIROMP and is expected to consist largely of some proposal such as Straubhaar’s 
GAMP that was discussed earlier.  The bottom line of NIROMP is believed to be positive 
in economic terms.   
What should a liberal philosopher think of these arguments?  The NIROMP 
proposal is interesting as envisioned.  However, it seems that it will fall victim to the 
same problem that many international agreements do.  Without a strong enforcement 
mechanism, the benefits will be strongly constrained.  Ghosh recognizes this problem and 
discusses the problem of a “hard instrument” versus a “soft instrument.”  Ghosh 
envisions a soft instrument, one in which countries retain their sovereign decision making 
processes and national enforcement mechanisms.  States will join NIROMP because they 
see it is in their best interest, just as states have chosen to commit to GATT and GATS in 
order to participate more fully in international trade.  However, a system without 
enforcement encourages free-riding.  Leaving free-riding states out of the system will 
encourage migrants from those free-riding states to continue costly patterns of irregular 
migration.  GATT and GATS, which rely upon soft instruments for enforcement, can in 
many ways be considered morally troubling.  Conceived, molded and operated by the 
dominant economic powers of the West, the institutions associated with world trade are 
viewed as exploitative of less powerful countries.  Some countries are compelled to 
tolerate such exploitation in order to gain at least some benefit from the system.  I think it 





Such asymmetries of power are troubling to liberals and it is doubtful that proponents of 
the open borders vision will find the regulated openness of NIROMP an adequate 
expression of liberal egalitarian concerns.  Further, NIROMP leaves fully intact the 
Westphalian rights of states which have been questioned from the open borders side of 
the debate.  The communitarian side of the debate might also be concerned that NIROMP 
doesn’t adequately address their concerns.  If the proposal were successful, it could lead 
to significant pressure for states to open their doors in ways that compromise the integrity 
of cultural values.  Although this problem always exists, the establishment of 
international regimes that place pressure upon this might be considered troubling. 
Ghosh, like Straubhaar, would leave existing agreements, such as those that apply 
to refugees, in place.  This potentially creates integration problems that may or may not 
undermine the NIROMP.  Additionally, NIROMP at this time provides for no 
prioritization of movement.  It is uncertain how many people might opt to move under 
NIROMP and whether the numbers might increase over what they are today.  If there are 
more people that desire to move than can move, some prioritization scheme, per Wilcox, 
will be required but is unaddressed.  Any prioritization scheme will treat people 
unequally because some will move and some will not be able to move, even when they 
want.  NIROMP itself, while an attempt to open borders, may be viewed as illiberal, 
unable to address the central concerns of theorists such as Carens and Cole.  Without a 
more detailed view of NIROMP it is difficult to assess it from the moral perspective.  
Finally, the benefits outlined by Ghosh do not address all of the goals of 
NIROMP.  Those goals which relate to the rights and noneconomic lives of migrants 





beneficial.  But it is these goals, the reduction of forced migration due to war and natural 
disasters, the right of return and reunification, the expansion of choice and the reduction 
in the exploitation of migrants that are of most interest to the moral philosopher.  They 
receive the least amount of attention from Ghosh.  Why is this?  It is not because they are 
not recognized as problems in the current migration regime; they are, or he would not 
have included them as problems to be resolved by the project.  Perhaps it is because he 
thinks they will be achieved as byproducts of the other benefits and therefore, do not need 
direct attention.  Or perhaps it is because the other arguments will be better received by 
the international community or that they are more concrete and measureable.  Whatever 
the reason, Ghosh’s neglect in recognizing improvement in rights conditions and other 
aspects of life as a positive benefit of NIROMP is troubling because it leaves a central 
concern of the open borders debate treated as unimportant, to be resolved by addressing 
other problems.  Even when Ghosh recognizes the importance of resolving these issues, it 
is because it enhances the systems efficiency, encourages migrants to return home and 
makes the project more cost effective.
64
  It is not because the respect of these rights and 
the people who hold them is important.  This leaves one to question the balance of 
priorities in the project.  Without direct attention to rights and the benefits to people that 
are achieved when rights are respected, rights as a motivation for changing the system of 




 This chapter has reviewed a number of different proposals, characterized as either 
nonideal or international regimes.  The nonideal proposals are uncomfortable with the 
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current state of actual people in the world, people who cannot wait for the theorists to 
find consensus in their debate.  Real people need relief from their oppressive conditions 
now.  I examined two proposals in this area:  the possibility that migration is a superior 
alternative to aid as examined by Frederick Whelan and the development of a Global 
Principal of Harm by Shelley Wilcox.  Whelan considers the reasons for why migration 
options are superior to the use of aid to relieve conditions of suffering in the world and 
finds the argument unconvincing.  At best, migration is something that could be done 
concomitantly with aid.  Wilcox’s argument seeks to establish priority among migrants, 
determining who gets in first, something that none of the ideal arguments examine.  
Those who suffer a deficit of human rights as a direct result of harmful actions by states 
should be prioritized in accordance with her GPH ahead of those whose motivation in 
movement is driven by nonrights deficit related reasons.  Proposals such as these, while 
bringing to the fore salient issues that need to be considered within the scope of the open 
borders debate, do little to resolve the fundamental disagreement of the debate because 
their application is to particular contexts.  In the absence of those contexts, they say 
nothing as to what migration policy should be.   
I also examined two proposals characterized as international regimes because they 
seek to establish a set of international protocols as part of international law.  Thomas 
Straubhaar’s General Agreement on the Movements of People is an economic proposal 
that seeks to balance the allocation of labor based upon global labor markets.  Included in 
the proposal are migrant taxes to mitigate the effects of negative externalities of 
migration and an income tax proposal based upon both residency and citizenship.  





hold citizenship.  This proposal was found wanting in that it creates an inordinately 
complex tax scheme which may actually discourage movement or encourage irregular 
movement.  To the extent that GAMP places economic concerns above moral concerns it 
will also be troubling.  Finally, I examined Bimal Ghosh’s NIROMP proposal.  This 
proposal also does not appear able to address the liberal concerns that created the open 
borders debate in the first place.  Although it recognizes the importance of rights and the 
conditions of life for people, it pushes them too far in the background, leaving them only 
to service the more obvious economic ends of the project. 
 The problem that now exists is that none of the arguments examined thus far, as 
representative of the typical arguments made in the debate, have served to move us 
further towards resolving the liberal question of borders:  Are states morally justified in 
controlling movement across their borders?  In order to resolve this question, I believe 






MORAL CONSENSUS IN THE OPEN BORDERS DEBATE 
 
 
In this chapter I turn to the positive aspects of this project.  To this point I have 
argued that there are problems in the different positions within the open borders debate 
that prevent one view from becoming universally (or nearly so) accepted.  Although I 
have not argued for it in this thesis thus far, I believe that theoretical debates in political 
philosophy should be conducted in a manner that can influence policy makers.  The 
failure to do this has been true of both the theoretical and public debates regarding 
immigration policies with the result that normative considerations, and in particular the 
normative considerations regarding open borders considered in the previous chapters, do 
not influence existing national immigration control policies.
1
  Neither comparative nor 
theoretical work regarding immigration policies indicates that moral considerations 
occupy a significant role.
2
  Neither does this debate, through its primary proponents or 
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others, appear to play a role in the public debate about immigration.  This raises a 
question: Why is the moral debate of political philosophers regarding borders without 
influence in shaping immigration control policies?   
 It is an assumption of this thesis that the theoretical debate considered thus far 
should influence policy makers.  The problem of immigration, both legal and illegal, is a 
significant issue for most governments in the Western world.  It occupies a prominent 
position in public debate for both politicians and citizens.  Those whose theoretical work 
is so closely tied to a prominent public issue should have in mind that their work should 
address the problem at some point.  Theoretical work that fails to achieve this goal should 
be revised in a manner that does achieve this goal.  This is not to claim that theoretical 
work is inappropriate, or more specifically, that the theoretical work done on borders is 
inappropriate, but rather it is a claim that we must be mindful of the necessity to bridge 
the gap between theoretical work and political practice.  The influence is not always 
direct, and ultimately, the philosopher does not determine how influential his or her ideas 
will be.  As Phillip Petit writes: “It would be utopian to think that what happens in 
politics is a function of the normative ideas that circulate in and around the political 
world.”3 Nor is the quality of the ideas a relevant factor.  Good ideas and bad ideas are 
put into political practice.  However, the foundation of these ideas is important.  Petit 
again: “Yet normative ideas are of first importance in political life.  For it is only possible 
for politicians and public officials to gain support for the policies they pursue to the 
extent they can represent them as legitimate…motivated by this or that…agreed to 
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commitment.”4  Political philosophers involved in a debate about immigration, with its 
obvious implications for policy, need to rethink how the debate is proceeding and 
whether there is a more productive way to frame the problem and its resolution.  In this 
chapter I will suggest a new focus for framing the debate in order to be more influential 
in the public debate regarding immigration.   
This new focus relies upon the idea that at the heart of debates about open 
borders, there is a consensus position.  When the moral perspectives in a debate become 
fragmented and polarized, as they are in the open borders debate, an avenue to bridge 
these divergent perspectives is the development of a consensus position from which we 
can begin our consideration anew.  I borrow this approach from Jonathan Wolff and 
Avner de-Shalit’s book Disadvantage.  In the first section of this chapter I will explore 
this approach and what it means to develop this kind of moral consensus.  In the final 
section of this chapter I will identify and explain the position of moral consensus that 
exists in the open borders debate. 
 
Developing Moral Consensus 
 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit in Disadvantage, claim that the 
identification of a moral consensus representing the central concerns of divergent 
normative claims regarding the same issue is a means to overcome the problem of 
polarization and influence public policy.
 5
  The book presents a three step process.  First 
the consensus position must be identified.  The middle step is to explore the meaning of 
the consensus, both abstractly and how it is experienced in the world.  The final step is to 
make policy recommendations that reflect the manner in which the consensus is found in 









the world with the intention of resolving the associate problems.
6
  In the context of liberal 
societies the implementation of social policy requires a public consensus regarding the 
problem and the solution upon which the policy can be based.  The absence of a public 
consensus will leave specific policy prescriptives contentious and undermine the ability 
of the policy to achieve the identified goals.  Achieving this public consensus relies upon 
an underlying theoretical consensus.  The absence of theoretical consensus will leave 
public policy unaffected because of the inability to generate the public consensus upon 
which the social policy can be founded.  Therefore, the route for political theory to affect 
public policy is to identify a theoretical consensus upon which many can agree and 
towards which policy can be aimed.
7
  Such an approach enables policy makers to target 
that which is most essential.  In this thesis I focus on the first step of their process, the 
identification of the consensus position.
8
 
The idea of equality in philosophy is a highly fragmented concept with the 
problem being identifying in what way people should be equal.  Various accounts have 
argued for equality of resources, opportunity, well-being, opportunity for well-being, or 
respect to name a few of the accounts.  Wolff and de-Shalit claim that because there are 
so many versions available, a commitment to one of them by a policy maker for 
implementation purposes would lead to the policy being opposed by both nonegalitarians 
and egalitarians alike, who would prefer to use a different account of equality.  This 
leaves the potential public policy without widespread support, a condition that is sure to 
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doom any policy.  But Wolff and de-Shalit note another problem of egalitarian theories 
within academic philosophy.  They are constructed in ways that ensures they will leave 
no mark on public policies.  They reach for a level of abstraction that separates them 
from the world in which policies are implemented.  The theory becomes disengaged with 
the real world, developing bizarre and unreal examples and counterexamples.  To resolve 
these problems Wolff and de-Shalit seek to develop an account of egalitarian theory that 
is useful for public policy, that is, that can be used by governments to move society 
towards being a society of equals.
9
   
The task then, is how to take these useful discussions about distinct perspectives 
regarding equality to the point where they can affect policy:  “for the purpose of social 
theory it is necessary to see how a broader consensus within egalitarianism can be 
generated.  If theorists fail to meet this challenge they risk leaving social policy in a 
theoretical vacuum, or perhaps in chaos where any theory is treated as if it is as good as 
any other.”10  In response to this need Wolff and de-Shalit do two things.  They set 
themselves to the task of identifying the broad consensus shared by the divergent 
perspectives of egalitarian thought from the perspective of what policy can do.  They then 
use empirical data, in their case, interviews, to provide a check upon the consensus theory 
they develop.  Wolf and de-Shalit, after identifying the egalitarian consensus as 
identifying the worst off and improving their position through the elimination of 
disadvantage, spend the majority of their book developing an understanding of 
disadvantage as experienced by people.  Finally, they develop explicit policy 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 3-4 and 10-13. 
10





recommendations.  I would like to say two things about this process of identifying 
consensus. 
Consensus, in the manner used by Wolff and de-Shalit, identifies a commitment 
that represents the central concern of the different theories in the domain, the condition 
which the theories intend to resolve.  This task isn’t straightforward in the sense that one 
can simply line up the stated principles of each theory and find the ones that are 
equivalent.  It requires some interpretation to figure out what problem is being solved, 
what characterizes the end it aims at, and then to develop a principle that can represent 
this concept.  The resulting principle won’t necessarily use the same language, but will 
capture the same problem and aim at an end that resolves, or at least begins to resolve, 
the problem.  One reason why the language of the theory and consensus principle differs 
is that the consensus principle must be turned into policy prescription.  Theoretical 
principles are often not worded in ways that can be readily implemented.  In the case of 
Wolff and de-Shalit, the commitment of egalitarian sufficiency theories (the idea that that 
everyone should have enough of certain goods), when coupled with the contextual reality 
of finite or limited resources, translates into a policy principle of identifying the worst 
off
11
 and improving their position.
12
  Those who are worst off are characterized by their 
disadvantages, especially clustered disadvantages.  What public policy should do, in an 
environment in which there are inadequate resources to do everything or to provide 
enough of the right kinds of goods, is eliminate disadvantages.  The elimination of 
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disadvantages (which is not money alone) improves the conditions of those without 
enough.  What is important for my purposes here is not to evaluate whether this is the 
correct consensus principle for the egalitarian debate, but to demonstrate how abstract 
egalitarian principles can be translated into a shared principle that is applicable to policy 
development.  This consensus principle doesn’t contain the actual elements of policy.  
However, it does make the policy task plain.  Identify the conditions of disadvantage that 
make someone worst off and figure out what can be done to eliminate those 
circumstances.  These largely empirical tasks must be completed within the political 
context of policy.  The consensus principle remains stable even in the midst of the policy 
debate.  As particular kinds of disadvantages are eliminated or substantially reduced, 
policy can change to focus on other kinds of disadvantage.  The consensus principle, help 
those who are worst off by eliminating disadvantage, doesn’t change even as policy 
addresses new or different disadvantages.  What is important to note here is that the 
bridge between theory and policy has been intentionally crossed.  The identification of 
consensus gets us part of the way across the bridge with the translation into policy 
language completing the task. 
The kind of consensus to which I am referring here should not be confused with 
the concept of overlapping consensus as proposed by Rawls.  The Rawlsian conception 
represents a political conception that could be embraced or endorsed by people who share 
a wide range of reasonable conceptions of the good or comprehensive doctrines.
13
  The 
overlapping consensus contains value commitments but is explicitly political, relating to 
the basic structure of society.  In the case under consideration here, the content of an 
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overlapping consensus relates to the commitments of liberalism, principally the equal 
moral worth of all people, which drive the open borders debate, not to the moral 
principles we derive from the debate about immigration policy.  As such, the consensus I 
am aiming for here is derived from the principles contained in the overlapping consensus 
that Rawls appeals to.  Each of the positions I have considered in earlier chapters should 
be compatible with the overlapping consensus.  Presumably each of these positions, 
including my own consensus, could be endorsed by people with various conceptions of 
the good.  The overlapping consensus is intended to provide unity and stability to the 
political system in that it is a system to which different people could be committed 
without compromising their own vision of the good.  In Rawlsian terms, the consensus I 
propose must be able to be endorsed by different groups from their own point of view in 
order to be considered compatible with the overlapping consensus. 
Finding an actual consensus principle is different from finding a consensus 
principle that could be shared by all the theories.  This latter process represents 
theoretical work rather than practical work.  The distinction is subtle but important 
because it recognizes the value and place of the theoretical work and recognizes that there 
are two tasks here.  The first is the theoretical work that enables us to think about 
problems outside the limiting bounds of public policy and practical considerations.  The 
second task is the translation into policy terms.  If we start and end in the policy realm, 
then we are likely to implement policies much like other policies already implemented, 
rather than to find new and perhaps better ways, of addressing social concerns.  As Wolff 
and de-Shalit note, both sides of the process need the other.
14
  Philosophers need to be 
mindful of the world in which people live and to which policy applies, while policy work 
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requires a solid conceptual foundation that is outside the practical world.  The two tasks 
go hand in hand.   
Identifying consensus in these divergent theoretical positions is not about 
negotiation.  It is not about trading ideas such that one theory contributes one principle 
while another theory contributes a second principle.  It is about identifying that which 
represents the central concern shared by the different positions and enables the concerns 
and aims of the theories to be at least partly achieved.  Policy making in the world of 
political practice will involve negotiation, particularly if there are multiple paths to 
achieve the ends of the policy.  The work of identifying the consensus principle is prior to 
this point.  After the consensus of the theoretical work is identified, the central moral 
principle can be expressed.  This principle can then be made manifest in public policy.  It 
is at this point that negotiation becomes part of the process. 
I am now ready to turn to my final task of identifying the moral consensus in the 
open borders debate, in a context compatible with the world of political practice. 
 
Consensus in the Open Borders Debate 
 
Identifying the Consensus 
 
The development of a consensus in the open borders debate requires the 
distillation of the arguments for both open and closed borders into a shared consensus 
about what is important, that is, the central moral concern of the open borders debate.  
Each side of the argument raise issues of importance to human lives that immigration 
policies should, on the one hand, foster, and on the other, not undermine.  Central to the 
arguments of the open borders debate is the effects of border controls upon the lives of 





into a context, be it rich or poor, people on the move do so because they are pursuing a 
better life in a new place or they have been forced to move by circumstances beyond their 
control.  Carens, for example, commonly opens his pieces with the story of some poor 
person, threatened in the present by those who have enough, simply for trying to better 
his or her life.  Walzer and Miller bring to the debate the interests of those who wish to 
protect some way of life they have come to know.  Their interest is not so much aimed at 
keeping others out as keeping what they have, that which is both familiar and meaningful.  
From these divergent ideas comes the idea that the central concern of the open borders 
debate is the negative effects of border controls upon people, both those who move and 
those who do not.  Rawls, in considering cosmopolitanism, identifies a similar concern: 
“The ultimate concern of a cosmopolitan view is the well-being of individuals and not the 
justice of societies.”15  Although theoreticians such as Cole suggest that the concern is 
about reaching a theoretical coherence that follows from fundamental liberal 
commitments, the reason coherence is important is because the lack of coherence affects 
the lives of people, often in profoundly negative ways.  The inability to move often 
undermines the possibility of people leading lives that those individuals find meaningful.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the central concern of the open borders debate 
among liberal political philosophers regards the effects of the ability or inability to move 
upon the possibility of individuals leading lives that are meaningful.
16
  Recognizing that 
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it is the effect upon individuals that is central to both sides of the debate, I suggest the 
following as the consensus view of the open borders debate: 
The right of states to control their borders is constrained by the moral 
obligation of a state to give appropriate regard to the interests of both 
itself and other states and of individuals (both inside and outside state 
borders, without regard for citizenship) affected by their immigration 
control policies and to minimize or eliminate the negative effects of those 
policies. 
 On this consensus states are able to control their borders, determining who gets in and 
who does not, who can stay and who cannot, provided they take into account the effects 
of those control policies, including the specific decisions that follow from those policies, 
upon itself, other states and all individuals, affected by the policy.  When those effects are 
negative, the state must take action to minimize or eliminate the negative effect.  Further 
explanation and justification is warranted. 
 In exploring the meaning of this consensus statement I want to focus upon four 
different aspects.  The first is why the focus of the consensus statement is the state rather 
than the individual.  The second is to understand the nature of the constrained right for 
states.  The third area is the problem of interests.  The final aspect is the problem of 
determining negative effects. 
 
The State in the Consensus 
 
The focus of the consensus statement is upon the state rather than the individual 







  Whenever people live together, as part of the 
normal course of events, problems arise which require an institution to which people can 
appeal in order to resolve these problems.  Any scheme of cooperation involving a 
sizeable number of people requires structuring that reaches beyond the problem of 
conflict resolution.  As society grows the institutions of coordination become more 
complex, tending to become plural rather than unitary.  As institutions from different 
geographic regions come into contact they recognize that some issues are best 
coordinated across small geographic units whereas other issues require coordination 
across large geographic units.
18
  The state, in our current context, represents one level of 
a complex scheme of institutions designed to coordinate human activity.  Look beyond 
the state, to organizations of global governance and coordination, and there is no 
unqualified acceptance and the success of such organizations is problematic in many 
cases.  Look below the state, to smaller regional organizations such as states, provinces or 
cities and one finds unqualified acceptance and success but an inability to provide 
coordination for large issues, such as migration, because they lack the requisite authority.  
As a process of history, it is not inconceivable that in the future migration might be 
controlled by some institution other than the state, but such a scheme is problematic at the 
present time.  The state, then, is a valuable institution for coordinating human activities.    
This claim is simply an instrumental claim:  the state accomplishes a necessary 
function related to human activity.  Given the importance of the state in framing and 
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coordinating human activity, it is appropriate to focus upon what the state can or cannot 
do.  This claim does not rely upon arguments of nationality and self-determination, 
although it is compatible with them.  It will permit states to function in the absence of a 
national identity, recognizing that in many cases the existence of states is arbitrary, 
manufactured as a result of human decisions rather than being the product of the more 
natural process that Miller envisions creates nationalities.  Both kinds of states receive 
standing in this consensus.  This claim about states is not intended to undermine the 
important standing of the individual in liberal theory.  The state has moral standing 
because it represents collective action with profound effects, both negative and positive, 
upon individuals.  
People live in a world of states, and to be stateless, as Walzer notes, is to have 
one’s life always at terrible risk.19  Conceding that states exist and provide a valuable 
function is not the same as a claim that states should exist or that they should exist in 
some particular form with a specific set of rights.  It is a factual claim, that states do exist, 
in a wide variety of forms and that it is not morally troubling that they do; it is, rather, 
morally valuable that they do exist.  If people are going to live together and cooperate 
with one another, some institutional scheme must exist.  However “frayed” the notion of 
state is with its rights being “disaggregated or unbundled,”20 it remains the current 
context.  Even as theorists reconceive the state in various ways, such as the disassociation 
of the state with control over territory but instead with control over those to whom it 
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 states as a way of organizing life will remain for the foreseeable 
future.  Although there are many states, it is reasonable to assume that coordination is 
facilitated by a smaller number of institutional organizations, rather than a larger number.  
Complex global coordination is hard to envision if all aspects of coordination occurred at 
the municipal level.  Similarly, at this time it is difficult to envision a single organization 
coordinating this activity, especially mindful of Kant’s warning regarding the global 
state.
22
  What, then, exist are multiple states needing to coordinate their activities with 
one another.   
The situation does not change with the existence of suprastate organizations.  
Suprastate organizations, such as the European Union, do not abrogate the authority and 
importance of the state, but derive their limited authority from the authority of the state.  
The European Union has only the authority that its member states have been willing to 
cede to it.  This is, in a very real sense, a social contract among states, in that the EU 
receives its authority from the consent of the governed and is constrained by those who 
give it its authority.  Even here, though, the freedom of movement legally possessed by 
citizens of EU states has on several recent occasions been rejected when domestic 
political situations required it.  The commitment to being European has not sufficiently 
overridden the commitments of national identity.   
Financial problems in 2012 related to the euro demonstrate the problem of 
collective commitments without adequate enforcement mechanisms.  The commitment to 
                                                 
21
 See Cole, Philosophies of Exclusion, 74-76 for the suggestion of a model in which any government 
organization has the ability to tax those to whom it provides services but has no control over whom can be 
in the area in which it provides services.  Territory plays a role because the area of service is bounded, but 
not importantly so.  The state in this model seems to function no differently than a local utility company (or 
Nozick’s dominant protection agency). 
22
 Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, 






a shared currency is undermined by the failure to provide fiscal and monetary institutions 
with the authority needed to deal with crises.  Coordination without authority, which may 
work well in good times, is problematic in challenging circumstances.  The focus, 
therefore, must be upon an institution with the required authority to enforce policy.  From 
a different perspective, suprastate organizations such as the EU simply move the 
problem.  One is free to move about within the member states, but those residing outside 
any of those member states are not free to move inside those boundaries.  Borders 
distinguishing those who are in from those who are out still exist at any border between a 
member and a nonmember state.  The state, then, remains valuable as an existing 
organizing feature of life and is not undermined by the presence of larger organizations.
23
 
From the perspective of the open borders school, one might expect the focus upon 
the state to be inappropriate.  The focus should be upon the individual, specifying what 
individuals should be able to do.  While there is value in recognizing what it is that 
individuals should be able to do, it is more appropriate, as an issue of global justice, to 
focus upon the institutions which ensure the conditions of justice and create the context in 
which people live their lives, particularly if the idea of global justice is to be about 
something more than individual well-being.  Above I claimed that states have moral 
justification; here the claim is a pragmatic one.  It is states which are the important actors 
in creating and assuring the conditions of both social and global justice.
24
  Even if the 
conceptualization of global justice is as uncertain as Nagel claims,
25
 it is still possible to 
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recognize that people live in deplorable conditions around the world and that the state has 
tremendous ability to improve those conditions.  This conclusion requires no fixed 
conceptualization of global justice.
26
 
That the actions of the state are the proper focus of the consensus is also indicated 
by the fact that an overwhelming majority of people in the world, including those living 
in unacceptable conditions of poverty and oppression, do not wish to move.  Whether it is 
the intangible preferences and affections that tie people to place and others, or 
Straubhaar’s “preference for immobility” that is tied to “location specific advantages” 
explainable in strictly economic terms, the simple fact of the matter is that most people, 
including those with the resources and opportunities to move, do not move.  Focusing 
upon the right of people to move in the face of the limited demand to move neglects the 
needs of those most greatly affected by global injustice.  This leads to the focus upon 
how the state creates the environment that permits movement and the effects of its denial 
for those who wish to move.  Focusing on the context is more likely to create a positive 
environment for movement than a focus upon a right that will be little exercised.  Making 
the state the central focus of the consensus places obligations upon the state that will 
affect those who do not move, since the state must consider the effects of their policy 
upon those affected, which includes both migrants and nonmigrants.  Finally, some 
proponents of the open borders argument, in particular Carens,
27
 allow that under at least 
some conditions states may control their borders, even in an open borders scenario.  If 
there are some conditions under which those who argue for open borders concede border 
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control, the concern shifts from, can borders be controlled to how borders should be 
controlled.  Under what conditions can states restrict entry into their country? 
 
Rights and Constraints in the Consensus 
 
 If it is morally permissible, within liberal theory, for states to restrict entry, under 
what conditions or situations should states be able to do this?  How should this right of 
states be understood?  There is both a positive and a negative assertion being made in the 
consensus statement.  The positive statement is that states do have the right to control 
their borders.  The negative assertion is that this right is not absolute, there are constraints 
placed upon it.  The state cannot control borders without considering the effects of those 
controls and responding appropriately to negative effects.  This ties how the right to 
control borders is implemented directly to the results of the border controls.  More should 
be said about constrained rights. 
 David Miller, in the context of immigration, has proposed the distinction between 
basic freedoms and bare freedoms.  Basic freedoms represent things that people should 
have no matter what else they have.  They are rights to be claimed regardless of the 
circumstance and place obligation upon others.  Bare freedoms, on the other hand, are 
contextual and while their possession might be worthwhile, it is not obvious that the 
moral implication of not having the freedom rises to the same level as a basic freedom.  
Bare freedoms do not place obligations upon other people to ensure that they are 
provided.  A case must be made that the possession of a freedom is morally significant 







  Basic freedoms place constraints upon the actions of states, bare freedoms do 
not.   
 Miller distinguishes between basic and bare freedoms by grounding basic 
freedoms in human needs, whereas bare freedoms are rooted in contingent human ends.
29
  
An example will serve to show the difference.  All people have a need for food in order 
to survive.  Thus, the need for some minimal level of nutritious sustenance becomes a 
basic right.  As a basic right it places obligations upon all to ensure that it is met.  But 
people can be sustained by quite a wide range of foods, and the need for sustenance 
doesn’t translate into a claim regarding particular foods.  It would be good to have the 
desires for particular foods met, but this desire is not rooted in human needs and 
therefore, at best, is recognized as a bare freedom.  In the context of global justice, Miller 
would say we all have obligations to end starvation; we do not have obligations to 
provide a diet filled with the foods desired by those who are starving.  Miller applied this 
distinction to movement as discussed earlier: more movement is a good thing, but not one 
that we can require that all take positive action to ensure.  Taking this same distinction 
and applying it to the state right to control borders, states have a bare freedom to control 
their borders.  The right to control borders is not tied to the basic needs of a state, but is 
tied to the contingent ends of the state.  The right to control their borders is therefore 
something good to have, but is constrained.  But how it is constrained needs to be 
explained.  Nozick’s idea of side constraints is useful here. 
Side constraints focus not upon the moral standing of the end goal but upon the 
methods that can be used to achieve the goal.  We don’t seek to determine whether some 
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particular goal has acceptable moral standing, but we assess the process by which that 
goal can be achieved.  Side constraints are moral constraints that should not be violated in 
the pursuit of final ends.
30
  Although Nozick intends not to focus upon the goal, the idea 
of side constraints is compatible with those circumstances in which the goal has been 
determined as acceptable but the concern is how to achieve that goal.  Side constraints are 
compatible with the claim that states may control their borders but places limitations 
upon how states may go about achieving that goal.  States are constrained by the need to 
consider the effects of their actions and eliminate the negative effects.  The reason we 
care about how states go about controlling their borders is because of the liberal 
commitment to the individual.  Individuals hold a position of importance in liberal theory 
alongside the moral value of the state.  This constraint reflects the central moral concern 
of the open borders debate regarding the effect of border control policies upon all 
individuals.  Constraining the states in this manner also reflects Kantian commitments 
regarding the use of the individual as mere means.
31
  Individuals cannot be used as means 
by states in the control of their borders.  This perspective brings to the front the central 
concern in the open borders debate: the effects upon all individuals of border controls. 
One benefit of stating the consensus in terms of a constrained right is that it can 
respond to the constantly changing conditions in the world experienced by people.  The 
constraint remains stable even as the context changes and new kinds of negative effects 
emerge which the state needs to take account of.  If the statement is left merely in terms 
of an unconstrained right, then the state will be free to do what it chooses in controlling 
borders.  But circumstances change and what might presently be an acceptable type of 
                                                 
30
 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 29. 
31





control might in the future be unacceptable.  Technological advances change conditions 
around the world in a way that affects migration.  The dispersal of call centers supporting 
American business throughout the world might be perceived as minimizing the negative 
effects of border controls.  Prior to this dispersal individuals would have needed to move 
for their economic improvement, whereas now technology enables the job to move to 
them.  The consensus as expressed doesn’t need to change to address these new 
circumstances. 
One of the primary reasons for rejecting a formulation of the consensus in terms 
of individual rights has already been identified by determining that the effects of state 
action is what is important.  A further reason is that in a world of states it is difficult to 
identify a positive right that can be claimed against multiple states.
32
  Arguments for a 
universal right of entry have been controversial because it creates a political claim against 
a sovereign power with which the claimant has no relation.  Most states will reject a 
claim against their sovereignty to guarantee the movement of those outside its jurisdiction 
into its jurisdiction.  Individuals will also find it difficult to fight the denial of a right to 
movement against strong and remote countries.
33
  The focus of the right of movement 
guaranteed within documents such as the UDHR and ICCPR is a right that can be 
claimed against one’s own state and therefore, presumably enforced.  In these documents 
the citizen is guaranteed the right of exit and return, a claim that is held against an 
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identifiable government which is that citizen’s government and which is obligated to 
ensure that this right is not violated.   
The constraints have been termed as a moral obligation, one that must be honored 
whether or not there is a legal framework requiring that the control of borders be done in 
a particular way.  States, as organizations exercising authority, have boundaries to their 
authority, beyond which the state has no legitimate authority even if it might possess the 
ability to exercise its power.  As with other organizations, the power of the state is 
constrained.  If we envision it as rising out of the social contract, it is bound by the terms 
of that contract.  But it is also bound by the context within which states exist and operate.  
States do not exist in an isolated world.  Although the modern state derives its most basic 
rights from the Westphalian context, this context has been continually modified by the 
actions of these same states.  The framework of international law put into place by these 
states modifies the context in which they operate.  But this is not the only framework in 
which states operate.   
Liberal states also operate in a moral framework similar to that in which each of 
us as individuals operate.  State actions should be bound by our shared moral 
understandings because states draw their existence from the purposes of individuals 
whose actions are morally bound.  What I mean by this, is that the state does not escape 
moral constraints because it is a faceless, amorphous institution.  It acts on behalf of 
people living within its borders, achieving collectively what cannot be achieved 
individually.  In the individual realm our actions are bound; so also are they bound in the 
collective realm.  These moral understandings, within this context, are often translated 





states have a right to control borders, essential to fulfilling their functions, but coupled 
with a moral obligation which constrains how they can pursue the fulfillment of this 
right. 
 
Individual and State Interests 
 
The problem of interests is one of long standing disagreement in philosophical 
literature, especially when posed against the problem of people’s preferences.  The 
problem is how to characterize what an interest is, when a person has an interest and the 
role of preferences in interests.  For example, in Feinberg’s account of interests to say 
someone has an interest is to say that someone has a stake in the well-being of something: 
“a person has a stake in X (whether X be a company, a career, or some kind of ‘issue’ of 
events) when he stands to gain or lose depending on the nature or condition of X.”34  If I 
have a stake in a company, the better off the company is the better off I am.  Feinberg 
divides interests into two categories.  Welfare interests are those things related to the 
generalized conditions that enable a person to pursue other ends, such as health and 
adequate food.  Ulterior interests relate to a person’s aims or goals which require that 
welfare interests be satisfied.  A person needs to have adequate food (welfare interest) in 
order to pursue a career as an opera singer (ulterior interest).  White, whose work on 
freedom of association formed the foundation for Wellman’s argument for closed borders 
discussed in Chapter 3, provided an account of integrity interests (related to fundamental 
individual values) and opportunity interests (related to fair access to goods with 
instrumental value).
35
  The protection of these interests was used to morally evaluate the 
various reasons for which people were excluded from associations: one could not be 
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excluded for reasons that violate the respect of these interests.  It is not necessary to 
develop an account of interests here in the first step of the consensus process.  For my 
purposes here, I simply need to recognize that people and states have interests of some 
sort, deferring for the second step of the process concerns over what kinds of interests are 
legitimate or which are relevant to immigration.  But it is the pursuit of interests, broadly 
construed, that creates the problems of migration and to assert that interests are important 
is unproblematic at this stage. 
The claim that individuals hold interests may be approached from two 
perspectives.  First, they hold interests of an individual nature.  This recognition pushes 
the focus of interest down to the individual level.  Migration requests are often focused 
upon specific aspects of an individual’s life, such as marriage to a particular individual or 
the experience of particular cultural or religious experiences.  Therefore, to include the 
consideration of these personal individual interests is reasonable.  But this is not the only 
manner in which it is possible to think about individual interests.   
As a matter of global justice, it is possible to say that people have interests in the 
conditions of justice, the context which enables justice to be achieved and thereby gives 
regard to their interests.  For example, Brock identifies a three part concern of justice 
including the fulfillment of basic needs, basic rights and the required institutional context 
to support the continual fulfillment of the first two.
36
  From this perspective, people have 
an interest in having their basic needs fulfilled, their rights respected and the ongoing 
expectation that these two conditions are not at risk  This was the focus of Wilcox’s 
Global Principle of Harm discussed earlier.  But it is inadequate to focus solely upon 
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these contextual conditions of justice.  People whose basic needs and rights are assured 
develop additional interests that are affected by constraints upon movement.  These 
additional interests play a more prominent role in having a meaningful life for those 
whose basic needs and rights are assured.  Their lack of fulfillment becomes a negative 
experience with potentially significant negative effects upon their life.  Focusing solely 
upon the interests of context, while important, and more basic than individual interests, is 
inadequate by itself.  The consideration of interests within immigration must focus on 
both the context in which interests occur and on particular individual interests. 
States as well as people require consideration, for states have interests as the 
coordinating institution for the people that reside within the state.  Although this might 
appear to undermine the liberal commitment to the individual it recognizes the manner in 
which states affect those very interests of the individual.  The state is the institutional 
agent that protects and assists the individual in pursuit of his or her interests by providing 
an environment in which interests can actually be pursued.  It is not that the state has 
interests unrelated to its citizens and residents, but that the state has interests in 
maintaining the social context which assists in helping the state to fulfill its function in 
relation to its citizens.  This social context is like a commons in that it must be managed 
if it is to be effective over long periods.  What is required in this social context will vary 
based upon our understanding of the interests of citizens, such as basic rights, and the 
kind of social context they choose to build for themselves and the role that government 
plays in providing that context.  Societies can choose to provide different kinds of 





support.  It is reasonable that when states make these commitments, that the effects of 
immigration policy upon these commitments be taken into account.   
Relating government policy for immigration to government function has been 
recognized within migration policy, but not well explored.
37
  Immigration affects the 
burdens placed upon institutions such as education or judicial systems.  From this internal 
consideration it is reasonable for states to make policies that ensure these institutions 
function in a manner that meets the needs of both citizens and those who are admitted.  
For example, public education is typically provided in most countries today.  When the 
ability of the educational system to function properly is threatened the state must take 
steps to preserve the system’s proper function.  If that threat results from a large number 
of immigrants who require additional language support, it might be reasonable for limits 
to be placed upon immigration until the proper function is secured.  Consider the case of 
the Los Angeles Unified School District where nearly one-third of over 619,000 students 
are classified as English learners with at least 96 first languages spoken.
38
  Resources are 
diverted to support teaching English to these students leaving fewer, and perhaps 
inadequate, resources for more general educational purposes.  The state might be justified 
in this case to limit immigration.  Migration policies that encourage a brain drain effect 
by inducing highly skilled people to emigrate require close consideration from this 
perspective.  The migration of physicians might leave a state unable to coordinate 
adequate health care for its populace.  When national policies encourage this kind of 
movement of physicians it should be considered troubling.  Therefore, the state must also 
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look externally, giving regard to the interests of other states.  If the state’s interest is in 
maintaining an environment which provides an environment that is good for its residents, 
other states must recognize the manner in which state policies affect this. 
 This aspect of the consensus reflects the commitments of moral particularism and 
moral universalism which Cole argued are incompatible.  It aims to give consideration to 
both citizen and noncitizen, expressing the commitments of moral universalism.  But it 
also recognizes that the context of states gives place to special obligations and distributes 
responsibilities differently to different individuals, reflecting the commitments of moral 
particularism.  We do share commitments to those who are close to us.  But these 
commitments do not negate the commitments we have to all.  Both pieces are required for 
us to understand how we assess moral circumstances and why we act in moral 
circumstances.  When moral universalism and particularism are joined together we can 
assess circumstances as morally troubling regardless of who is in the circumstance.  We 
can also understand who, within the contextual framework, has both the responsibility 
and reasons to act.  In some circumstances we recognize that a particular group of people 
have the responsibility to act.  We don’t all rush to fight the fire in the burning house 
down the street.  Others have this responsibility.  We recognize that for many issues of 
justice it is the state or one’s compatriots who have responsibility and reasons to act.  But 
this does not negate that when those who are responsible are unable or unwilling, that 
some responsibility falls to someone who is not normally responsible.  The degree of 
responsibility or the extent of our actions is, in these cases, more limited than in others.  
If a lost and hungry child appears on my doorstep, I take the child in and provide food 





blend moral particularism and moral universalism together can we make the kinds of 
distinctions between who should act first and who should act later.   
This blending is relevant when applied to problems of global justice as well.  
Miller in arguing against the cosmopolitan view writes: “This anti-cosmopolitan stance 
does not mean that we have no global duties at all.  But it means that our duties have to 
be differentiated: we owe more to some than to others.”39  But this distinction is 
compatible with Pogge’s claim that we treat positive duties differently than negative 
duties.  If our duty is positive, in the sense that we provide for others, then distinctions in 
what support we are required to provide can be made.  But if our duty is negative, then no 
distinctions are made.  Pogge writes: “Miller is right that a person may, by living together 
in a political community, increase what they owe to one another, well above what they 
own to human beings in general…Persons cannot, by living together in a political 
community, decrease what they owe foreigners.”40  Moral particularism doesn’t eliminate 
the obligation to those more distant; it merely makes it less pressing in those cases where 
we have equal obligations and a scarcity of resources.  But it is worth noting here that in 
the case of equal obligation and a scarcity of resources, moral universalism doesn’t 
provide any guidance, leaving us in the situation of Buridan’s Ass.  If two people are in 
equal need and we have equal obligation to each but with inadequate resources for both, 
we have no ability to decide who to help so we help no one, help each inadequately or 
help arbitrarily.  If moral universalism leads to this kind of circumstance it is as troubling 
as moral particularism is to claim that our only obligations are to those with who we are 
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in relationship.  The two commitments can, and must, coexist, working together.  The 
moral consensus aims to bring this forward in a manner the open borders debates hasn’t 
accomplished. 
The goal here, and the difficult part to achieve in practice, is the balancing of 
interests that inevitably are part of any political context.  The balancing is complex, 
between individual and states and citizens and noncitizens.  The state cannot simply 
disregard the interests of some, nor can it give excess regard to some.  In many 
circumstances the interests of one group will run counter to the interests of another.  How 
these interests are balanced is problematic and doesn’t promise an easy answer.  But it is 
not appropriate to give consideration only to compatriots and the state’s own interest.   
 
Determining Negative Effects 
 
What we care about most in the open borders debate, and hence in the consensus, 
is the negative effects of immigration policies.  Therefore, the consensus addresses the 
effects of policies rather than simply stating that borders should be open or closed.  
Determining negative effects is not straightforward.  Three issues arise: identifying the 
negative effects, measuring the negative effects and eliminating the negative effects. 
The problem of identifying the negative effects of immigration policies is 
complicated by the presence of harmful conditions already existent in the world.  People 
live in horrendous conditions around the world.  But these conditions are not caused by 
immigration policies; they are caused by other problems such as corrupt governments, 
poor management and unfavorable natural conditions.  Certainly the case is that the 
denial of immigration leaves people in these horrendous conditions, but it not 





Feinberg’s account of harm is useful to understand this problem.  Not all actions harm (in 
Feinberg’s sense of a setback to interests), and there is a distinction between a harmed 
condition (one in which there is some problem but no setback to interests) and harmful 
conditions (ones in which the harm is likely to continue).
41
  Immigration policies do not 
always cause harm, and even when they cause a setback to interests, it is not obvious that 
this is harm.  Some setbacks are permissible and while they set back a particular interest, 
they do not create ongoing conditions of harm.  In this sense, refugee policies can be 
easily distinguished from immigration policies because to deny the refugee the 
opportunity to move leaves the refugee in a harmful condition, one in which harm is 
likely to continue.  The intent of this discussion is to emphasize the need to engage in 
careful consideration of what effects are attributable to immigration policies and what 
effects are due to other causes. 
We must also give consideration to how to measure the effects of policies upon 
people both those within the state and those outside the particular state.  This is an 
empirical question that will, as Bader has claimed, rely upon social and behavioral 
scientists to determine the valid measures.  In some cases this might be the utilization of 
some aggregate measure, in other cases it needs to be the consideration of each 
individual.  It is readily acknowledged by most that the well-being of a substantial 
number of people in the world is inadequate and is given inappropriate consideration by 
those whose well-being is more than adequate.  These people, whose well-being is more 
than adequate, are obligated by liberal ideals, to consider the plight of others in the world.  
When that circumstance is affected by the policies of the state, the state has that same 
obligation.  It might seem odd that an institution is obligated to give consideration to 
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individuals far away.  But we owe negative duties to everyone.  Pogge argues that 
“compatriotism makes no difference to our most important negative duties.”42  If this 
claim is correct, then we must consider whether the effects of national immigration 
control policies violate a negative duty.  The consensus position claims that this is 
determined by knowing the effects of the action.  If the action harms, then we have a duty 
to refrain from that harm.  If the action does not harm, then the state has more discretion 
in carrying out the policy.  But to the extent that state actions affect people, both within 
and outside the state, the state must give consideration to those effects. 
Finally, consideration must be given how best to eliminate the negative effects of 
immigration policies.  The approach doesn’t necessarily require the opening of borders 
but rather the elimination of effects.  Policies have many components and the interplay 
between these various components needs to be examined as well for the negative effects 
they create.  It also leaves open the manner in which the negative effects of the policy 
might be mitigated.  Wilcox argued that we have not just a negative duty to stop harming, 
but a positive duty to admit whenever that is the only available remedy for the negative 
effects resulting from our actions.  Although this position is compatible with the 
consensus statement, it is not included because the numbers affected far exceed what can 
be admitted.  For this reason it is more likely that the requirement to consider the 
negative effects of immigration policies will result in more extensive aid obligations or 
other kinds of actions.  Consider again the problem of the brain drain effect, especially as 
experienced in sub-Saharan Africa.  Medical personnel in this area frequently relocate to 
parts of Western Europe and the United States to fill needs for medical personnel in these 
countries.  One possible resolution to this problem might be to cease recruitment of such 
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personnel, leaving the decision to relocate to be prompted solely by the choice of the 
individual.  Another proposal might be to recognize that when a physician or nurse is 
admitted to permanent residency that the receiving state has an obligation to ensure that 
additional medical personnel are trained in the sending country.
43
  This might strike some 
as odd since it implies training foreign personnel in foreign schools.  But if one 
recognizes that the receiving country could have trained its own personnel instead of 
using immigrants, the net cost to the receiving country is not significantly different.  Such 
an approach would permit movement but hopefully negate the deleterious effects of 
emigrants leaving their home countries without the implementation of the migration fee 
scheme proposed by Straubhaar.  In the case where movement has both positive and 
negative effects, the states involved must in some manner compensate for the deleterious 
effects in exchange for the beneficial effects of the movement.
44
 
While the focus in this section has been upon immigration control policies that 
directly affect the control of the border, the effects of policies downstream must also be 
taken into account and some action taken to minimize those effects which are negative.  
For example, to grant entry without a plan of integration might have as negative an 
impact on the individual as the denial of entry that leads a person to remain in a situation 
of endangerment.  The arrival of an immigrant in a foreign country, unable to navigate 
social systems, leaves that person subject to exploitation.  The proponents on all sides of 
the argument agree that to admit immigrants and not provide a path for integration to an 
                                                 
43
 A similar idea has been proposed by Gillian Brock, “Emigration, Losses and Burden-Sharing: Which 
Arrangements are Fair?, paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, 
Pacific Region, Seattle, Washington, April 4-7, 2012. 
44
 A more difficult case would be where it is the sending country that receives the benefit and the receiving 
country suffers the costs.  Such cases as the transfer of prisoners to their home country are such an 
example.  It seems in such cases that the two states must negotiate to balance the costs and benefits in a 





equal standing with existing citizens is unjust on the liberal account.  In addition to 
interaction with policies downstream, consideration must be given to the interaction of 
immigration control policies with other policies related to problems of population 
density.  How might immigration control policies affect policies regarding 
overpopulation or environmental degradation?  Do people moving around the world 
improve or aggravate these problems?  What happens if the policies increase or decrease 
the volume of remittances sent home?  How do the policies affect the spread of disease 
around the world?  These are just some of the problems that must be considered in 
determining what the negative effects of open or closed borders might be.  The problem 




 In this chapter I have developed a consensus position regarding border controls 
based upon the central moral concerns of the open borders debate.  This approach is 
modeled on the work of Wolff and de-Shalit related to the limited ability of egalitarian 
thought to influence public policy because there are many disparate accounts of equality 
available.  Wolff and de-Shalit proposed the development of a consensus position as a 
means to overcoming theoretical debates that are fractured or polarized in a manner that 
prevents them from influencing public policy.  The development of the consensus is the 
first step of a three-step process and captures the essential concerns of the debate.  I 
explored some of the issues related to developing this consensus and distinguished it 
from the idea of an overlapping consensus associated with John Rawls.   
I argued that the various arguments in the open borders debate are concerned with 





meaningful lives.  Developing this central concern into a consensus statement, I proposed 
that states have the right to control borders constrained by the obligation to give 
appropriate regard to the interests of citizens, noncitizens and states negatively affected 
by their policies.  I then explored four different aspects of the consensus.  First, I 
discussed that the state plays a prominent role in the consensus statement as the actor 
who possesses the authority to address the problems of immigration.  I then discussed the 
idea of constrained rights utilizing Miller’s distinction between basic and bare freedoms 
and Nozick’s idea of side constraints.  Thirdly, I explored the problem of interests, 
especially the idea that people have different kinds of interests that must be regarded as 
well as the interests of states in providing the context for the fulfillment of individual 
interests.  This consideration of interest extends to both citizens and noncitizens.  Finally, 
I explored the problem of negative effects, how to identify them and the need to 
distinguish them from the negative effects of other policies, the problem of measuring the 
effects and the problem of how to mitigate the negative effects.  
 The proposed consensus is not adequate to enable the specification of 
immigration policy.  It has simply pointed us in the direction of what is important in the 
debate that policy needs to address.  Just as it was necessary for Wolff and de-Shalit to 
develop a theoretical understanding of disadvantage as well as an understanding of how it 
was experienced by people prior to developing policy to address the condition of 
disadvantage, something similar needs to occur for the open border debate.  We need to 
have an understanding of state interests that are tied to legitimate state functionings and 
how to maintain them.  There must be a more complete accounting of legitimate 





policies so that it can be understood when those effects are negative in a manner that 
requires response.  It is obvious that the denial of movement affects a person, but that 
alone should not be understood, in most cases, as a negative effect to be eliminated.  If 
this were to be the case, then the only resolution is completely open borders.  These 
questions are significant and remain open for further investigation.  Undoubtedly, as this 
consensus statement is explored in the second and third steps of the process, the need to 








Our world struggles with the problems of immigration today.  In the words of 
Bhagwati it is “out of control.”1  Movement is permitted in some cases and denied in 
others, often for the most arcane of reasons.  Even when not obscure, the reasons behind 
such decisions lack moral clarity or justification.  That is the practical side of the 
problem.  The theoretical side of the debate is just as complicated.  If the basic 
commitment of liberal political theory is the equal moral standing of all individuals, how 
do we justify the presence of borders and their control such that individuals receive 
different consideration and treatment based solely upon their status as members of a 
particular political community?  Over the past 30 years scholars have debated the 
problem of borders and border controls from the perspective of liberal political theory.  
The creation of “insiders” and “outsiders” and the resulting inclusion and exclusion is 
troubling to some and represents a state of “liberal incoherence” that cannot be defended.  
Yet, it is vigorously defended by those who hold to this same basic liberal commitment.  
This ongoing debate has not resulted in any resolution to the question or influenced in a 
substantive manner national policies related to immigration control.  This thesis has 
attempted to bring a new focus to this debate by identifying the moral consensus found in 
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the debate which can be developed in a manner useful for influencing national 
immigration policies.   
 I only want to briefly here rehearse the argument that precedes this Chapter.  
After introducing the problem of borders from the perspective of liberalism I considered 
some of the most prominent arguments that have been offered in support of open and 
closed borders.  The claims for open borders rely upon different starting points but all end 
with the conclusion that liberalism cannot support closed borders.  This is the case 
because important principles for liberals, be they property rights, justice as fairness, 
utilitarianism, freedom of movement, freedom of association or common ownership of 
natural resources, when considered in light of the egalitarian, individualistic and rights 
based perspective of liberal thought, cannot be compromised without engaging in illiberal 
practices that deny people their rights.  I have argued that these arguments are flawed and 
do not lead to the conclusions their proponents claim.  Either alternative interpretations of 
central claims in their arguments exist that can be used to support closed borders to some 
degree, such as Carens’ interpretation of Nozick or Steiner’s use of Locke’s view of 
world ownership, or the proponent has not adequately considered the claim that is being 
made and the unconsidered aspects of that claim, such as the principle of the freedom of 
movement, indicate the starting point is much more constrained than initially thought. 
 The claim that states may close their borders shares the same central 
commitments of liberalism as the open borders school, yet reaches a different conclusion.  
The arguments are somewhat more diverse than those for open borders.  Walzer’s 
membership argument relies upon a theory of goods that requires that political 





function within society.  It is a necessity of both human nature and human society for 
closure that requires membership be controlled.  Miller’s argument from national identity 
relies upon the positive contribution which national identity makes to people’s lives to 
derive a right of political self-determination that includes moral commitments to 
compatriots that are more stringent than those to noncompatriots.  Wellman starts with a 
single principle, the freedom of association and argues that countries may exclude those 
with whom they do not want to associate.  As with the open borders arguments I argued 
that these arguments are flawed in ways that make them weaker than their proponents 
claim.  Walzer’s view of membership makes membership a dominant good, violating the 
conception of justice he develops.  Miller’s view is troubling to the extent that his 
reliance upon moral particularism leads us to make moral decisions that compromise the 
commitments we have to all people.  Wellman conflates the idea of association as 
constitutive of self-determination and the idea that it is just an aspect of it.  Wellman 
further confuses the manner in which association has value in personal lives as opposed 
to political relations, where the lack of association undermines people’s well being.  The 
result is that borders must be more open than is claimed. 
 I also considered a set of nonideal arguments that make the claim that in the 
absence of theoretical agreement, the need to resolve the great suffering in the world that 
many experience requires that we open our borders to those in need.  Some claim that 
immigration is more effective than aid.  I examined this argument from the perspective of 
Whelan and rejected the argument as being inadequate because there is evidence that aid 
is effective and the number of those who might use migration over aid is so large that 





of Harm.  Her theory is problematic in its details and cannot, in any manner, provide 
relief to a substantial number of people needing assistance in the world today nor provide 
any long-term guidance in the development of immigration policies.  I also examined two 
proposals for international regimes for the control of movement between states.  I 
rejected both proposals as either unworkable in their present state because of problems of 
complexity and enforcement or inadequate because of their overwhelming reliance upon 
troubling economic measures. 
 Finally, I proposed that our consideration of this issue will benefit from the 
identification of a moral consensus that captures about the central concern of the debate 
and that can be explored in a manner that will influence policy.  In this approach I 
utilized the three-step model used by Wolff and de-Shalit related to the debates regarding 
egalitarianism which first identifies the consensus, then explores the consensus both 
theoretically and how it is experienced by people and finally develops policy 
recommendations to resolve the problems identified.  This thesis focuses on the first step 
of the process, as it is essential to the overall project of resolving immigration issues.  
 I proposed the following consensus: 
The right of states to control their borders is constrained by the moral 
obligation of a state to give appropriate regard to the interests of both 
itself and other states and of individuals (both inside and outside state 
borders, without regard for citizenship) affected by their immigration 






The central concern of the theorists in this debate is the effects of immigration control 
policies upon individual lives.  This consensus captures this concern.  It claims that state 
control of borders is constrained by the obligation to consider and eliminate the negative 
effects of those controls upon the interests of the local state and other states as well as 
people both inside and outside the border.  By including the interests of other states and 
individuals outside the border, the consensus expresses the concerns of both sides of the 
debate and balances the role of moral particularism and moral universalism. 
 This consensus statement is by no means a final word as it represents only the 
first step of the process modeled by Wolff and de-Shalit.  Understanding what are 
legitimate interests of individuals and states needs exploration.  How can these interests 
be balanced against one another?  How do we measure the effects of state actions?  How 
are these effects actually experienced in the world?  How do we distinguish those effects 
that are due directly to migration policies from those that are caused by other policies and 
institutions?  This consensus doesn’t tell us, nor do I think it will ever tell us, what 
migration policies ought to be between particular countries.  There is also no simple yes 
or no answer to questions regarding the control of borders.  Yet this consensus is a crucial 
element; it aims to establish a view of migration that reflects the liberal commitment to 
the equal moral worth of all people which applies to a truly global view of migration.  It 
is also important to note that as a view based upon the commitments of liberalism it can 
be rejected by those who do not share those commitments.  People and states which do 
not share the perspective of liberalism will need some other argument to agree to any 





order to disorder is in everybody’s interests and will benefit those people and states that 
are hesitant.   
The discussion regarding the status of borders is today vigorous and dynamic, yet 
it continues to move along the same dividing line that was initially established.  I have 
attempted in this thesis to overcome that divide.  If that can be accomplished, it will be 
possible to move the consideration of borders forward such that immigration policy can 
be modified to reflect a more just world, which is the proper goal of our concerns 
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